MR ROBOT is a sophisticated Android Malware-as-a-Service operation targeting Indian bank customers. It operates on a subscription model allowing cybercriminals to rent customized banking trojans distributed via fake Play Store pages and messaging apps. The malware uses a multi-stage dropper to deploy banking trojans that intercept SMS and OTPs, silently enable call forwarding to bypass two-factor authentication, and overlay phishing screens to steal sensitive financial and identity information. One affiliate compromised 153 devices and intercepted over 5,400 SMS messages. The operation includes a Telegram bot storefront offering about 36 fake apps impersonating banks and government services, with stolen data exfiltrated to Firebase Realtime Database and Telegram channels.
Hirudo is an Android banking remote access trojan that combines credential theft with live remote control capabilities. It is distributed via shopping and entertainment apps acting as droppers, which install the trojan behind fake update prompts. The malware replaces legitimate banking apps with patched versions that disable internal security checks. The campaign targets eight Indonesian banking apps covering seven banks, embedding a hooking engine in the replacements. Distribution uses legitimate advertising infrastructure including Amazon CloudFront. Targeting extends beyond Indonesia to China, India, Mexico, Morocco, Thailand, and Malaysia. Backend data from August 2026 revealed thousands of stolen credentials and device records. No CVE or official patch information is available.
RATHat is an Android banking trojan characterized by its unique architecture where the malicious application serves merely as an entry point. After obtaining Accessibility Service permissions, it enables wireless debugging, pairs with the device's ADB daemon, and deploys a native Go service that operates outside Android's permission model. The operation's primary investment lies in its infrastructure, with three successive Command-and-Control panel generations emerging between April and September 2026: BlackCat, followed by Panda Workshop V5 and V6. These panels function as complete malware factories, building, signing, and publishing samples automatically while implementing scheduled rebuilds to evade hash-based detection. Nearly 100 separate deployments across Europe, LATAM, and South-Eastern Asia suggest a Malware-as-a-Service model. Notably, the operation integrates AI on both sides: the malware uses Gemini models to locate on-screen controls when automation fails, while the panel employs LLMs to estim...
RemControl is an Android banking trojan operating as Malware-as-a-Service since May 2026. It targets over 30 financial institutions in Western Europe, the Middle East, and Canada via fake TVTap IPTV download pages distributed through malvertising. The malware abuses Android Accessibility Service to inject phishing overlays, stream device screens in real-time, log keystrokes, and enable full remote control. The criminal infrastructure was partially built using AI-generated content, including phishing pages and C2 panel documentation. The threat actor UNKK operates these campaigns, with possible links to the Medusa UNKN affiliate botnet.
Gigabud is an Android remote access banking trojan active since 2022, attributed to GoldFactory group, targeting victims across Southeast Asia, South Asia, Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The malware now utilizes Vwork, a weaponized fork of the open-source app cloning application Shelter, to evade detection by creating isolated work profiles. After initial Gigabud infection, Vwork is installed to clone banking applications into the work profile, hiding malicious activity from signature-based detection in application security SDKs. Between February and July 2026, approximately 1,469 compromised devices and 1,281 potentially compromised logins were observed in Indonesia alone, with estimated losses of roughly $960,939. The infection chain involves social engineering through phishing sites delivering fake apps disguised as legitimate services, followed by credential theft through overlays and remote-controlled fraudulent transactions executed within cloned banking apps.
ERMAC and HookBot are two branches of one Android banking trojan sold as a service, forking from shared code originating with Cerberus. A copy of the builder, Laravel backend, and React panel leaked in August 2025, enabling unrelated operators to deploy panels with default credentials and keys still in place. The lineage runs Cerberus to ERMAC to Hook, confirmed through source code analysis showing identical database migrations and network protocol structures. HookBot added VNC remote control and 38 new commands while maintaining ERMAC's core. The leaked source includes a Docker stack, Obfuscapk builder, and IP-whitelist firewall that hides panels but leaves the builder port exposed. Operators target 484 apps across 40+ countries including Japanese banks, Brazilian financial institutions, Turkish banks, and cryptocurrency wallets. Detection artifacts survive in builder obfuscator flags and favicons, while panel titles remain easily changed.
A new NFC relay malware family called WindRelay has been discovered operating in combination with SpyNote RAT to enable sophisticated contactless payment fraud. The scheme uses live social engineering phone calls where fraudsters impersonate bank employees and guide victims to install personalized RAT malware labeled with the victim's own name. Once installed, the RAT enables silent deployment of WindRelay, which captures contactless payment card data via NFC when victims tap their cards to their phones. The captured data is relayed in real-time to fraudster-controlled terminals for immediate cash-out through physical purchases or ATM withdrawals. The operation employs dual monetization, combining RAT-driven digital loan fraud with NFC-based card-present transactions. Group-IB identified 23 WindRelay samples targeting victims in Czechia, Slovakia, and Slovenia between November 2025 and July 2026.
An Android malware campaign masquerading as a bank KYC verification application targets users in India through WhatsApp distribution. The threat operates as a multi-stage dropper installing secondary payloads while establishing persistent command-and-control communication. It combines native code obfuscation, Firebase-based remote execution, VPN-based traffic manipulation, and WebView-based phishing to systematically harvest sensitive user data. The infection chain progresses through deceptive update screens, VPN activation, silent APK installation, and extensive permission abuse. The deployed payload enables SMS interception, call control, USSD execution, and structured credential theft through staged phishing interfaces mimicking legitimate banking workflows. Exfiltrated data is encrypted locally and transmitted to jsonapi.biz, while critical configuration values are hidden inside native libraries to hinder detection.
