Search: http://85.193.80.19
5 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d10f01e2954dde5faac23074d02bb989f22d0dcb78be82c1c4417531fef8b859) The package ships a bundled Node script pyservercheck/js/main.js whose visible top half is a healthcheck stub matching the README, followed by a long run of tab whitespace and a trailing eval(atob('...')) that decodes to a two-stage loader. The decoded loader queries public Ethereum RPC endpoints (eth.blockscout.com, 1rpc.io/eth, eth.drpc.org, ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com, eth-mainnet.public.blastapi.io) for the latest transaction from the hardcoded sender 0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a, extracts an IPv4 pair from the tx `to` field, fetches XOR-obfuscated stage-2 code from http://<decoded-ip>:443/0x/cls and /0x/ls, eval()s it, and re-launches it via a detached `spawn('node', ['-e', <code>])`. Execution is wired to two auto-triggers: pyproject.toml overrides setuptools `build_py` and `develop` with pyservercheck._setup_cmd.BuildPy/Develop, whose `run()` calls _run_main_js_now() -> subprocess.run(['node', main.js]) during `pip install` / `pip install -e.`; and BuildPy also writes a `pyservercheck.pth` file containing `import pyservercheck._hooks; pyservercheck._hooks.ensure_once()`, which Python auto-executes at every interpreter startup, invoking run_js() again. The `.main_js_ran` marker is advisory and can be removed to force re-execution. The C2 destination is rotatable by publishing a new Ethereum transaction from the sender address, so the fetched payload is fully attacker-controlled at each run. ## Source: kam193 (4b365b9df06973db4f112bdbf2ad704dcc91c1b7b3eaceddb06a8e884c3f760a) Package embeds obfuscated, JS-based malware downloading further remote stages. The code is triggered during building the package and on every Python startup (via PTH file). The next-stage IP is delivered via a blockchain. The payload and embedded IoCs are consistent with campaigns attributed to Lazarus APT/PolinRider. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-08-pybitjs Reasons (based on the campaign): - obfuscation - Downloads and executes a remote malicious script. - malware - abuses-pth - c2-in-blockchain | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ec7ebbcc82edaa241764193ea85c0492b99f9ed3be805c57ef0914518cd4b6f9) The postinstall script src/build.js reconstructs the strings 'https', 'POST', and the destination host 'rnjkerbf.org/P' from integer-encoded arrays via base-decoders in src/const.js and src/helpers.js, then dynamically requires the resolved module and issues an HTTPS POST to https://rnjkerbf.org/P. The value of the response header 'm' is passed directly to child_process.execSync, so arbitrary shell commands returned by the attacker-controlled server run on the installer's machine at 'npm install' time. Errors are swallowed by try/catch to hide failures. The URL, HTTP method, and required module name are all hidden behind numeric-literal decoders to evade static inspection. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database pinokio-redis is a malicious npm package and part of the multi-wave "forge-jsx" cross-platform RAT campaign (Wave 4). It was published by npm account 'donimique' (donimiqueakers@gmail.com). The package.json description ('Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge') and the bundled README.md (literally titled "# forge-jsx") do not match the package name or the shipped code. On npm install the declared postinstall chain (postinstall-clipboard-event.mjs, ensure-dist.mjs, postinstall-durable-materialize.mjs, postinstall-bootstrap.mjs, postinstall-agent.mjs) runs scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs, which spawns dist/cli-agent.js as a detached, window-hidden background process. The agent connects over WebSocket to a command-and-control relay whose host, ports and default password are stored as an AES-256-GCM blob in dist/deploymentCipherData.js and decrypted at runtime by XOR-reconstructing a 32-byte key from two halves embedded in dist/deploymentDefaults.js. The decrypted C2 configuration is publicHost 212.193.3.61, relayPort 9877 (WebSocket relay), apiPort 8765 (HTTP API), default password 'secret'. Postinstall also registers OS-level autostart (Windows Run key, macOS LaunchAgent, Linux systemd/XDG autostart; service name forge-js-worker) pointing at a durable copy of the agent stored in a hidden '.forge-jsxy' directory under the platform application-data