Threats Tagged 'asyncapi'

In July 2026, Microsoft Threat Intelligence uncovered a supply chain attack targeting the official AsyncAPI NPM organization. Attackers published malicious versions of multiple packages under the trusted AsyncAPI namespace, exploiting developer dependencies to distribute malware. The compromised packages deployed a multi-stage Remote Access Trojan through obfuscated lifecycle hooks that executed during routine build workflows. Upon installation, the malware retrieved second-stage payloads from IPFS gateways, established persistence on infected systems, and initiated command-and-control communications with external infrastructure. The attack leveraged trusted build automation and dynamic package retrieval via npx to bypass traditional security controls, affecting developers executing version-pinned tasks in their CI/CD pipelines.

On July 14, 2026, a coordinated supply chain attack compromised the @asyncapi npm organization, affecting five package versions across four packages. The attack originated from a GitHub Actions workflow vulnerability that exposed privileged credentials, enabling unauthorized code injection. Unlike typical postinstall attacks, this campaign executes at module import time, bypassing common npm install --ignore-scripts protections. The malicious code spawned hidden processes that fetched a second-stage payload from IPFS, deploying the Miasma modular runtime with command-and-control capabilities, persistence mechanisms, and credential harvesting features. The payload included disabled modules for supply-chain propagation, AI-tool poisoning, and sandbox evasion. All compromised packages were published through legitimate GitHub OIDC workflows with valid provenance signatures, masking the malicious activity within trusted release processes.

Four AsyncAPI npm packages were compromised in July 2026, delivering Miasma v3, a new variant of the worm previously found in Red Hat packages. The malicious versions (@asyncapi/generator, @asyncapi/generator-helpers, @asyncapi/generator-components, and @asyncapi/specs) were published through AsyncAPI's legitimate GitHub Actions workflow using npm's OIDC integration, creating packages with valid provenance attestations. Unlike previous variants, this attack triggers when applications load the poisoned library rather than during installation. The payload downloads a second stage from IPFS, establishing a persistent Node.js backdoor with arbitrary shell command execution capabilities. While the codebase contains credential theft, propagation, and AI-tool poisoning modules, this deployment primarily functions as a remote access trojan. The attack began with an unauthorized commit to the repository's release branch, highlighting the importance of branch protection even when using trusted-publisher mechanisms.

Four npm packages in the AsyncAPI namespace were compromised to distribute a multi-stage botnet loader called Miasma. The attack utilized trusted GitHub Actions publishing but originated from a poisoned source commit. Malicious code was injected into legitimate source files that execute when imported, launching a detached Node.js process to download an 8.25 MB encrypted payload from IPFS. The final payload is a sophisticated tasking framework supporting multiple command-and-control channels including REST, Nostr relays, IPFS, Ethereum smart contracts, and BitTorrent DHT. The framework establishes persistence via systemd services on Linux and fake NodeJS directories, supporting file operations, shell execution, data collection, and cross-ecosystem propagation capabilities for npm, PyPI, RubyGems, and Cargo ecosystems.

On July 14, 2026, an attacker exploited a misconfigured GitHub Actions workflow in the AsyncAPI generator repository through a 'pwn request' vulnerability. The attacker opened 37 pull requests, with one containing obfuscated JavaScript that exfiltrated a highly privileged Personal Access Token belonging to asyncapi-bot. Using the stolen credentials, the attacker published five malicious npm package versions under the @asyncapi namespace, which collectively receive over three million downloads weekly. The malware features a multi-stage payload that establishes persistence and connects to command and control infrastructure, executing on import rather than install. It includes capabilities for credential theft targeting browsers, SSH keys, cloud credentials, and cryptocurrency wallets. The payload shares technical characteristics with the Miasma malware framework but shows unique features including a comprehensive command framework.