Search: CVE-2026-42208

### Impact A database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted `Authorization` header to any LLM API route (for example `POST /chat/completions`) and reach this query through the proxy's error-handling path. An attacker could read data from the proxy's database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages. ### Patches Fixed in **`1.83.7`**. The caller-supplied value is now always passed to the database as a separate parameter. Upgrade to `1.83.7` or later. ### Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, set `disable_error_logs: true` under `general_settings`. This removes the path through which unauthenticated input reaches the vulnerable query. ### References - Patched release: [`v1.83.7-stable`](https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/releases/tag/v1.83.7-stable) **Discovery Credit**: Tencent YunDing Security Lab

Researchers uncovered an AI-driven intrusion ecosystem operated by affiliates of INC and The Gentlemen ransomware groups via seven exposed command-and-control servers. The operators integrated commercial AI models, exploited edge devices at scale, and compromised thousands of targets, primarily in the US industrial manufacturing and healthcare sectors. The infrastructure included multiple custom encryptor builds and evidence of active victim encryption. Operational security failures exposed source code, credentials, AI session logs, and victim data. The campaign demonstrates advanced ransomware-as-a-service operations leveraging AI and custom tooling.

Malware#simplehelp#phantom frameworkUnited States