Search: readme.txt
12 threats
Most recently published first
| Severity | CVSS | Signals | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (65aa3700b74bc0d50e4a4ee4fb3b903af0ac2ebea5867a3d1ffd0876647ec2a1) Package advertises itself as a 2048-style grid game statistics utility, but its declared postinstall hook (`node install-cb.js`) executes on `npm install` and performs behavior unrelated to that purpose. The postinstall shells out via execSync to run `uname -a` and `id`, reads `/proc/1/cgroup` and `/proc/mounts`, inspects Linux capabilities, checks for `/var/run/docker.sock`, and reads the Kubernetes service-account token and namespace at `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/`. It also enumerates `/`, `/root`, `/root/projects`, performs a host write-test, inspects network configuration, and greps the process environment for variables matching `token|secret|key|password|db_|redis|s3` and related patterns. The collected data (including the k8s SA token length and env keys) is written to `NCODE_ESCAPE.txt` in the current working directory and two parent directories. Author metadata is placeholder-shaped (`merge-tools <merge-tools@example.com>`) and the README/behavior mismatch indicates a cover-story shape. The install-time read of an installer-owned Kubernetes service-account token plus environment secret enumeration constitutes installer-side credential access and container-escape reconnaissance staging. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package dolyame-boxy-scroll version 35.9.9 contains malicious code that downloads and executes an attacker-controlled binary on the host system. Instead of providing the benign scroll abstraction described in its README, the package loads a platform-specific binary from Cloudflare Workers hosts, saves it under a disguised name in temporary directories, sets executable permissions, and runs it detached. If the HTTPS fetch fails, it uses a DNS-TXT record fallback to reconstruct the payload. The downloaded binary is not verified by hash or signature, allowing arbitrary code execution upon import of the package. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package eacq-acq-menu-core version 35.9.7 contains malicious code that downloads and executes platform-specific binaries from covert command-and-control (C2) servers. It reconstructs obfuscated hostnames at runtime to evade detection, downloads binaries via HTTPS, and falls back to retrieving payloads through DNS TXT record queries if HTTPS delivery fails. The payload is written to temporary directories under disguised filenames and executed in the background. The package's README falsely presents it as a benign base framework module, masking its malicious behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'checkout-use-disable-interaction' version 35.4.9 contains malicious code that downloads and executes a platform-specific native binary from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers subdomains and fallback DNS TXT records. The payload is saved to system temporary directories with filenames mimicking legitimate system artifacts and executed detached from the main process. The package README falsely advertises a benign microservice module, while the actual code performs unauthorized code execution and persistence by periodically re-running the dropper every ~6 hours. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database The npm package 'claims-navigate' version 35.2.2 contains malicious code that, upon being required, downloads an opaque binary from author-controlled Cloudflare Workers subdomains. This binary is saved with disguised filenames in temporary directories, given executable permissions, and executed detached from the main process. If HTTPS retrieval fails, the package uses a covert DNS-TXT channel to fetch the binary in chunks from multiple domains, reconstructs it, writes it to disk, and executes it. The downloaded binary is not verified by hash or signature, and environment variables related to telemetry are used as a cover story. The package README does not disclose any binary download behavior. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (acda9720ae54881219c0fbcee73795be85877d292aa62662f7cb6b92e775f608) Package ships an obfuscated dist/index.js that is invoked from the postinstall lifecycle hook (`node dist/index.js`). At install time, the script performs an HTTPS GET to https://onch.cc/test1.txt (and https://onch.cc/test2.txt), base64-decodes the response body, and executes it via `new Function('require', decoded)()`, granting the fetched code full Node.js capabilities (including `require`) on the installer's machine. The dropper is gated by `process.env.P == 1`, allowing the attacker to keep the payload dormant on incidental installers and detonate selectively (e.g., on CI runners where P is set). The fetching logic is obfuscated using javascript-obfuscator (hex identifiers, rotating string array, decoder wrapper), and the package's own build script (`"obfuscate": "javascript-obfuscator./dist/index.js..."