Threats Tagged 'brew-breezy-cve-2026-47712'

### Impact dulwich.porcelain.format_patch(outdir=...) derives each patch filename from the commit's subject line. Prior to this fix, get_summary only replaced spaces with dashes - path separators (/, \), parent-directory components (..), and other filename-hostile characters (e.g. :) were preserved verbatim and passed straight into os.path.join(outdir, f"{i:04d}-{summary}.patch"). A malicious commit subject could therefore direct the generated patch file outside the requested outdir. Reduced examples: - x/../../x produced <outdir>/0001-x/../../x.patch, resolving two directories above outdir. - x\..\..\x produced the equivalent escape on Windows, here \ is also a path separator. Related issues from the same root cause: - Subjects containing characters that are illegal in Windows filenames (e.g. :) caused format_patch to fail outright on Windows, where git would have succeeded. - Very long subjects produced excessively long filenames that could exceed filesystem limits; git truncates them. Anyone calling porcelain.format_patch (or the dulwich format-patch CLI) against untrusted commits - for example, a service that runs format-patch over user-supplied repositories or pull requests - could have patch files written to attacker-chosen locations within the process's write permissions. ### Patches Fixed in Dulwich 1.2.5. Users should upgrade. dulwich.patch.get_summary now mirrors git's format_sanitized_subject: only `[A-Za-z0-9._]` are kept, runs of other characters collapse to a single -, consecutive . collapse to a single ., trailing ./- are stripped, and the result is length-limited. This makes the returned string safe to embed as a filename component, so format_patch can no longer be steered out of outdir via the commit subject. ### Workarounds Until upgrading, callers that pass untrusted commits to porcelain.format_patch can: - Use stdout=True and write the patch to a destination they control, rather than letting format_patch choose the filename. - Validate the chosen path before opening - e.g. compare os.path.realpath(returned_path) against os.path.realpath(outdir) and reject any patch whose resolved path is not inside outdir. - Pre-screen commits and refuse to format any whose subject's first line contains /, \, .., or other characters that are not safe on the target filesystem. ### Resources - Fix commit: https://github.com/jelmer/dulwich/commit/c2446e51b - Affected API: dulwich.porcelain.format_patch / dulwich format-patch - Reference behavior: git's format_sanitized_subject in pretty.c