Search: ms-performance.hol.es
7 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medium | – | MediumCisco Talos Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. Lately I've found myself thinking a lot about the Australian TV series Mr. Inbetween (IMDb 8.7/10) — not because I'm a hitman for hire, but because I literally feel in-between. Specifically, in-between what I'd call the "pre-Mythos" and “post-Mythos” eras. We've crossed a capability threshold, and it's not just one model family driving that — Codex 5.3 and GPT-5.5 deliver comparable or better performance , and Tulongfeng or GLM-5.2 (an incredibly powerful open-weight model, MIT-licensed) show the frontier isn't limited to closed models anymore. On the other side of that line, real-world impact hasn't caught up yet and we're living in an artificial buffer zone. For me, defining the “pre-” and “post-” status comes down to the gap between "vulnerability discovery" and "vulnerability publication." Last week’s Patch Tuesday gave a signal of change, as Joe pointed out , so maybe the buffer zone has come to an end. Let's dive into the 2026 Q2 stats. As in past years, we're seeing a steeper curve than the year before — a solid 49% YoY growth, though still not the hockey-stick moment I keep waiting for. By the end of June we were tracking close to 200 CVEs per day. Using the keyword methodology described here , I found 452 AI-related CVEs this calendar year. If "openclaw" is added to the keyword list, that number jumps by another 536 — a reminder that these counts are sensitive to keyword drift. Given how much the keyword list keeps changing, I'm reconsidering whether to keep publishing this particular metric going forward. KEVs, by contrast, "only" grew 13% — a small April spike aside, it's fairly flat relative to total CVE growth. Networking-gear-related CVEs continued their climb, now accounting for 24% of KEV-related vulnerabilities (up from 20% in Q1) — consistent with the trend I flagged last quarters. As in previous quarters, CVEs from 2024 or earlier still make up about 24% of everything we're tracking. More strikingly, even though the standard enterprise patch cycle is described to run 30–90 days, 181 days into 2026, 46% of today's actively-exploited (KEV) CVEs still trace back to 2025 or earlier. Old vulnerabilities don't retire, new ones keep arriving, and machine-speed vulnerability discovery is going to keep outpacing human-speed patching. Which brings me back — once again — to EPSS as a tool for prioritizing patching against this dataset. If you patched purely by CVSS 9+, you'd be urgently chasing ~3,700 CVEs — but 95% of those sit below 5% EPSS, meaning the real-world odds of exploitation are tiny. Of the 32 CVSS 9+ CVEs with EPSS ≥ 50%, 25 are already on CISA's KEV list. The remaining seven outliers are still high-probability by EPSS but haven't made KEV yet — worth watching. Ray Shoesmith (Mr. Inbetween) once told his therapist, "You know, if I hit somebody, I generally got a pretty good reason." Same principle applies to patching. Don't swing at everything — swing at what you have good reason to believe is coming for you. The one big thing Cisco Talos has discovered "msaRAT," a new Rust-based remote access trojan (RAT) deployed by the Chaos ransomware group. Built on the Tokio asynchronous runtime, it establishes a covert command-and-control (C2) channel by hijacking Chrome or Edge browsers via the Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP). The infection starts with a deceptive MSI file masquerading as a Windows update that loads the payload directly into memory, paving the way for ransomware deployment. Why do I care? This RAT is a master of evasion, living off the browser to build its C2 infrastructure without ever directly touching the network. By routing traffic through legitimate browser processes and trusted services, msaRAT easily bypasses traditional network-based detections. Additionally, its use of the Tokio runtime enables highly efficient, parallel execution of malicious tasks, accelerating the attacker's ability to establish persistence and deploy doubl… | Cisco Talos | |||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.1% | CVE-2026-64026Linux kernel · rxrpc: Fix DATA decrypt vs splice() by copying data to buffer in recvmsg High7.8EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-64026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix DATA decrypt vs splice() by copying data to buffer in recvmsg This improves the fix for CVE-2026-43500. Fix the pagecache corruption from in-place decryption of a DATA packet transmitted locally by splice() by getting rid of the packet sharing in