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8 threats
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| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | 5.3 | EPSS 0.4% | CVE-2026-55414nl-portal-backend-libraries · Missing Authorization Medium5.3EPSS 0.4%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-55414 NL Portal Backend Libraries provide backend components for Dutch government portals that interact with residents, customers, suppliers, and partner organizations. From 1.1.0 until 3.0.4, and in 3.1.0, the public getFormDefinitionByObjectenApiUrl and deprecated getFormDefinitionById GraphQL resolvers are reachable without CommonGroundAuthentication and forward a caller-influenced URL through ObjectenApiService.getObjectByUrl to ObjectsApiClient.getObjectByUrl, which attaches the privileged Objecten-API token. The host-equality check restricts requests to the configured Objecten-API host but does not constrain the scheme, port, or path, allowing an unauthenticated caller to induce a token-bearing request to a chosen endpoint on that host. Standard deployments are not exposed to cross-host SSRF, token capture requires attacker-controlled routing on the configured host, and typed deserialization limits returned data to objects shaped like form definitions. The 3.0 release line is fixed in version 3.0.4. The advisory does not identify a fixed 3.1 release. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Between late September 2025 and early April 2026, the threat group BlueDelta conducted espionage campaigns targeting government and diplomatic organizations in Romania, Spain, and Türkiye. They deployed HOOKEDGE, a lightweight Windows batch-script backdoor, via macro-enabled Word documents with diplomatic-themed lures. HOOKEDGE shares code and tradecraft overlap with the HEADLACE backdoor and abuses legitimate webhook services for command-and-control, payload staging, and data exfiltration. The implant was continuously refined to evade sandbox detection and adapt to webhook service constraints. BlueDelta used a tiered operational model, deploying second-stage payloads with shorter beaconing intervals for high-value targets while preserving initial access infrastructure. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General A China-nexus threat actor is targeting Myanmar government personnel and diplomats through Operation QUICSILVER, delivering malware via Virtual Hard Disk files disguised as JPEG images. The campaign uses Burmese-language lures impersonating Myanmar's Information Technology and Cyber Security Department, including graduation ceremony invitations. The multi-stage infection chain begins with a malicious LNK file that abuses ftp.exe to execute scripts, reconstructs payloads from split files, and deploys QUICAgent, a custom Go-based backdoor. The implant retrieves C2 infrastructure through Cloudflare Workers, communicates over HTTP/3 using QUIC protocol, and employs RC4 encryption. Deleted documents recovered from the VHD reveal interest in ASEAN affairs, BIMSTEC, and Myanmar diplomatic activities. Three related campaigns were identified between April and July 2026, sharing similar TTPs and infrastructure. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| Critical | – | CriticalTenable Research Canada’s new Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (Bill C-8) introduces a strict 72-hour cyber incident reporting mandate. Find out how Tenable is helping critical national infrastructure operators bridge the IT/OT divide to ensure full compliance. Key takeaways: Bill C-8 introduces stringent new cyber incident reporting requirements and heavy financial penalties for critical infrastructure operators. Eliminating network blind spots with a hybrid IT/OT discovery approach, including Safe Active Querying for isolated, hard-to-reach process-control systems, enables operators to establish a required security baseline. Predictive Vulnerability Priority Rating (VPR) scoring helps you prioritize and focus limited resources on the critical flaws that actually threaten physical safety and uptime. Advanced multi-detection engines and seamless IT workflow integrations accelerate mean-time-to-respond (MTTR) to help both security teams and operators align with a strict 72-hour reporting requirement. With the enactment of Canada’s Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (CCSPA), commonly known as Bill C-8, the Canadian federal government is laying down a clear framework to protect the cyber-physical systems that are vital to national critical infrastructure security. For designated operators in telecommunications, energy, transportation, and banking, the mandate is clear: Establish formalized cybersecurity programs, mitigate supply chain risks, and — most critically — report cyber incidents to authorities within 72 hours. Failure to comply carries heavy consequences, including penalties that can reach up to $15 million Canadian dollars (CAD). But beyond the threat of fines, Bill C-8 highlights a fundamental operational challenge that many industrial organizations are still struggling to solve: How can you detect, investigate, and report a breach in 72 hours when you lack unified visibility across your converged IT and OT environments? Requirements for meeting Bill C-8's 72-hour incident reporting mandate In modern industrial operations and critical infrastructure, the line between IT and OT continues to blur. The introduction of connectivity (e.g., IoT-connected cameras and building management systems) has optimized processes and service delivery, but it has also introduced new cyber exposures. Today, threat actors do not honor traditional network silos; they frequently compromise a web-facing IT asset or IoT device and move