Attackers are distributing the ValleyRAT backdoor disguised as legitimate Chinese adware called QN Wallpaper. The malicious installer deploys a modified version of the wallpaper management tool and uses DLL sideloading techniques to execute malicious code under a signed process. ValleyRAT is a sophisticated backdoor capable of keylogging, clipboard monitoring, screenshot capture, and delivering additional modules. The campaign has affected over 1,500 unique users, primarily in China and India, with more than 100,000 detections throughout 2026. Attribution points to the Silver Fox threat group, known for operating ValleyRAT. The attackers disabled Windows Defender, established persistence mechanisms, and implemented process protection techniques including marking processes as critical to trigger system crashes if terminated.
Jewelbug is a China-based hackers-for-hire group conducting parallel operations: espionage campaigns targeting government ministries and militaries across the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and South Asia, alongside a cryptocurrency fraud business. Both missions operate from a single control panel called XG-Web, a browser-centric remote-access framework. The group's main implant is the Antino backdoor, complemented by a malicious browser extension disguised as 'PDF Viewer' and the ClientKing Linux/router implant. Their largest operation compromised over 15 government webmail tenants in a Middle Eastern country through a single watering-hole attack. The victim database recorded over one million implant check-ins and 580,000 stolen browser cookies within three months. Operators are linked to a registered Hunan Province company, with infrastructure supporting both espionage and commercial SEO poisoning operations targeting Chinese-speaking cryptocurrency users.
US Federal authorities have seized 13 domains allegedly used in a Chinese intelligence-linked operation to recruit Americans with access to classified government information. The websites posed as legitimate consulting firms, offering vague consultancy and advisory roles to current and former US government employees, military personnel, and security clearance holders. The operation, which began in November 2023, used fake company websites, online job postings, and social media recruiting to approach potential targets. Recruiters offered paid consulting work, then pressured candidates to share confidential insider information. The campaign employed false personas, stolen identities, AI-generated profile photos, encrypted messaging, cryptocurrency, and fake contracts to appear legitimate. Job postings appeared on platforms including Upwork, Expertia AI, and Hubstaff Talent, covering topics aligned with Chinese government interests.
A global espionage campaign targeting telecommunications and government organizations across four continents has been disrupted. The threat actor, UNC2814, is suspected to be linked to China and has been active since 2017. The campaign utilized a sophisticated backdoor called GRIDTIDE, which leveraged Google Sheets API for command and control. The attackers compromised 53 victims in 42 countries, with suspected infections in 20 more. GRIDTIDE's capabilities include executing shell commands, file transfers, and evading detection by disguising traffic as legitimate cloud API requests. The disruption involved terminating attacker-controlled cloud projects, disabling infrastructure, and revoking API access.
A sophisticated campaign by the Silver Fox APT group has been discovered using a fake version of the popular Chinese antivirus Huorong Security to distribute ValleyRAT, a Remote Access Trojan. The attackers created a convincing lookalike website with a typosquatted domain to trick users into downloading a malicious installer. The malware uses DLL sideloading techniques to deploy a full-featured backdoor with advanced stealth capabilities. It establishes persistence through scheduled tasks, disables Windows Defender, and employs various evasion tactics. Once installed, ValleyRAT provides attackers with extensive control over the victim's system, including keylogging, process injection, and credential theft. The campaign primarily targets Chinese-language systems but may be spreading to other threat actors due to the public leak of the ValleyRAT builder.
Rapid7 Labs has uncovered a sophisticated campaign attributed to the Chinese APT group Lotus Blossom, involving a new custom backdoor named Chrysalis. The attack compromised Notepad++ infrastructure to deliver the backdoor. Analysis revealed multiple custom loaders, including one using Microsoft Warbird for obfuscation. The Chrysalis backdoor has extensive capabilities for information gathering, file operations, and remote command execution. Additional artifacts found include Cobalt Strike beacons and Metasploit payloads. The campaign shows Lotus Blossom evolving its tactics, mixing custom and off-the-shelf tools with advanced obfuscation techniques to evade detection.
An analysis of Chinese hosting environments identified over 18,000 active malware command-and-control (C2) servers distributed across 48 infrastructure providers, with China Unicom hosting nearly half. The majority of malicious activity is C2 infrastructure (84%), followed by phishing (13%). Key malware families such as Mozi, ARL, and Cobalt Strike dominate C2 activity, supporting both cybercrime and state-linked operations. High-trust networks like China169 Backbone and CERNET are exploited, revealing persistent abuse patterns and infrastructure reuse across campaigns.