the I/O thread and unconditionally extracting the packet content into a bounce buffer in which the buffer is decrypted. recvmsg() (or the kernel equivalent) then copies the data from the bounce buffer to the destination buffer. The sk_buff then remains unmodified. This has an additional advantage in that the packet is then arranged in the buffer with the correct alignment required for the crypto algorithms to process directly. The performance of the crypto does seem to be a little faster and, surprisingly, the unencrypted performance doesn't seem to change much - possibly due to removing complexity from the I/O thread. Yet another advantage is that the I/O thread doesn't have to copy packets which would slow down packet distribution, ACK generation, etc.. The buffer belongs to the call and is allocated initially at 2K, sufficiently large to hold a whole jumbo subpacket, but the buffer will be increased in size if needed. However, to take this work, MSG_PEEK may cause a later packet to be decrypted into the buffer, in which case the earlier one will need re-decrypting for a subsequent recvmsg(). Note that rx_pkt_offset may legitimately see 0 as a valid offset now, so switch to using USHRT_MAX to indicate an invalid offset. Note also that I would generally prefer to replace the buffers of the current sk_buff with a new kmalloc'd buffer of the right size, ditching the old data and frags as this makes the handling of MSG_PEEK easier and removes the re-decryption issue, but this looks like quite a complicated thing to achieve. skb_morph() looks half way to what I want, but I don't want to have to allocate a new sk_buff. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 8.7 | EPSS 0.5% | CVE-2026-57584phalcon cphalcon · ReDoS High8.7EPSS 0.5%CVE Database V5CVE-2026-57584 Phalcon is a high-performance, full-stack PHP framework. Prior to 5.15.0, every Phalcon MVC application built with a default router registers a built-in route whose compiled PCRE pattern contains the nested quantifier (/.), and the same construct is produced by the /:params placeholder and the CLI router. Phalcon\Mvc\Router::handle() matches this pattern against the attacker-controlled request URI on every request, so a crafted path such as one containing repeated slashes followed by decoded newlines can trigger catastrophic backtracking and cause CPU exhaustion or route-matching failure. This issue is fixed in version 5.15.0. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS <0.1% | High7.8EPSS <0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-53192 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: timer: Fix UAF at snd_timer_user_params() At releasing a timer object, e.g. when a userspace timer (CONFIG_SND_UTIMER) gets closed and snd_timer_free() is called, it tries to detach the timer instances and release the resources. However, it's still possible that other in-flight tasks are holding the timer instance where the to-be-deleted timer object is associated, and this may lead to racy accesses. Fortunately, most of ioctls dealing with the timer instance list already have the protection with register_mutex, and this also avoids such races. But, SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS isn't protected, hence the concurrent ioctl may lead to use-after-free. This patch just adds the guard with register_mutex to protect snd_timer_user_params() for covering the code path as a quick workaround. It's no hot-path but rather a rarely issued ioctl, so the performance penalty doesn't matter. | GCVE Database | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General Microsoft Defender Experts identified an active cryptojacking campaign leveraging AI-assisted delivery mechanisms alongside traditional SEO poisoning. Attackers create fake download sites impersonating trusted utilities like CrystalDiskInfo, HWMonitor, and FurMark, targeting users with high-performance GPUs. Victims download ZIP archives containing legitimate executables bundled with malicious DLLs that establish persistence via ScreenConnect remote access tools. The operation employs sophisticated techniques including DLL sideloading, process hollowing into Microsoft-signed .NET binaries, and comprehensive defense evasion. Beyond cryptocurrency mining, the campaign establishes persistent remote access that could enable data theft, lateral movement, or ransomware deployment. The threat actors deliberately target PC enthusiasts and hardware-focused users most likely to own discrete GPUs suitable for profitable mining operations. | AlienVault OTX General | |||