laterally into the operational technology (OT) environment to disrupt physical processes. Meeting a 72-hour incident reporting window is nearly impossible if your security team is relying on fragmented point solutions. Solutions that focus exclusively on passive OT network monitoring often leave massive blind spots — especially considering that IT and IoT devices can constitute up to 50% of an industrial environment. When an incident occurs, teams waste precious hours manually correlating alerts across disconnected tools rather than actively investigating the root cause. To comply with CCSPA and protect uptime, critical national infrastructure (CNI) operators must bridge the IT/OT security divide. Establish your CCSPA cybersecurity baseline The CCSPA requires operators to implement formalized cybersecurity programs. The foundation of any mature security program is a comprehensive asset inventory — you cannot secure what you cannot see. The Tenable One Exposure Management Platform helps organizations eliminate security blind spots by building a complete, unified inventory of all OT, IoT, and IT assets. Tenable goes beyond passive-only network monitoring with our proprietary Safe Active Query technology. This hybrid approach safely communicates with industrial devices in their native protocols to uncover significantly more assets than passive monitoring alone — including dormant process control systems, shadow IT, and unmanaged IoT — without disrupting process integrity or impacting equipment uptime. Prioritize what matter… | Tenable Research | |||
| –Not rated | – | Kaspersky Security Blog Your phone rings, you pick up and say hello. On the other end: total silence. No one answers, and the call abruptly disconnects. If you don’t already use spam call blockers, you’ve almost certainly run into this situation before. In most cases, these are scam calls. Today, we explain why these calls happen, what the callers want from you, and how to protect yourself. Most importantly, we’ll look at whether you even need to bother protecting yourself against them in the first place. Who’s calling? It’s not just scammers on the line — robots, legitimate call center operators, and ordinary folks make these calls too. Let’s break down each type of caller — ordered from best-case to worst-case scenario for your security. Actual person The most harmless scenario is that an actual person called you, but their microphone is acting up. Maybe they accidentally muted themselves with their ear, or their smartphone connected to a Bluetooth headset, speaker, or car system that isn’t capturing their voice. Carrier glitches can also mute one side of a call. The caller might have no idea there’s a problem — as far as they know, they are speaking, but no one can hear them. In cases like this, you usually recognize the incoming phone number. If the call comes from an unknown number, there’s still no need to panic — though the list of those who might be calling gets much longer. One legitimate possibility is a call center agent who simply didn’t pick up or connect their headset in time. Call center systems are designed to dial numbers faster than agents can wrap up their calls. The system tried to route the call to a human, but no reps were available. That’s why you sometimes have to wait a few seconds before hearing a single word, or why you might hear ringing tones as if you were the one making the call. Robot or AI Silence on the line is a common sign of robocalls. Robots test whether a phone number is active and, if it is, pass it along to a human — meaning a real sales rep (or scammer) will call you back in the next few days. It’s worth noting that scammers aren’t the only ones making these pinging calls. Legitimate call centers use the exact same tools to reduce the workload on their live agents. An AI agent could also be behind the silent call. To the person answering, there’s no practical difference: the call looks identical to one made by a standard bot. However, AI can do more than just auto-dial numbers — it can analyze your response and use that data to decide whether your number is active and ready to be handed off to a live person for follow-up. Unwanted caller Now we get to the real threat. Perhaps one of the most dangerous and unpleasant sources of silent phone calls is a scammer. A quick, silent call like this can actually be the groundwork for a long, elaborate attack with cover stories about loans, government agencies, other fraudsters, even law enforcement. Debt collectors might also be calling and staying quiet. Your number could end up on their radar if you, your family, or close contacts have outstanding debts. In these cases, a silent call is often used as a tactic for psychological pressure. A similar technique is used in stalking. While silent calls cause no direct harm on their own, they can be leveraged to induce anxiety, create a feeling of being constantly watched, and cause ongoing emotional distress. Why do they call and stay silent? When you pick up, you likely respond out of habit with a quick “Hello?” or “Hi there.” That’s all it takes for the other party to gather a wealth of data. While this information used to be difficult to process, the rise of artificial intelligence has made the task significantly easier. Let’s look at what someone can learn about you from just one spoken word: Region, accent, and location. Scammers are sophisticated and cunning. Their tactics are often tailored by region — targeting residents of specific countries or even regions within them. This is especially relevant in places like In… | Kaspersky Security Blog | |||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit ExploitDev A legal case involving a traveler who allegedly used a 'duress password' on a GrapheneOS phone to wipe data during a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) search at a US airport. The incident raises complex legal questions about the use of duress passwords, warrantless device searches at ports of entry, and constitutional protections. The traveler was charged with a felony for wiping his phone, which CBP alleges destroyed evidence. The case highlights ongoing debates about privacy rights, government surveillance of activists, and the legality of device searches without warrants at US borders. | Reddit ExploitDev | |||