`) confirms obfuscation is applied deliberately before publish. The remote host onch.cc is unrelated to any documented package purpose (the package has no README), and the fetched content is opaque, mutable, and unpinned. This is a classic install-time RCE dropper with attacker-controlled remote code execution on `npm install`. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (8908ac72050dded53e2e163c528a446b7a4fd7a37a4874e14f95b08265f043c4) The package presents itself as an ESLint-inside-Jest runner but the documented linkProject/lintFiles/createJestRunner API is not implemented. The actual exports are harvest-and-upload primitives. lib/collect.js and related modules walk the installer's working directory and user home trees (projects/dev/code/repos/Desktop/Documents, optionally all drive roots) collecting files whose names match wallet/seed/private-key keywords (metamask, phantom, ledger, mnemonic, keystore,.env,.pem,.p12, etc.). A regex scanner (collectDevSecrets, DEV_SECRET_PATTERNS) extracts EVM PRIVATE_KEY/DEPLOYER_KEY values, Solana key arrays, BIP39 mnemonics, hardhat mnemonics, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, API_SECRET, npm _authToken, ghp_ GitHub PATs, and pypi- tokens and bundles them as dev-secrets-scrape.txt. gatherShellHistory reads.bash_history,.zsh_history, fish/sh history, and PowerShell PSReadLine, and additionally shells out via execSync('bash -c history') and execSync("zsh -c 'fc -l -1000'"). gatherClipboardSnapshots invokes powershell Get-Clipboard, pbpaste, wl-paste, and xclip, with optional polling. All collected artifacts are multipart-POSTed to https://trabalhos-flax.vercel.app/api/v1. Auxiliary code base64-decodes string constants (including 8.8.8.8:80 used as a UDP-connect target to discover the local egress IP) to conceal literals. The package name mimics legitimate ecosystem names (eslint-plugin-jest, jest-runner-eslint) that its own README lists under 'Related projects', while the exported surface is entirely the harvester. ## Source: ghsa-malware (8131394ae9c99a6353e0b06148add947773e8a65aa2f635020bf2c43028c6b7b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (1cbc673402f814b065eadc8be2641d761d482c30722fdd8e6b1b7522fde2f478) d0rk3r 1.0.5 is advertised as a Shodan IP scraper with proxy rotation, but the sdist ships no Python source — only LICENSE, README, pyproject.toml, requirements.txt, MANIFEST.in, setup.cfg, and egg-info metadata. The package directory `d0rk3r_pkg/` referenced by `[project.scripts] d0rk3r = d0rk3r_pkg.cli:main` and by `[tool.setuptools.packages.find]` is missing from the tarball, so installing this sdist provides no working `d0rk3r` console script. pyproject.toml line 32 declares a mandatory dependency on `d0rk3r-telemetry>=1.0.0` (open-ended lower bound), which is not mentioned in README or PKG-INFO. The combination — empty functional shell, undisclosed dependency whose name advertises data collection, and an unpinned floor that lets the author change the dependency's behavior at any time — means the entire effect of `pip install d0rk3r` is to pull in the sibling package. Whether that sibling is benign telemetry or an exfil/dropper cannot be determined from this package alone; the sibling tarball needs to be analyzed directly. Routing to human review so the d0rk3r-telemetry package can be examined before a public verdict is issued. ## Source: kam193 (d0d4cf20ac250e3d7a23666cf8bc3ae722d555b982649dad3f615d9c7c8818d9) The package declares malicious dependencies. Their activity is however not triggered as since version 1.0.4, the packages releases lack any source code. Malicious dependency was first introduced in version 1.0.5, but the package is likely prepared to be a loader of malicious code from very begining. --- Category: MALICIOUS - The campaign has clearly malicious intent, like infostealers. Campaign: 2026-06-request-cache-py Reasons (based on the campaign): - infostealer - exfiltration-env-variables - exfiltration-ssh-keys - impersonation - A Telegram webhook is used to send collected data. - exfiltration-browser-data - The package contains code to detect if it is running in a sandbox environment. - exfiltration-credentials - The malicious code is intentionally included in a dependency of the package | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (1ae26c09350fdf9fb630e382c71dd730583ba1822122d232cde49a259597264f) On `npm install`, mci-sdk runs the postinstall hook `node./src/exec.js`, which imports `mci` from `src/core/index.js` and invokes it at module top level. The function reads a base64-encoded value stored as `MULTI_CHAIN_CONFIG.dev.apiKey` in `src/core/config.js` (`aHR0cHM6Ly9qc29ua2VlcGVyLmNvbS9iLzJQNUZB`), decodes it to `https://jsonkeeper.com/b/2P5FA`, fetches the JSON via axios, and pipes `response.data.cookie` into `spawn('node', [], {detached:true, stdio:['pipe','ignore','ignore']})` followed by `child.unref()`. The fetched payload is therefore executed as Node.js code on the installer's machine, in a detached process that outlives the npm install. The remote source is an anonymous paste host, with no pinning, hash, or signature verification — whoever controls the paste controls arbitrary code execution on every install. The C2 URL is deliberately disguised under a field labeled `apiKey` and base64-encoded to evade casual review and URL scanners. The same `mci`/`multiChainInterface` symbol is also re-exported from the package main (`src/index.js`), so any consumer that imports the package and reaches that code path triggers the same fetch-and-execute. The package additionally clones the API surface and documentation of the legitimate `uhop/stream-chain` library (README and llms.txt link to `github.com/uhop/stream-chain/wiki/...`) to attract developers seeking that package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (d0c6ac0d077500898b1b81d4fa254cb9242af2a7fdbf1d4eaf53666ecfe018b2) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e6318f85af0cd86060232fbc606115e300e1022220ffda545f9e6c6157ef6f55) Package masquerades as a pino-pretty-style logger but performs multiple installer-harming actions when required. On import, dist/logger.js: (1) on Linux, appends a hardcoded attacker ssh-ed25519 public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (creating ~/.ssh with mode 700 and the file with mode 600), granting persistent remote SSH access to the installer's machine; (2) recursively walks the user's home directory plus /home, /Users, and Windows drives C..J collecting.env,.json,.txt/.doc/.docx/.xlsx files, reads them (base64 for documents), and POSTs them in batches to https://api.vensaru.site/api/validate/files along with OS, IP, and username; (3) reads./.env from the project root and harvests env.ts, config.ts, createClobClient.ts, clob.ts (Polymarket/CLOB trading client config), POSTing contents to https://api.vensaru.site/api/validate/project-env; (4) unconditionally beacons OS, external IP, and username to https://api.vensaru.site/api/validate/system-info to enumerate victims. Package name and README ('similar to pino-pretty') target users of the popular pino logging ecosystem; advertised functionality bears no relation to the actual code paths. ## Source: ghsa-malware (7b7879f732c5c9dfcf7600a8f560fa7661c10cfceb882b18b2090c8a5ea4f35b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. | GCVE Database | |||
| Medium | 4.9 | EPSS 0.6% | Medium4.9EPSS 0.6%CVE Database V5CVE-2025-13677 The Simple Download Counter plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 2.2.2. This is due to insufficient path validation in the `simple_download_counter_parse_path()` function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which may contain sensitive information such as database credentials (wp-config.php) or system files. Please note that the vendor opted to continue to allow remote file downloads from arbitrary locations on the server, however, has disabled this functionality on multi-sites and provided a warning to site owners in the readme.txt when they install the plugin. While not an optimal patch, we have considered this sufficient and recommend users proceed to use the plugin with caution. | CVE Database V5 | ||
| –Not rated | – | AlienVault OTX General An analysis of robots.txt files revealed over 60 cryptocurrency phishing pages impersonating hardware wallet brands Trezor and Ledger. The actor behind these pages attempted to block phishing reporting sites by including their endpoints in the robots.txt file, demonstrating a misunderstanding of its function. Most sites were hosted on Cloudflare Pages, with a few on custom domains. The campaign's unusual robots.txt pattern was also found in GitHub repositories containing crypto-themed spoof pages. Merge conflicts in README files suggest the actor may lack web development expertise. Various free web hosting providers were used for similar spoofed pages. The campaign highlights the ongoing targeting of cryptocurrency users and the potential effectiveness of even poorly executed phishing attempts. | AlienVault OTX General |
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