CVE-2026-81885 is a medium severity vulnerability in radare2 prior to version 6.2.0. The issue involves the NE relocation fixup-chain parser, which lacks iteration limits or cycle detection when processing relocation entries. An attacker can trigger a denial of service by opening a crafted NE executable that causes the parser to repeatedly allocate resources indefinitely, leading to excessive CPU and memory consumption. This vulnerability is fixed in radare2 version 6.2.0.
CVE-2026-86317 is a medium severity vulnerability in ggml-org llama.cpp up to version 0.4.0. It affects the RPC Server component, specifically the rpc_server::deserialize_tensor function. The vulnerability arises from a reachable assertion triggered by manipulation of the argument 'ne'. This flaw can be exploited remotely without authentication or user interaction.
n8n versions prior to 1.123.69, 2.33.4, and 2.34.1 contain a NoSQL injection vulnerability in the MongoDB node's Find, Delete, and Aggregate operations. The vulnerability arises because the Query parameter is parsed as JSON after expression resolution without sanitizing MongoDB operators, allowing injection of special operators like $ne or $where. This can lead to unauthorized full-collection disclosure, deletion, or other database operations.
CVE-2026-16767 is a path traversal vulnerability in Ne-Lexa php-zip affecting versions 4.0.0, 4.0.1, and 4.0.2. The issue exists in the ZipFile::extractTo function of src/ZipFile.php, where manipulation of the entryName argument allows an attacker to perform path traversal. The vulnerability can be exploited remotely without authentication. The vulnerability has a medium severity score of 6.9. No official patch or remediation has been published yet, and the vendor has not responded to the issue report.
Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, an unauthenticated network attacker obtains a valid Rocket.Chat OAuth access token for an arbitrary user by sending a single HTTP POST with MongoDB query operators to /oauth/token. The Rocket.Chat OAuth2 server does not validate that grant parameters are strings before forwarding them to findOne({...}) against the oauth_apps and oauth_access_tokens collections, so an attacker substitutes {"$ne": null} for client_id, client_secret, and refresh_token and receives a freshly minted {access_token, refresh_token} pair bound to whichever user's refresh token Mongo returned first. The resulting access token is a first-class bearer credential against the full /api/v1/* surface as that user. By iterating with $nin / $regex operators the attacker walks the entire oauth_access_tokens collection, collecting one fresh access token per user per request. If any matched token belongs to an admin, the stolen bearer gives full admin API access (including Apps-Engine app installation, i.e. server-side code execution). No account, credentials, userId, or prior interaction with the instance are required. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11.
Rocket.Chat is an open-source, secure, fully customizable communications platform. Prior to 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11, Rocket.Chat's CAS login handler forwards the client-supplied options.cas.credentialToken value straight into a MongoDB findOne({_id: ...}) query without any runtime type check. TypeScript's string parameter annotation is erased at runtime, so an unauthenticated attacker can substitute a MongoDB query operator ({"$gt": ""}, {"$ne": null}, etc.) for what the server expects to be an opaque ticket string. The injected operator matches the first unexpired document in the credential_tokens collection, bypassing the CAS ticket check entirely. When any legitimate CAS or SAML SSO login is in flight, the attacker's next DDP login call matches the same credential-token row via the NoSQL operator and is issued a full Meteor auth token (userId + token) bound to the victim. The token is immediately usable against the complete REST and DDP surface as that user. If the victim is an administrator, this escalates to full instance compromise via Apps-Engine app install. This vulnerability is fixed in 8.5.0, 8.4.1, 8.3.3, 8.2.3, 8.1.4, 8.0.5, 7.13.7, and 7.10.11.
## Summary
`JWSVerifier::getAlgorithm()` in `src/Library/Signature/JWSVerifier.php` (line 144) merges protected and unprotected headers using PHP's spread operator:
```php
$completeHeader = [...$signature->getProtectedHeader(), ...$signature->getHeader()];
```
In PHP, when spreading arrays with duplicate string keys, the **last array's values take precedence**. Since the unprotected header (`getHeader()`) is spread second, an attacker can override the integrity-protected `alg` parameter by placing a different value in the unprotected header.
This creates a Time-of-Check/Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability:
1. `HeaderCheckerManager` validates `alg` from the **protected** header
2. `JWSVerifier` uses `alg` from the **unprotected** header for actual verification
The same issue exists in `JWEDecrypter.php` (lines 120-124) where `array_merge()` exhibits the same last-wins behavior for `alg` and `enc`.
