In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: deny access for an empty DACL instead of granting the request
smb_check_perm_dacl() returns the access mask it computes to the SMB2
CREATE handler, which uses it as the granted access for the open. For a
security descriptor whose DACL is present but contains no ACEs, the
function is supposed to deny access: an empty (non-NULL) DACL grants no
access to anyone except the object owner's implicit READ_CONTROL and
WRITE_DAC (MS-DTYP 2.4.5).
The empty-DACL branch only denies when both
- the DACL has no trailing bytes (pdacl_size == sizeof(struct smb_acl)),
and
- the request contains bits beyond READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC.
In every other case it takes the shared "goto err_out" with rc still 0,
which returns success without modifying *pdaccess, so the caller grants
the full requested access. Three problems follow:
- The READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC carve-out models the owner's implicit
rights, but the check runs before is_owner is computed, so those
rights are handed to *every* caller, not just the owner. For
READ_CONTROL the SMB2 CREATE path does not fall back to
inode_permission(), so any user can read the security descriptor of
an object whose empty DACL is meant to deny them.
- A request of exactly READ_CONTROL and/or WRITE_DAC is granted to any
caller. WRITE_DAC lets the handle rewrite the DACL.
- A DACL that declares zero ACEs but carries trailing bytes
(pdacl_size > sizeof(struct smb_acl)) skips the deny entirely and is
granted whatever was requested.
On shares where the NT ACL is the authoritative access control -- e.g.
"force user" shares, where every client maps to one POSIX identity so
POSIX cannot distinguish users -- this is an access-control bypass.
Compute is_owner before the empty-DACL branch and deny access from an
empty DACL unless the caller is the owner requesting no more than
READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: ipu-bridge: Fix use-after-free in IVSC error path
ipu_bridge_get_ivsc_acpi_dev() returns an ACPI device with a reference
held. If no matching CSI device is found, ipu_bridge_check_ivsc_dev()
drops that reference before passing the device to dev_err(). Concurrent
CSI device and ACPI namespace removal can drop the other references,
making this the final put. dev_err() then reads the freed struct
acpi_device and its kobject name.
This was reproduced without kprobes by racing normal CSI platform-device
unregistration and ACPI configfs table removal against the production
ipu_bridge_init() entry. KASAN reported the final free through
device_release(), followed by invalid reads through _dev_err().
Emit the error message while the lookup reference is still held, then
drop the reference as before.
Source reproducers and vulnerable/fixed serial logs, with only the build
hostname redacted, are available at:
https://github.com/kimaiden1984-boop/linux-ipu-bridge-acpi-uaf-reproducer
The fixed target builds with W=1 on x86-64. This was not tested on
physical IPU hardware. The tests establish runtime reachability but do
not measure occurrence frequency on shipping systems or establish
exploitability.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails
aie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a
failed start frees it again:
hwctx->priv->mbox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev->mbox);
...
ret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann, ...);
if (ret)
goto free_channel;
...
free_channel:
xdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann);
hwctx->priv->mbox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That
pointer is the driver's own test for whether a hardware context has a
usable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL,
aie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message
helpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them.
It matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls
aie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live,
after aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context
survives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return
value entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is
left is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every
later user of it takes the non-NULL branch:
- the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed
channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(),
- a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() ->
aie2_destroy_context(),
- closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() ->
aie2_release_resource() -> xrs_release_resource() ->
aie2_xrs_unload() -> aie2_destroy_context(),
and aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel()
followed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already
freed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel.
The AIE4 management channel already does this correctly -
aie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev->aie.mgmt_chann right after freeing
it. Do the same here.
The create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails,
xrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling
->unload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx->priv, so the stale pointer
never outlives the structure holding it.
Starting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer
sizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and
request_irq() can fail.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: khugepaged: fix swap entry value to folio_pfn()
Patch series "mm: khugepaged: fix tracepoint UAF", v5.
The khugepaged tracepoints take a folio pointer and call folio_pfn(), but
by then the folio may no longer be valid: freed after folio_put(),
folio_unlock() or pte_unmap_unlock(), or not a folio at all but an
xarray-encoded swap entry. On classic SPARSEMEM, dereferencing it oopses
khugepaged as soon as the trace event is enabled; on other memory models
it merely prints a bogus pfn.
Pass the pfn to the tracepoints directly, captured while the folio is
still pinned, closing the use-after-free windows in
mm_khugepaged_scan_file(), mm_khugepaged_scan_pmd() and
mm_khugepaged_collapse_file().
This patch (of 3):
When the swap entries found exceed max_ptes_swap, the loop is left via
break with folio still holding the xarray value that encodes the swap
entry, not valid folio pointer.