folder, so the implant survives removal of the npm package. Once running it performs credential-grade theft: dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js walks the filesystem for BIP39-checksum-valid mnemonics, secp256k1/WIF private keys and BIP32 extended keys (xprv/tprv/zprv); dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js enumerates Chromium/Edge/Brave/Vivaldi/Yandex/Opera profiles across Windows, macOS and Linux and copies extension LevelDB stores (including MetaMask/Phantom-shaped wallet stores); harvested data is uploaded to the Hugging Face Hub using an embedded hf_ write token (dist/hfCredentials.js) or delivered via the relay; dist/hostInventorySend.js POSTs host inventory (hostname/platform/node/OS) to the relay and dist/discordRelayUpload.js forwards agent-side PNG screenshots to per-client Discord channels. This is the first wave of the campaign to ship rotated AES key material (new DEPLOYMENT_KEY_A/KEY_B/MASK_A/MASK_B byte arrays, hex 12335cede9edad1edbce89fd3ef0836c8edd3778e48f3f38f2330198ec8b1eb0), verified byte-identical across the four donimique-account packages (zod-pino434, zod-pino444, zredis-typed, pinokio-redis) — a single shared build. C2 212.193.3.61 (AS206216, Advin Services LLC, Nurnberg DE) is reused from the Wave 3 pino-zod/zod-pino IP rotation. The campaign is definitively linked by shared C2 infrastructure, the hardcoded '.forge-jsxy' durable directory, the dist/deploymentCipherData.js + dist/deploymentDefaults.js XOR-key fingerprint, and the '# forge-jsx' README tell that spans multiple package names and npm accounts. Only one version of pinokio-redis (1.0.127) exists and all versions are malicious. Tarball SHA-256: a400b0342add77fd3a58e086334b35e11d79e234b180bb360f48adcd61ec4acd, SHA-1: 04b6035df92ef9eb790d64d425c05c51fce46ca7. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (2593226767577439cd32d202e0e5e07ef74a6526f9ad7cb42f4bad087d04aa30) The package name presents as a Redis client for Pinokio, but the shipped tarball contains a credential-harvest and data-relay toolkit that has no relationship to Redis. dist/discordRelayUpload.js issues outbound POSTs and shells out (ping) to relay collected content; dist/hfCredentials.js and dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js decode base64-embedded blobs (Buffer.from(..., 'base64')) at runtime; dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js performs fetch() calls to huggingface.co endpoints under a "secret scan" module name — a shape consistent with harvesting scanned secrets rather than defending them. dist/deploymentDefaults.js and scripts/encode-deployment.mjs carry base64-encoded deployment configuration decoded at runtime, obscuring destination endpoints. scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs runs at npm install (postinstall) and issues network activity (GET, ping) on install without user interaction, providing auto-execution on default install. The combination — install-time auto-executed agent, base64-obfuscated configuration/payloads across multiple files, a Discord upload relay path, and a "secretScan" module that fetches to remote endpoints — describes an installer-side credential and data exfiltration toolkit, not a Redis integration. Name/purpose mismatch, install-time execution, and multi-file obfuscation together satisfy the active-attack shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d8c9c7ad731c0929056de138dff2c461e808854d25aea316f6fe865a3d04d8c0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full co | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database zredis-typed is a malicious npm package and part of the multi-wave "forge-jsx" cross-platform RAT campaign (Wave 4). It was published by npm account 'donimique' (donimiqueakers@gmail.com). The package.json description ('Node.js integration layer for Autodesk Forge') and the bundled README.md (literally titled "# forge-jsx") do not match the package name or the shipped code. On npm install the declared postinstall chain (postinstall-clipboard-event.mjs, ensure-dist.mjs, postinstall-durable-materialize.mjs, postinstall-bootstrap.mjs, postinstall-agent.mjs) runs scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs, which spawns dist/cli-agent.js as a detached, window-hidden background process. The agent connects over WebSocket to a command-and-control relay whose host, ports and default password are stored as an AES-256-GCM blob in dist/deploymentCipherData.js and decrypted at runtime