## Affected Code
**JWSVerifier.php line 144** — Spread operator merge order allows unprotected header to override `alg`:
```php
$completeHeader = [...$signature->getProtectedHeader(), ...$signature->getHeader()];
```
**JWEDecrypter.php lines 120-124** — `array_merge()` with same last-wins behavior:
```php
$completeHeader = array_merge(
$jwe->getSharedProtectedHeader(),
$jwe->getSharedHeader(),
$recipient->getHeader()
);
```
## Attack Vectors
### Vector A — Mixed key sets (HIGH probability)
If the application uses a JWKSet containing keys of different types (common in multi-tenant or federation scenarios), the JWSVerifier iterates all keys (line 86). An attacker can force a different algorithm that matches a different key in the set.
### Vector B — alg ONLY in unprotected header (HIGH probability)
If `alg` is placed EXCLUSIVELY in the unprotected header (not in the protected header at all), `HeaderCheckerManager::checkDuplicatedHeaderParameters()` does NOT trigger. The JSON Flattened/General serializers allow tokens with no protected header or a protected header without `alg`. RFC 7515 Section 4.1.1 states `alg` MUST be integrity-protected, but the library does not enforce this.
### Vector C — Direct JWSVerifier usage (HIGH probability)
`JWSLoader` takes `?HeaderCheckerManager` (nullable). If developers use `JWSVerifier` directly or create `JWSLoader` without a `HeaderCheckerManager`, the duplicate header check never runs.
## Contrast with JWSBuilder (safe)
`JWSBuilder::findSignatureAlgorithm()` (line 196) uses `[...$header, ...$protectedHeader]` where protected wins. It also has `checkDuplicatedHeaderParameters()` (line 218). The JWSVerifier has **neither** safeguard.
## Proof of Concept
```php
<?php
// Demonstrate algorithm override via unprotected header
$protected = ["alg" => "RS256", "typ" => "JWT"];
$unprotected = ["alg" => "HS256"];
$merged = [...$protected, ...$unprotected];
// $merged["alg"] === "HS256" — unprotected wins!
// JSON Flattened JWS with algorithm override:
$maliciousJws = json_encode([
'payload' => base64url_encode($payload),
'protected' => base64url_encode('{"alg":"RS256"}'),
'header' => ['alg' => 'HS256'], // OVERRIDE
'signature' => base64url_encode($sig),
]);
// HeaderCheckerManager validates RS256 from protected header -> PASS
// JWSVerifier uses HS256 from unprotected header -> attacker's algorithm choice
```
A full working PoC demonstrating HS512-to-HS256 downgrade with mixed keysets is available upon request.
## Suggested Fix
In `JWSVerifier::getAlgorithm()`, read `alg` exclusively from the protected header:
```php
private function getAlgorithm(Signature $signature): Algorithm
{
$protectedHeader = $signature->getProtectedHeader();
if (! isset($protectedHeader['alg'])) {
throw new InvalidArgumentException('The "alg" parameter must be in the protected header.');
}
return $this->signatureAlgorithmManager->get($protectedHeader['alg']);
}
```
For `JWEDecrypter`, reverse the merge order so protected header wins, or extract `alg`/`enc` exclusively from the protected header.
## Résolution
Un correctif a été préparé sur une branche dédiée basée sur `3.4.x`, avec des tests anti-régression dédiés (fork privé temporaire de cette advisory, PR #1).
**JWS algorithm confusion** — `JWSVerifier` lit le paramètre `alg` exclusivement dans le header protégé en intégrité (RFC 7515 §4.1.1) ; un `alg` placé dans le header non protégé ne peut plus surcharger l'algorithme signé.
**Validation :** `php -l` OK, PHPUnit vert, aucune nouvelle erreur PHPStan introduite (différentiel nul vs `3.4.x`), aucun commentaire ajouté dans le code source. Après merge, cascade prévue `3.4.x → 4.0.x → 4.1.x`.
Mongoose is a MongoDB object modeling tool designed to work in an asynchronous environment. Prior to 6.13.9, 7.8.9, 8.22.1, and 9.1.6, a vulnerability allows bypassing Mongoose’s sanitizeFilter query sanitization mechanism via the $nor operator. When sanitizeFilter is enabled, Mongoose wraps query operators in $eq to neutralize them. However, prior to the fix, $nor was not included in the set of logical operators that are recursively sanitized. Because $nor accepts an array (like $and and $or), and arrays do not trigger hasDollarKeys(), malicious operators such as $ne, $gt, or $regex could be injected inside a $nor clause without being sanitized. This vulnerability is fixed in 6.13.9, 7.8.9, 8.22.1, and 9.1.6.
CVE-2024-21802 is a heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the GGUF library's info->ne functionality within llama.cpp (commit 18c2e17). A specially crafted .gguf file can trigger this flaw, potentially allowing code execution if an attacker provides a malicious file.