That value is passed to trace_mm_khugepaged_scan_file(), which feeds it to
folio_pfn(). On FLATMEM and SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, the page_to_pfn() is plain
pointer arithmetic, so the trace event merely prints bogus scan_pfn. On
classic SPARSEMEM, the page_to_pfn() reads page->flags, dereferencing the
tiny encoded integer and oopsing khugepaged whenever the trace event is
enabled.
So when folio is the swap entry value, simply set pfn to -1, just like
exhausted scan naturally.
And the folio_put() has maybe dropped the last reference of folio. The
trace_mm_khugepaged_scan_file() is left with a dangling folio pointer. so
using the folio_pfn() before dropping the reference, closing
use-after-free window.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: spi-pci1xxxx: quiesce DMA engines on transfer timeout
If a DMA-mapped transfer times out waiting for DMA_TERM and neither DMA
abort interrupt arrived, pci1xxxx_spi_transfer_with_dma() returns
through the error label while both DMA engines are still enabled, the
done/abort interrupt status is still armed and the transfer state
(p->xfer, p->tx_sgl, p->rx_sgl) is still registered.
The ISRs keep firing afterwards: they reprogram the DMA engines from
p->tx_sgl / p->rx_sgl and signal completion through p->xfer and
p->spi_xfer_done, all of which the SPI core is free to unmap or reuse
once transfer_one() has returned, which is a use-after-free. A late
done interrupt can also start the next transfer queued behind the
failed one.
Stop both DMA engines, drain the pending done/abort interrupt status
and synchronize the DMA IRQs before dropping the in-progress state and
the transfer pointers, and re-enable the engines afterwards so that
subsequent transfers keep working. The engines are only turned back on
once both were confirmed to have stopped: re-enabling an engine that
failed to stop would cancel the pending stop request and let it keep
running into buffers the SPI core is about to unmap or free, which is
exactly the window this patch closes. An engine that failed to stop is
left disabled, as the abort paths already do.
The DMA interrupt status and mask registers are shared between the two
SPI instances, so the cleanup drains only this instance's done/abort
status bits instead of masking the interrupt lines, which would also
suppress the peer instance's completion interrupts.
Also make the DMA ISRs ignore interrupts while no transfer is in
progress so that a stray MSI after the cleanup can no longer act on
the cleared state.
No PCI1XXXX hardware was available for testing and QEMU has no model
of this PCIe part, so the timeout path was exercised with a userspace
replica of the timeout branch and the DMA ISRs, with the register and
interrupt accesses mocked: on the unfixed code both a wedged engine
that clears after the timeout and a late done interrupt touch the
freed transfer state, while with this fix applied neither does and an
engine that failed to stop is left disabled. The module was also
loaded and unloaded in a QEMU x86_64 guest running a kernel with this
fix applied.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: bound inode fork length against the fork size during log recovery
xlog_recover_inode_commit_pass2() copies an inode log item's data/attr
fork region into the inode buffer using the on-log region length without
bounding it against the fork capacity, e.g.:
len = item->ri_buf[2].iov_len;
memcpy(XFS_DFORK_DPTR(dip), src, len);
The only guard is an ASSERT, which is a no-op on production kernels
(CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG off), and xfs_dinode_verify() runs only after the copy.
A crafted image with a dirty log can therefore drive a heap out-of-bounds
write at mount time. The XFS_ILOG_DBROOT sibling already passes
XFS_DFORK_DSIZE as a bound; the DDATA/DEXT and ADATA/AEXT memcpy paths
did not.
Bound each logged fork region against the destination fork size before
copying it, and reject the log item with -EFSCORRUPTED when it does not
fit. Because the recovered inode is only verified after the fork data has
been copied in, the checks are done up front, before any memcpy into the
on-disk inode.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate NT transaction response layout and offsets
validate_ntransact() assumes that the response uses the fixed 18-word NT
transaction layout. A different WordCount makes get_bcc() locate the byte
count at a different offset from pSMBr->ByteCount, allowing the subsequent
bounds checks to use inconsistent response boundaries.
The function also turns the 32-bit ParameterOffset and DataOffset fields
into pointers before checking their bounds. On a 32-bit client, a large
offset can wrap the pointer below end_of_smb and pass the one-sided pointer
comparison. The caller then dereferences the parameter pointer or copies
from the data pointer.
Require the expected WordCount before reading the byte count. Check each
offset and count against the received SMB length as integers before forming
either pointer. Use subtraction after validating the offset so that the
range checks cannot overflow.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Do not send CB_RECALL_ANY to NFSv4.0 clients
deleg_reaper() sends CB_RECALL_ANY to every ACTIVE client holding
delegations, but CB_RECALL_ANY is an NFSv4.1 operation. An NFSv4.0
client's callback service accepts only CB_GETATTR and CB_RECALL, so it
replies OP_ILLEGAL. The decoder maps the unexpected opnum to -EIO, and
nfsd4_cb_done() marks the client's callback channel down.