| High | 7.5 | EPSS 0.7% | High7.5EPSS 0.7%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2026-27137 The Grafana plugin for Performance Co-Pilot includes datasources for scalable time series from pmseries and Redis, live PCP metrics and bpftrace scripts from pmdabpftrace, as well as several dashboards. Security Fix(es): * crypto/x509: Incorrect enforcement of email constraints in crypto/x509 (CVE-2026-27137) * crypto/x509: golang: Go crypto/x509: Certificate validation bypass due to incorrect DNS constraint application (CVE-2026-33810) * golang.org/x/net/idna: golang: net/http: golang.org/x/net/idna: Privilege escalation via incorrect Punycode label processing (CVE-2026-39821) * mime: golang: Golang MIME: Denial of Service via maliciously-crafted MIME header (CVE-2026-42504) * encoding/asn1: golang: Go encoding/asn1: Denial of Service via excessive recursion in Unmarshal (CVE-2026-33818) * net/url: golang: golang net/url: Denial of Service from quadratic complexity in path resolution (CVE-2026-56860) * net/http: golang: Go net/http: Unencrypted HTTP/2 connections vulnerable to Denial of Service (CVE-2026-56853) * html/template: golang: Go html/template: Cross-Site Scripting via pathological input (CVE-2026-56858) * crypto/tls: golang: Golang crypto/tls: Denial of Service via indefinite KeyUpdate messages (CVE-2026-56862) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section. | GCVE Database | ||
| High | 7.8 | EPSS 0.1% | High7.8EPSS 0.1%GCVE DatabaseCVE-2025-39791 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm: dm-crypt: Do not partially accept write BIOs with zoned targets Read and write operations issued to a dm-crypt target may be split according to the dm-crypt internal limits defined by the max_read_size and max_write_size module parameters (default is 128 KB). The intent is to improve processing time of large BIOs by splitting them into smaller operations that can be parallelized on different CPUs. For zoned dm-crypt targets, this BIO splitting is still done but without the parallel execution to ensure that the issuing order of write operations to the underlying devices remains sequential. However, the splitting itself causes other problems: 1) Since dm-crypt relies on the block layer zone write plugging to handle zone append emulation using regular write operations, the reminder of a split write BIO will always be plugged into the target zone write plugged. Once the on-going write BIO finishes, this reminder BIO is unplugged and issued from the zone write plug work. If this reminder BIO itself needs to be split, the reminder will be re-issued and plugged again, but that causes a call to a blk_queue_enter(), which may block if a queue freeze operation was initiated. This results in a deadlock as DM submission still holds BIOs that the queue freeze side is waiting for. 2) dm-crypt relies on the emulation done by the block layer using regular write operations for processing zone append operations. This still requires to properly return the written sector as the BIO sector of the original BIO. However, this can be done correctly only and only if there is a single clone BIO used for processing the original zone append operation issued by the user. If the size of a zone append operation is larger than dm-crypt max_write_size, then the orginal BIO will be split and processed as a chain of regular write operations. Such chaining result in an incorrect written sector being returned to the zone append issuer using the original BIO sector. This in turn results in file system data corruptions using xfs or btrfs. Fix this by modifying get_max_request_size() to always return the size of the BIO to avoid it being split with dm_accpet_partial_bio() in crypt_map(). get_max_request_size() is renamed to get_max_request_sectors() to clarify the unit of the value returned and its interface is changed to take a struct dm_target pointer and a pointer to the struct bio being processed. In addition to this change, to ensure that crypt_alloc_buffer() works correctly, set the dm-crypt device max_hw_sectors limit to be at most BIO_MAX_VECS << PAGE_SECTORS_SHIFT (1 MB with a 4KB page architecture). This forces DM core to split write BIOs before passing them to crypt_map(), and thus guaranteeing that dm-crypt can always accept an entire write BIO without needing to split it. This change does not have any effect on the read path of dm-crypt. Read operations can still be split and the BIO fragments processed in parallel. There is also no impact on the performance of the write path given that all zone write BIOs were already processed inline instead of in parallel. This change also does not affect in any way regular dm-crypt block devices. EPSS 0.1%Vulnerability | GCVE Database |
Page 1 of 1