Miasma Worm Returns to npm
In July 2026, four AsyncAPI npm packages were compromised to deliver Miasma v3, a new variant of a worm previously seen in Red Hat packages. The malicious packages were published via AsyncAPI's legitimate GitHub Actions workflow using npm's OIDC integration, resulting in valid provenance attestations. This variant activates when the poisoned library is loaded, not during installation, downloading a second-stage payload from IPFS that establishes a persistent Node.js backdoor capable of arbitrary shell command execution. The attack started with an unauthorized commit to the repository's release branch, underscoring the need for branch protection even with trusted-publisher mechanisms. The primary function of this deployment is a remote access trojan, although the codebase includes modules for credential theft, propagation, and AI-tool poisoning. No known exploits in the wild have been reported.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The Miasma v3 worm compromised four AsyncAPI npm packages (@asyncapi/generator, @asyncapi/generator-helpers, @asyncapi/generator-components, and @asyncapi/specs) by leveraging an unauthorized commit to the repository's release branch. The attacker used the legitimate GitHub Actions workflow with npm's OIDC integration to publish malicious versions with valid provenance attestations. Unlike previous Miasma variants, this version triggers upon library load rather than installation. It downloads a second-stage payload from IPFS, establishing a persistent Node.js backdoor that allows arbitrary shell command execution. While the malware includes capabilities for credential theft, propagation, and AI-tool poisoning, this deployment mainly functions as a remote access trojan. The incident highlights the importance of branch protection controls even when using trusted publisher workflows.
Potential Impact
The compromised packages enable attackers to establish a persistent backdoor on systems that load the poisoned libraries, allowing arbitrary shell command execution. This can lead to remote access, potential credential theft, lateral movement, and further compromise of affected environments. The attack undermines trust in the supply chain by abusing legitimate publishing workflows and valid provenance attestations. Although no active exploits in the wild have been reported, the presence of advanced capabilities in the malware codebase indicates a significant potential risk if exploited.
Mitigation Recommendations
Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Organizations should verify the integrity of AsyncAPI npm packages before use and monitor for updates from AsyncAPI regarding remediation. Additionally, enforcing strict branch protection on release branches and reviewing CI/CD workflows for unauthorized changes are critical to prevent similar supply chain compromises. Since this attack abuses legitimate publishing workflows, relying solely on provenance attestations is insufficient without additional controls.
Indicators of Compromise
- domain: obfuscator.io
- ip: 85.137.53.71
- url: http://85.137.53.71:8080
- url: http://85.137.53.71:8081
- url: http://85.137.53.71:8091
Miasma Worm Returns to npm
Description
In July 2026, four AsyncAPI npm packages were compromised to deliver Miasma v3, a new variant of a worm previously seen in Red Hat packages. The malicious packages were published via AsyncAPI's legitimate GitHub Actions workflow using npm's OIDC integration, resulting in valid provenance attestations. This variant activates when the poisoned library is loaded, not during installation, downloading a second-stage payload from IPFS that establishes a persistent Node.js backdoor capable of arbitrary shell command execution. The attack started with an unauthorized commit to the repository's release branch, underscoring the need for branch protection even with trusted-publisher mechanisms. The primary function of this deployment is a remote access trojan, although the codebase includes modules for credential theft, propagation, and AI-tool poisoning. No known exploits in the wild have been reported.
AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The Miasma v3 worm compromised four AsyncAPI npm packages (@asyncapi/generator, @asyncapi/generator-helpers, @asyncapi/generator-components, and @asyncapi/specs) by leveraging an unauthorized commit to the repository's release branch. The attacker used the legitimate GitHub Actions workflow with npm's OIDC integration to publish malicious versions with valid provenance attestations. Unlike previous Miasma variants, this version triggers upon library load rather than installation. It downloads a second-stage payload from IPFS, establishing a persistent Node.js backdoor that allows arbitrary shell command execution. While the malware includes capabilities for credential theft, propagation, and AI-tool poisoning, this deployment mainly functions as a remote access trojan. The incident highlights the importance of branch protection controls even when using trusted publisher workflows.
Potential Impact
The compromised packages enable attackers to establish a persistent backdoor on systems that load the poisoned libraries, allowing arbitrary shell command execution. This can lead to remote access, potential credential theft, lateral movement, and further compromise of affected environments. The attack undermines trust in the supply chain by abusing legitimate publishing workflows and valid provenance attestations. Although no active exploits in the wild have been reported, the presence of advanced capabilities in the malware codebase indicates a significant potential risk if exploited.
Mitigation Recommendations
Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Organizations should verify the integrity of AsyncAPI npm packages before use and monitor for updates from AsyncAPI regarding remediation. Additionally, enforcing strict branch protection on release branches and reviewing CI/CD workflows for unauthorized changes are critical to prevent similar supply chain compromises. Since this attack abuses legitimate publishing workflows, relying solely on provenance attestations is insufficient without additional controls.
Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- ["https://research.jfrog.com/post/miasma-worm-returns-to-npm/"]
- Adversary
- null
- Pulse Id
- 6a579712c94f47186288661d
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Domain
| Value | Description | Copy |
|---|---|---|
domainobfuscator.io | — |
Ip
| Value | Description | Copy |
|---|---|---|
ip85.137.53.71 | — |
Url
| Value | Description | Copy |
|---|---|---|
urlhttp://85.137.53.71:8080 | — | |
urlhttp://85.137.53.71:8081 | — | |
urlhttp://85.137.53.71:8091 | — |
Threat ID: 6a579dc068715ace43e91708
Added to database: 07/15/2026, 14:48:32 UTC
Last enriched: 07/15/2026, 15:09:03 UTC
Last updated: 07/15/2026, 15:09:03 UTC
Views: 6
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