Nothing brings the channel back. nfsd4_run_cb_work() sets NFSD4_CB_UP
only for a minor version above zero, and the only nfsd4_probe_callback()
call site an NFSv4.0 client reaches is nfsd4_setclientid_confirm(). One
visit from the reaper therefore leaves the channel marked down until the
client re-establishes its clientid. RENEW then returns
NFS4ERR_CB_PATH_DOWN for as long as the client holds delegations.
nfsd4_cb_channel_good() stops returning true, so the client is granted
no further delegations.
Skip clients at minor version zero.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Don't complete a cld upcall the daemon has not read
cld_pipe_downcall() matches a reply to its upcall on the xid alone.
A write that arrives before the daemon has read that upcall
completes __cld_pipe_upcall() while its struct rpc_pipe_msg is still
queued on the pipe. The waiter returns, its stack frame goes away,
and the pipe keeps a list_head that points into it. The next
rpc_queue_upcall() walks that pointer:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in __list_add_valid_or_report
Read of size 8 at addr ffffc90007027950 by task syz.0.96/13066
__list_add_valid_or_report+0x6a/0x130
rpc_queue_upcall
cld_pipe_upcall
nfsd4_cld_grace_start
nfsd4_cld_tracking_init
The pipe is mode 0600 in rpc_pipefs, so the trigger is a broken or
hostile nfsdcld rather than an unprivileged task.
Record whether the daemon has consumed the whole message and
complete only when it has. cld_pipe_destroy_msg() runs on every path
by which the pipe releases a message, so it can maintain that flag
under cn_lock. nfsdcld sends its -EINPROGRESS downcalls only after
reading the upcall, so the new check does not break the GraceStart
record stream.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Copy the deferred RPC Call from the head buffer
svc_defer() snapshots the RPC Call for replay once a pending cache
upcall resolves. It copies the Call starting (rq_arg.len -
head[0].iov_len) bytes before head[0].iov_base, a back-up that once
covered a transport header. No transport has had one since commit
983084b2672c ("SUNRPC: Remove svc_rqst::rq_xprt_hlen"), so the two
lengths are meant to be equal.
An RPCSEC_GSS Call breaks that assumption. Unwrapping the integrity
service truncates rq_arg.len by the length of the trailing checksum,
and unwrapping the privacy service leaves rq_arg.len short by an
amount the client sets with trailing bytes after the wrap token.
Neither adjusts head[0].iov_len. Both lengths are size_t, so the
subtraction underflows and the copy starts past head[0].iov_base.
Every deferred integrity Call replays a shifted snapshot.
A deferred replay skips GSS verification, so a shifted snapshot runs
as an authenticated Call. With the privacy service the offset is
client-chosen. A forged Call placed in that window, naming another
user's GSS context handle, runs under that identity.
Copy the Call from head[0].iov_base. Refuse to defer a Call whose
length runs past the head buffer, so the copy cannot read out of
bounds.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: rebind completed CREATE replays without draining the old channel
A completed DurableHandleReqV2 CREATE can be replayed through another
channel while its original channel is exiting. The existing replay path
returns the open but leaves its connection and oplock references pointing
at the old channel. Its open count also stays on that channel, and a
later CLOSE through the surviving channel decrements the wrong counter.
After checking the owner, lease key and persistent flag, verify that an
active open is still published in the requesting session's file table.
Do this even when no oplock was granted, and before processing a consumed
replay. Do not read a borrowed opinfo session pointer for this check.
Keep a healthy original binding. If the original channel is exiting or
releasing, move the open and its own oplock references to the requesting
channel. Serialize this with CLOSE using the session file-table lock,
and with detach, reconnect and notification snapshots using m_lock.
The earlier lock index and lease-table changes make their lifetimes
independent of this connection change. No old-channel r_count wait is
needed, including when an unrelated request remains active there.
Account final close against fp->conn in one place, balance durable detach
and reconnect, and transfer the count with a replay binding change. A
final global lookup put may run after CLOSE has removed the volatile id;
unlink the open from the inode list on that final close as well.
A live completed CREATE replay may follow a break that lowered the
durable open's batch oplock. Apply the batch eligibility check only to
detached reconnects, while retaining the owner, lease key and persistent
flag checks for active replays.
Gogs versions up to 0.14.4 have an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows collaborators with write access to push commits to protected branches by merging pull requests. This occurs because the MergePullRequest function bypasses branch protection checks and the PullRequest.Merge function omits hook environment variables, enabling unauthorized merges into branches restricted to allowlisted users.
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A remote code execution vulnerability exists in JetBrains TeamCity versions before 2026.2.1 and 2026.1.5. The flaw is due to a UI patches callback in the Kotlin DSL sandbox, allowing an attacker with limited privileges to execute arbitrary code remotely without user interaction. The vulnerability has a high severity score of 8.8 CVSS v3.1.
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