The Knownsec leak exposes a state-aligned Chinese cyber contractor deeply integrated with national security and intelligence operations. Internal documents reveal Knownsec's role in developing offensive cyber capabilities, large-scale reconnaissance systems, and data fusion platforms for public security bureaus and military clients. Key products include ZoomEye for global IP scanning, GhostX for exploitation, and Passive Radar for covert network mapping. The leak provides unprecedented insight into Knownsec's organizational structure, personnel, and strategic targeting of foreign critical infrastructure, particularly in Taiwan and other Asian countries. It demonstrates how commercial entities like Knownsec function as core components of China's cyber-espionage ecosystem, blending state objectives with industrial-scale development of intrusion and surveillance technologies.
ESET researchers have uncovered a new China-aligned APT group named LongNosedGoblin targeting governmental entities in Southeast Asia and Japan for cyberespionage. The group employs a varied custom toolset of C#/.NET applications and abuses Group Policy for lateral movement. Key tools include NosyHistorian for collecting browser history, NosyDoor backdoor using cloud services as C&C, and NosyStealer for exfiltrating browser data. The attackers also utilize techniques like AppDomainManager injection and AMSI bypassing. LongNosedGoblin has been active since at least September 2023, showing ongoing campaigns throughout 2024 and 2025. The research provides detailed analysis of the group's malware and tactics, including potential sharing of the NosyDoor backdoor among multiple China-aligned actors.
The Chinese APT group Silver Fox has launched an SEO poisoning campaign targeting Chinese-speaking users, impersonating Microsoft Teams. The campaign uses a modified ValleyRAT loader with Cyrillic elements to mislead attribution. Silver Fox aims to conduct espionage and financial fraud, posing a significant threat due to its dual mission. The attack chain involves a fake Teams website, malicious ZIP files, and binary data retrieval from XML and JSON files. The malware exploits rundll32.exe for binary proxy execution and establishes C2 communication. Attribution to Silver Fox is based on overlapping infrastructure and links to previous campaigns. Organizations with global operations, especially in China, are advised to implement robust security measures and logging capabilities to defend against this evolving threat.
APT24, a Chinese threat actor, has conducted a three-year cyber espionage campaign using BADAUDIO, a highly obfuscated first-stage downloader. The group has evolved from broad strategic web compromises to more sophisticated tactics, including supply chain attacks and targeted phishing. They compromised a Taiwanese digital marketing firm, affecting over 1,000 domains. APT24 uses advanced techniques like control flow flattening, fingerprinting, and covert data exfiltration. The malware integrates with Cobalt Strike Beacon and employs DLL Search Order Hijacking for execution. The campaign demonstrates the actor's persistent and adaptive capabilities, highlighting the growing sophistication of Chinese cyber threats.
China-aligned threat actor PlushDaemon has been conducting espionage operations since 2018, targeting entities in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Cambodia, South Korea, the United States, and New Zealand. The group employs a custom backdoor called SlowStepper and uses a network implant named EdgeStepper to hijack legitimate updates. EdgeStepper redirects DNS queries to a malicious node, rerouting traffic from legitimate infrastructure to attacker-controlled servers. The group has also exploited web server vulnerabilities and performed a supply-chain attack. PlushDaemon's adversary-in-the-middle technique involves compromising network devices, deploying EdgeStepper, and using it to redirect DNS queries for software updates to malicious nodes. This allows them to serve malicious updates containing the LittleDaemon downloader, which then deploys the SlowStepper implant.