by XOR-reconstructing a 32-byte key from two halves embedded in dist/deploymentDefaults.js. The decrypted C2 configuration is publicHost 212.193.3.61, relayPort 9877 (WebSocket relay), apiPort 8765 (HTTP API), default password 'secret'. Postinstall also registers OS-level autostart (Windows Run key, macOS LaunchAgent, Linux systemd/XDG autostart; service name forge-js-worker) pointing at a durable copy of the agent stored in a hidden '.forge-jsxy' directory under the platform application-data folder, so the implant survives removal of the npm package. Once running it performs credential-grade theft: dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js walks the filesystem for BIP39-checksum-valid mnemonics, secp256k1/WIF private keys and BIP32 extended keys (xprv/tprv/zprv); dist/chromiumExtensionDbHarvest.js enumerates Chromium/Edge/Brave/Vivaldi/Yandex/Opera profiles across Windows, macOS and Linux and copies extension LevelDB stores (including MetaMask/Phantom-shaped wallet stores); harvested data is uploaded to the Hugging Face Hub using an embedded hf_ write token (dist/hfCredentials.js) or delivered via the relay; dist/hostInventorySend.js POSTs host inventory (hostname/platform/node/OS) to the relay and dist/discordRelayUpload.js forwards agent-side PNG screenshots to per-client Discord channels. This is the first wave of the campaign to ship rotated AES key material (new DEPLOYMENT_KEY_A/KEY_B/MASK_A/MASK_B byte arrays, hex 12335cede9edad1edbce89fd3ef0836c8edd3778e48f3f38f2330198ec8b1eb0), verified byte-identical across the four donimique-account packages (zod-pino434, zod-pino444, zredis-typed, pinokio-redis) — a single shared build. C2 212.193.3.61 (AS206216, Advin Services LLC, Nurnberg DE) is reused from the Wave 3 pino-zod/zod-pino IP rotation. The campaign is definitively linked by shared C2 infrastructure, the hardcoded '.forge-jsxy' durable directory, the dist/deploymentCipherData.js + dist/deploymentDefaults.js XOR-key fingerprint, and the '# forge-jsx' README tell that spans multiple package names and npm accounts. Only one version of zredis-typed (1.0.127) exists; all versions are malicious. Tarball SHA-256: a1853a45bcb561f96e0e7c0dec7f96e640ae53be62e65158880812ff104c9e41, SHA-1: b74170f2d850bfd8d0a9d750af88a03ba2c42e61. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (330bc399769c68aa2a7f09a635bb038680c88c855268cc3643759492ebd96de9) The package name presents as a typed Redis client, but the tarball ships a multi-file exfiltration payload unrelated to any Redis functionality. `dist/discordRelayUpload.js` performs host reconnaissance (ping) and POSTs base64-encoded content to remote endpoints. `dist/relayServer.js` similarly runs ping-based host probing. `dist/secretScan/agentStartupAudit.js` fetches attacker-controlled URLs on huggingface.co (used here as a data/staging endpoint), and `dist/secretScan/contentScanner.js` performs credential/secret scanning with base64 encoding of results. `dist/hfCredentials.js` handles third-party (Hugging Face) credential material via base64 decode. `dist/deploymentDefaults.js` and `scripts/encode-deployment.mjs` encode/decode deployment payloads via base64. `scripts/postinstall-agent.mjs` is registered as an install-time agent that performs outbound GET requests and host ping — running automatically on `npm install`. The combination of postinstall-time network activity, host reconnaissance, filesystem secret scanning, base64-encoded payload handling, Discord-labeled relay upload, and hardcoded remote fetch endpoints is unambiguous credential/data exfiltration disguised as a Redis type package. Nothing in the shipped modules implements a Redis client. The traced content also tripped the safety filter on downstream analysis, corroborating the malware shape. ## Source: ghsa-malware (73b8d51428450de7f67cb29aa402a94aefd62bdcf03e4f0eee43c554576eec2e) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 6.9 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium6.9EPSS 0.2%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-6860 Red Hat Streams for Apache Kafka, based on the Apache Kafka project, offers a distributed backbone that allows microservices and other applications to share data with extremely high throughput and extremely low latency. This release of Red Hat Streams for Apache Kafka 3.2.1 serves as a replacement for Red Hat Streams for Apache Kafka 3.2.0, and includes security and bug fixes, and enhancements. Security Fix(es): * golang-github-danielqsj-kafka_exporter: