The npm package dsh-plugin-blender-3d version 0.2.1 contains a malicious postinstall script that downloads and executes a payload installing an XMRig cryptocurrency miner and persistent backdoors. The malware installs systemd units or cron jobs for persistence and mines Monero using a hardcoded wallet. If run with root or passwordless sudo, it achieves full persistent agent installation with stealthy system-component-like binaries and relay/tor channels. The package is considered fully compromising to any host where installed.
A cryptomining botnet compromised 3,562 Redis servers by exploiting unauthenticated Redis instances using rogue replication to inject cron jobs that deployed XMRig miners. The affected Redis versions range from 2.8.17 to 7.2.0 across various Linux distributions, indicating misconfiguration rather than a software vulnerability. The attacker toolkit, exposed via an open directory, contained exploit source code, campaign logs, and Windows registry hives. Additional attack vectors targeting WordPress, MongoDB, and SSH were included but did not result in confirmed compromises. The operation mined Monero using a wallet linked to the operator's own systems. Meterpreter deployment capabilities were also observed, extending the operator's activity timeline. No known exploits in the wild or vendor patches are documented.
The net-util-y8 npm package contains a malicious payload hidden in its package.json description field. This payload is a large base64-encoded POSIX shell script that acts as a dropper for the XMRig Monero miner. The script attempts to ensure required tools are installed with root privileges, downloads XMRig binaries from suspicious sources, and configures the miner to connect to a specific Monero mining pool using a hardcoded wallet address. It also includes functionality to kill competing miners and obfuscate its process name. This package appears to be part of a multi-package cryptomining campaign using payload smuggling techniques to evade detection.
The npm package 'cbc97b7a' contains a malicious payload embedded in its description field as a large base64-encoded POSIX shell script. When decoded and executed, this script downloads and installs an xmrig cryptominer that mines Monero cryptocurrency using a hardcoded mining pool and wallet. It establishes persistence via cron jobs and uses multiple fallback command-and-control IP addresses. The package itself contains no legitimate code files, only the malicious script hidden in metadata, designed to be executed by a companion loader fetching the package metadata and piping it to a shell. Any system with this package installed should be considered fully compromised, and all secrets on that system should be rotated from a separate, clean machine.
The PyPI package 'btcflx' version 0.1.0 is a malicious library that, upon import, searches for Monero cryptocurrency wallet directories on the user's system, terminates related processes to unlock files, archives the wallet data, and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot. The package disguises itself as an HTTP speed-up library, misleading users about its true intent. It also sends status messages about the wallet discovery to the same Telegram bot. This behavior constitutes clear malicious activity aimed at stealing cryptocurrency wallet data.
The PyPI package 'btcflip' version 0.1.0 is a malicious library that, upon import, archives the user's Monero cryptocurrency wallet directory and exfiltrates it to a hardcoded Telegram bot. The package disguises itself as an HTTP speed-up library but contains code that terminates Monero-related processes to release file locks before stealing wallet files. The exfiltration target and wallet paths are obfuscated using base64 encoding. This behavior occurs immediately when the package is imported, making any use of the package a direct compromise of Monero wallet security.
The kotoraka package on PyPI is a malicious package that, upon import, exfiltrates cryptocurrency wallet files from the user's system. It targets Monero wallet directories, terminates related processes to release file locks, archives the wallet data, and uploads it to a Telegram bot using hardcoded credentials. The package falsely declares itself as an HTTP speed-up library, but its actual behavior is data theft triggered immediately on import without user interaction.
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## Source: amazon-inspector (2cce5614817c010bad6d6bd86146713b627ad235b87d9ccd341bd3d996a80119)
wellnpm@2.0.9 ships a 24MB ELF binary named `launch` which is the XMRig Monero miner (RandomX, cn/upx2, ghostrider algorithm strings, libuv/OpenSSL linkage, hashvault pool references). `package.json` declares `"main": "launch"` and `"scripts.start": "./launch"`, so running `npm start` on this package immediately launches the miner. A bundled `config.json` is pre-configured against `pool.hashvault.pro:80` with the hardcoded recipient wallet `4AUTfJGTvT8A98PSE99EunfrnUbkWe9vU3FN3qsABQLP5aPKQuvWS5sCaD9WaXFQUqNtDLb9dcxiBgJiWCfjvDXp5ptWDYG`, so all hashrate from victim machines is credited to the author. A second `scripts.deploy` script targets Android Termux: it moves `libuv.so` into `/data/data/com.termux/files/usr/lib`, chmod+x's the `xmr` and `edit` shell wrappers, and copies them into `/data/data/com.termux/files/usr/bin` so the miner becomes a persistent, PATH-resolvable command in the user's Termux environment. The wrappers themselves are one-liners that `cd node_modules/wellnpm && npm start`. README does not mention mining; metadata is placeholder (`author: Your Name <wellenterprise81.gmail.com>`, `description: A brief description of your package`). This is a cryptojacking dropper masquerading as an npm module.
## Source: ghsa-malware (8e91f40e7af1730f15a357bb3074c7d208765ba41598c35373ed5b3b374d607a)
Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.