The Silent Lynx APT group has been conducting espionage campaigns targeting Central Asian nations, Russia, China, and Azerbaijan. Two main campaigns were identified: one focusing on Russia-Azerbaijan relations and another on China-Central Asia relations. The group uses various malware including PowerShell scripts, .NET implants, and C++ reverse shells. They leverage spear-phishing with malicious attachments, GitHub-hosted payloads, and scheduled tasks for persistence. The campaigns aim to gather intelligence on diplomatic communications, transportation projects, and other strategic initiatives. Silent Lynx shows a pattern of targeting summit meetings and infrastructure deals in the region, with a particular focus on events in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
The Silent Lynx APT group has been conducting espionage campaigns targeting diplomatic entities and critical infrastructure in Central Asia, Russia, and China. Two major campaigns were identified: one focused on Russia-Azerbaijan relations and another on China-Central Asia relations. The group used various malware tools including PowerShell scripts, .NET implants, and C++ reverse shells. They leveraged spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments and GitHub-hosted payloads. Key targets included government think-tanks, diplomats, and entities in mining, transport and communication industries. The campaigns coincided with important summits and meetings between the targeted countries. Attribution was based on similarities in tactics, tools, and victimology to previous Silent Lynx operations.
A sophisticated cyber campaign targeting Chinese individuals in the FinTech, cryptocurrency exchange, and trading platform sectors has been uncovered. The operation uses spear-phishing emails with malicious .LNK files embedded in fake resumes. When executed, these files initiate a multi-stage infection process, ultimately deploying ValleyRAT malware. The malware establishes persistence through scheduled tasks, performs system reconnaissance, and exfiltrates sensitive data. The campaign's infrastructure is primarily hosted in Hong Kong, with multiple domains using the .work TLD to impersonate job portals. The attackers employ various techniques to evade detection, including anti-VM checks and attempts to disable antivirus software.
This analysis examines the Bookworm malware family and its connection to the Chinese APT group Stately Taurus. Using a structured attribution framework, the study evaluates tactics, tooling, operational security, infrastructure, victimology and timelines to establish a high-confidence link between Bookworm and Stately Taurus. Key evidence includes shared program database paths, overlapping command and control infrastructure, and consistent targeting of Southeast Asian governments. The framework assigns scores to each piece of evidence, resulting in an overall attribution confidence score of 58.4 out of 100, indicating strong confidence in the connection. This systematic approach aims to improve analytical rigor and collaboration in threat intelligence.
In mid-2025, China-aligned threat actor Hive0154 deployed new malware variants, including an updated Toneshell backdoor and a novel USB worm called SnakeDisk. Toneshell9 evades detection and supports C2 communication through local proxies. SnakeDisk only executes on devices in Thailand, propagating via USB drives and dropping the Yokai backdoor. The malware shows code overlaps with previous Tonedisk variants. Hive0154 continues to refine its large malware arsenal, targeting organizations worldwide with frequent development cycles. The group uses multiple custom loaders, backdoors, and USB worm families, showcasing advanced capabilities. Defenders should monitor for suspicious network activity, USB drives with hidden components, and implement recommended security measures to mitigate risks from this evolving threat.
A new spyware campaign dubbed SparkKitty has been discovered targeting both iOS and Android devices. The malware, believed to be connected to the previously identified SparkCat campaign, is distributed through official app stores and unofficial sources. It primarily steals photos from infected devices, likely searching for cryptocurrency wallet information. The campaign has been active since at least February 2024 and mainly targets users in Southeast Asia and China. The malware is embedded in various apps, including modified versions of popular applications like TikTok, and uses different techniques to evade detection. The researchers identified multiple variations of the malware, including obfuscated libraries and malicious frameworks mimicking legitimate ones.
APT41, a sophisticated Chinese state-sponsored threat actor, blends cyber espionage with cybercrime tactics. They target various sectors globally, including healthcare, telecom, and government entities. Recently, APT41 was observed using Google Calendar for malware command-and-control on a Taiwanese government website. Their attack chain involves spear-phishing emails, malicious ZIP archives, and a three-module malware system called ToughProgress. This malware uses stealthy techniques like in-memory execution, encryption, and process hollowing to evade detection. The unique aspect of ToughProgress is its use of Google Calendar events for covert data exchange, creating a stealthy communication channel for remote command execution and data exfiltration.
The TA-ShadowCricket group, formerly known as Shadow Force, has been active in the Asia-Pacific region since 2012, targeting Windows servers and MS-SQL servers. They operate an IRC server with over 2,000 affected IPs in 72 countries. The group uses various malware and tools, including Upm, SqlShell, Maggie, and Wgdrop. Their activities involve three stages: initial access and reconnaissance, backdoor deployment, and additional malicious behaviors. The group has connections to China and has been quietly stealing information for over 13 years without demanding ransom or releasing stolen data. Their persistent activity suggests preparation for potential large-scale attacks in the future.
