Threats Tagged 'cve-2026-45709'

## Summary The fix for GHSA-6jxm-fv7w-rw5j (CVE-2026-23845, "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTML Check API"), shipped in mailpit `v1.28.3`, hardened `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::downloadCSSToBytes` with a 5MB size cap, a `text/css` content-type check, login-info stripping in `isValidURL`, and an opt-in `--block-remote-css-and-fonts` config flag — but **did not add the IP-filtering dialer that the same codebase already uses on the two sister SSRF endpoints** (the proxy handler and link-check). At HEAD `8bc966e61834a24c48b4465da418f75e73be0afd` (2026-05-06), `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::newSafeHTTPClient` is mis-named — it builds an `http.Client` whose `Transport.DialContext` calls `net.Dialer.DialContext` directly with no IP allowlisting. As a result, the SSRF originally reported by Bao Anh Phan still permits the server to dial: - loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`, `::1`), - private (`10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `fc00::/7`), - link-local incl. **cloud IMDS** (`169.254.0.0/16`, especially `169.254.169.254`), - CGNAT (`100.64.0.0/10`), - and any other reserved/multicast range, — provided the target replies with `HTTP/200` and a content-type beginning with `text/css`. With redirect-following (`CheckRedirect` allows redirects to any `isValidURL` URL with no IP filter), an attacker-controlled public site can redirect mailpit's request into the private network without ever appearing in the email's HTML. In the default mailpit deploy (no UI auth, no SMTP auth, port 1025/8025 exposed), this is an unauthenticated, network-reachable SSRF triggered by sending an HTML email and then issuing one HTTP `GET` to `/api/v1/message/{id}/html-check`. ## Affected versions - `internal/htmlcheck/css.go` at HEAD `8bc966e61834a24c48b4465da418f75e73be0afd` (2026-05-06). - All versions `>= v1.28.3` (the version that shipped the GHSA-6jxm fix). Versions `<= v1.28.2` are vulnerable to the original GHSA-6jxm; versions `>= v1.28.3` carry the still-vulnerable variant described here. ## The incomplete fix The original GHSA-6jxm fix added size+content-type+login-info hardening to `downloadCSSToBytes`. But the dialer it uses still has no `safeDialContext`. The companion `linkcheck` and `proxy` handlers in the same codebase have all-three protections: size cap, content-type/redirect filter, **AND** a `safeDialContext` that runs `tools.IsInternalIP(ip.IP)` per resolved address — same pattern the htmlcheck dialer should adopt. Side-by-side at HEAD `8bc966e`: | File | Function | `safeDialContext` (IP filter)? | TOCTOU-safe (dial-by-IP)? | |---|---|---|---| | `internal/linkcheck/status.go::safeDialContext` line 140-163 | dial check | YES | YES (resolved IP joined with port) | | `server/handlers/proxy.go::safeDialContext` line 393-415 | dial check | YES | YES | | `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::newSafeHTTPClient` line 275-310 | dial check | **NO** | n/a | The mis-named `newSafeHTTPClient` reads: ```go // internal/htmlcheck/css.go:275-310 func newSafeHTTPClient() *http.Client { dialer := &net.Dialer{ Timeout: 5 * time.Second, KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second, } tr := &http.Transport{ Proxy: nil, DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error) { return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, address) // no IP filter }, ... } client := &http.Client{ Transport: tr, Timeout: 15 * time.Second, CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error { if len(via) >= 3 { return errors.New("too many redirects") } if !isValidURL(req.URL.String()) { return errors.New("invalid redirect URL") } return nil }, } return client } ``` `isValidURL` only rejects non-http(s) and userinfo URLs — it does NOT reject internal IPs. Compare `linkcheck/status.go::safeDialContext`: ```go ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host) ... if !config.AllowInternalHTTPRequests { for _, ip := range ips { if tools.IsInternalIP(ip.IP) { return nil, fmt.Errorf("blocked request to %s (%s): private/reserved address", host, ip) } } } return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(ips[0].IP.String(), port)) ``` That's the protection htmlcheck is missing. ## Reachability chain (default deploy) ``` Listen() # config/config.go:36 SMTPListen = "[::]:1025" ↓ SMTP server # internal/smtpd/main.go:222-249 AuthRequired: false, AuthHandler: nil ↓ attacker injects HTML body with <link rel="stylesheet" href="...attacker.com/redirect.css"> ↓ storage.Store(...) ↓ Listen() # server/server.go HTTPListen ↓ attacker sends GET /api/v1/message/{id}/html-check apiv1.HTMLCheck # server/apiv1/other.go:18 ↓ no UI auth in default deploy (auth.UICredentials == nil) htmlcheck.RunTests(msg.HTML)