Astro is a web framework for content-driven websites. Prior to 7.4.5, Astro rendered a string used as a dynamic element name as raw HTML after applying an incomplete character filter. A / in the string could make an HTML parser treat the remainder as attributes, allowing untrusted element-name input to inject event-handler markup. The .astro dynamic-tag renderer, JSX renderer, and MDX renderer were affected, and exploitation required an application to use request-controlled or stored untrusted data as all or part of an element name. This issue is fixed in version 7.4.5.
Astro is a web framework for content-driven websites. From 7.0.0 until 7.0.6, the composable astro/hono pipeline installs security.checkOrigin only through the middleware() primitive, while actions() and pages() can dispatch to user code independently. Mounting actions() before middleware(), as in the examples/advanced-routing example and Cloudflare Hono documentation, allows cross-origin form-encoded action requests to execute before the origin check, and using pages() without middleware() drops the check for on-demand endpoints and pages. The flaw enables blind write-only cross-site request forgery using the victim's cookies against ActionHandler.handle and PagesHandler.handleWithErrorFallback when manifest.checkOrigin is enabled; the attacker can trigger a state-mutating action or endpoint handler but cannot read the cross-origin response. The default non-composable astro() pipeline is not affected. This issue is fixed in version 7.0.6.
Astro is a web framework. Astro versions prior to 6.1.10 used AES-GCM encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of server island props and slots parameters, but did not bind the ciphertext to its intended component or parameter type. An attacker could replay one component's encrypted props (p) value as another component's slots (s) value, or vice versa. Since slots contain raw unescaped HTML while props may contain user-controlled values, this could lead to XSS in applications. This occurs when the application uses server islands, two different server island components share the same key name for a prop and a slot, and an attacker has full control over the value of the overlapping prop (requires a dynamically rendered page). This vulnerability is fixed in 6.1.10.
A security flaw has been discovered in TimBroddin astro-mcp-server up to 1.1.1. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file src/index.ts of the component MCP Tool Query Construction. Performing a manipulation of the argument request.params.arguments results in sql injection. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.
Astro is a web framework. Prior to version 9.5.4, Server-Side Rendered pages that return an error with a prerendered custom error page (eg. `404.astro` or `500.astro`) are vulnerable to SSRF. If the `Host:` header is changed to an attacker's server, it will be fetched on `/500.html` and they can redirect this to any internal URL to read the response body through the first request. An attacker who can access the application without `Host:` header validation (eg.through finding the origin IP behind a proxy, or just by default) can fetch their own server to redirect to any internal IP. With this they can fetch cloud metadata IPs and interact with services in the internal network or localhost. For this to be vulnerable, a common feature needs to be used, with direct access to the server (no proxies). Version 9.5.4 fixes the issue.
Astro is a web framework. Prior to version 5.14.2, Astro reflects the value in `X-Forwarded-Host` in output when using `Astro.url` without any validation. It is common for web servers such as nginx to route requests via the `Host` header, and forward on other request headers. As such as malicious request can be sent with both a `Host` header and an `X-Forwarded-Host` header where the values do not match and the `X-Forwarded-Host` header is malicious. Astro will then return the malicious value. This could result in any usages of the `Astro.url` value in code being manipulated by a request. For example if a user follows guidance and uses `Astro.url` for a canonical link the canonical link can be manipulated to another site. It is theoretically possible that the value could also be used as a login/registration or other form URL as well, resulting in potential redirecting of login credentials to a malicious party. As this is a per-request attack vector the surface area would only be to the malicious user until one considers that having a caching proxy is a common setup, in which case any page which is cached could persist the malicious value for subsequent users. Many other frameworks have an allowlist of domains to validate against, or do not have a case where the headers are reflected to avoid such issues. This could affect anyone using Astro in an on-demand/dynamic rendering mode behind a caching proxy. Version 5.14.2 contains a fix for the issue.