Go crypto/tls: Denial of Service via multiple TLS 1.3 key update messages (CVE-2026-32283) * quarkus-vertx-http: io.quarkus:quarkus-vertx-http: Authorization bypass via semicolons in HTTP requests (CVE-2026-39852) * kafka-clients: Apache Kafka Clients: Information disclosure and data corruption due to race condition in producer buffer management (CVE-2026-35554) * log4j-layout-template-json: Apache Log4j JsonTemplateLayout: Denial of Service via invalid JSON output (CVE-2026-34481) * log4j-core: Apache Log4j Core: Invalid XML output causes denial of service in logging (CVE-2026-34480) * log4j-core: Apache Log4j Core: Log injection via CRLF sequences due to configuration attribute renames (CVE-2026-34478) * netty-codec-dns: Netty: High integrity impact due to improper DNS domain name constraint enforcement (CVE-2026-42579) * netty-codec-http: Netty: Incorrect HTTP response parsing leads to data confusion (CVE-2026-42584) * netty-codec-http: Netty: HTTP Request Smuggling due to improper handling of conflicting HTTP/1.0 headers (CVE-2026-42581) * netty-handler-proxy: Netty: HTTP Header Injection via HttpProxyHandler Disabled Validation (CVE-2026-42578) * netty-codec-http: Netty: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in HTTP content decompression (CVE-2026-42587) * netty-codec-http2: Netty: Denial of Service via unbounded memory allocation in HTTP content decompression (CVE-2026-42587) * netty-codec: Netty: Denial of Service via excessive memory allocation in LZ4FrameDecoder (CVE-2026-42583) * netty-codec-compression: Netty: Denial of Service via excessive memory allocation in LZ4FrameDecoder (CVE-2026-42583) * next: Next.js: Authorization bypass via crafted query parameters (CVE-2026-44574) * next: Next.js: Denial of Service via crafted POST requests to server actions (CVE-2026-44579) * next: Next.js: Denial of Service via Image Optimization API (CVE-2026-44577) * next: Next.js: Information disclosure due to middleware bypass in Pages Router with i18n (CVE-2026-44573) * next: Next.js: Server-Side Request Forgery via crafted WebSocket upgrade requests (CVE-2026-44578) * next: Next.js: Information disclosure via security fix bypass in middleware with Turbopack (CVE-2026-45109) * next: Next.js: Unauthorized access to protected content via middleware bypass (CVE-2026-44575) * quarkus-vertx-http: Quarkus: Authorization bypass in HTTP path-based policies via encoded characters (CVE-2026-50559) * golang-github-danielqsj-kafka_exporter: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing (CVE-2026-39821) * vertx-core: eclipse-vertx/vert.x: Denial of Service via TLS handshake with wildcard server name (CVE-2026-6860) * netty-handler: netty-handler: IPv6 subnet rule bypass due to incorrect masking operation (CVE-2026-44249) * netty-codec-haproxy: Netty-codec-haproxy: Denial of Service via malformed HAProxy message (CVE-2026-44893) * netty-codec-http2: netty-codec-http2: Denial of Service due to resource leak (CVE-2026-48043) * netty-codec-haproxy: Netty HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec: Denial of Service via memory leak from crafted PROXY protocol headers (CVE-2026-48059) * netty-resolver-dns: Netty has Insufficient Bailiwick Validation for NS Records (CVE-2026-47691) * netty-resolver-dns: Netty: Information disclosure and data manipulation due to improper CNAME record validation (CVE-2026-45674) * netty-handler: Netty: Denial of Service due to eager buffer allocation in TLS handshake (CVE-2026-45416) * golang-github-danielqsj-kafka_exporter: Go net package: Denial of Service via long CNAME response in LookupCNAME (CVE-2026-33811) * cluster-operator: Cross-namespace privilege escalation via Kafka.spec.entityOperator.watchedNamespace in Strimzi (CVE-2026-55225) * micrometer-core: Micrometer: Denial of Service via specially crafted HTTP requests (CVE-2026-40984) * micrometer-core: Micrometer: Denial of Service via specially crafted gRPC requests (CVE-2026-40983) * golang-github-danielqsj-kafka_exporter: golang crypto/x509: Denial of Service via excessive processing of DNS SAN entries (CVE-2026-27145) * jackson-databind: jackson-databind: Arbitrary code execution via PolymorphicTypeValidator bypass (CVE-2026-54512) * jackson-databind: Jackson-databind: Denial of Service via deeply nested JSON processing (CVE-2026-50193) * golang-github-danielqsj-kafka_exporter: Golang MIME: Denial of Service via maliciously-crafted MIME header (CVE-2026-42504) * jacks | GCVE Database |
Page 1 of 1