| –Not rated | – | Check Point Research Note: SysAid was not compromised, and no SysAid vulnerability was involved. The attacker had already gained access to the victim environment and abused a legitimate software-deployment feature to deploy malware onto another machine within it. Key Points Check Point Research (CPR) tracks ‘ Cavern Manticore ’ as an Iran-nexus threat actor operating against Israeli targets , with a focus on the government and IT sectors. Cavern Manticore shares technical overlaps with other Iranian MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security)-linked threat actors, including MuddyWater and Lyceum . CPR observed a modular C2 framework in the wild, with all samples built on top of .NET but compiled into different output formats. These components are used as Cavern agent and Cavern modules . The framework’s anti-analysis posture relies on uncommon .NET compilation formats ( Mixed-Mode C++/CLI and Native AOT ) that force reverse engineers into multiple toolsets and metadata-reconstruction workflows, together with per-module AppDomain isolation as an anti-forensics measure. In malware-engine coverage, the majority of observed samples score zero or very low detection rates on VirusTotal. Post-exploitation modules provide the threat actor with extended capabilities , including file system and database browsing, LDAP querying, network reconnaissance, and tunneling. In multiple observed intrusions, the initial foothold was achieved through abuse of existing Remote Monitoring and Management ( RMM ) software deployed in the targeted organization. Introduction Since early 2026, Check Point Research (CPR) has tracked a new modular command-and-control framework used by Cavern Manticore , an Iran-nexus APT group primarily targeting Israeli organizations, with a focus on IT providers, and government sectors. Cavern Manticore is an Iran MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security)-linked actor, with links to the OilRig subgroup named Lyceum . The framework reflects a mature and adaptable toolset built around a shared .NET foundation, while using multiple compilation formats across different components, including .NET Framework , .NET Mixed-Mode C++/CLI , and .NET Native AOT . The compilation format itself becomes the anti-analysis layer that forces reverse engineers into multiple toolsets and metadata-reconstruction workflows. During our investigation, we observed both Cavern agents and Cavern modules in the wild, highlighting a modular architecture that separates core communication capabilities from mission-specific post-exploitation functionality. This design allows the operators to tailor deployments per victim environment, limit what defenders and analysts can recover from any single victim and extend access after compromise through specialized modules for reconnaissance, data access, tunneling, and lateral movement. Figure 1: Cavern Modules Evade Malware Engines. Technical Analysis: Cavern – A Modular .NET C2 Framework 1. Cavern at a Glance Cavern is a modular post-exploitation C2 framework built entirely on .NET, but deliberately compiled into three different binary formats: .NET Framework ( IL-only ), Mixed-Mode C++/CLI ( IL + Native ), and .NET 8 NativeAOT ( Native-only ). The recovered execution chain begins with SysAid’s software update feature, which the actor leverages to deploy a WinDirStat DLL sideloading package to C:\ProgramData\WinDir\WinDirStat.exe . The legitimate WinDirStat.exe binary loads the trojanized uxtheme.dll , which is the Cavern Agent , and the agent in turn loads a dedicated native communication module n-HTCommp.dll to reach the C2 and then pulls down additional post-exploitation modules on operator command. Figure 2: Cavern Agent Execution Chain. The table below provides an overview of the modules. Component Internal Name Format Role Cavern Agent uxtheme.dll Mixed-Mode C++/CLI (.NET 4.7.2, IL + Native) Core backdoor, module orchestrator Communication Module n-HTCommp.dll NativeAOT (.NET 8, Native-only) HTTPS/WebSocket transport, XOR… | Check Point Research | |||
| Critical | 10.0 | EPSS 1.1% | CVE-2026-11429Altium Enterprise Server · Path Traversal Critical10.0EPSS 1.1%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-11429 Two endpoints in the Vault Service ScriptsController, shared by Altium Enterprise Server and Altium 365, accept file uploads where a user-supplied filename component is used to construct the destination path without validation, allowing arbitrary files to be written to any location writable by the service account. Because the file write operation completes before authentication is validated, the vulnerability can be exploited without any credentials, session, or prior knowledge of the system. An unauthenticated network attacker can use this primitive to place executable content in directories where it is later executed by the service, resulting in remote code execution under the Vault Service account. Altium Enterprise Server is fixed in 8.1.1; the issue has been remediated in Altium 365 (commercial and government cloud) at the service level. | CVE Database V5 |
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