Threats Tagged 'device code phishing'

Wazza is a multi-stage phishing kit actively targeting Microsoft 365 accounts since July 2026. It uses phishing emails with PDF lures themed around business documents to redirect victims through a complex infrastructure involving Google Sites and CloudFlare Workers. The kit impersonates multiple well-known services and employs advanced browser checks and client-side protections. It abuses Microsoft OAuth device authorization to trick victims into completing authentication, allowing attackers to gain access to accounts and cloud resources. The campaign is medium severity due to credential theft risks.

This analysis examines infrastructure used by multiple Russian cyber espionage clusters targeting individuals in academia, think tanks, and organizations across Europe and the United States. The investigation expands on three threat clusters (UNC6293, UNC7005, and UNC5976) that employed OAuth phishing, Microsoft device code phishing, and WhatsApp targeting. UNC6293 utilized lure domains impersonating the Council on Foreign Relations and government portals, with possible Evilginx configurations. UNC7005 demonstrated lower sophistication with poor operational security, using domains like my-invite[.]org for phishing campaigns. UNC5976 employed Google Drive impersonation domains for OAuth phishing. The analysis leverages historical DNS data, CSS hash similarities, favicon analysis, registration patterns, and certificate information to identify additional infrastructure and tracking methods for discovering related malicious domains and IP addresses.

MediumMalwareUnited StatesCzechia#device code phishing#oauth phishing#dns pivoting

Three suspected Russian cyber espionage clusters—UNC6293, UNC7005, and UNC5976—target individuals in academia, aerospace, defense, governments, and think tanks in Europe and the US. They use sophisticated phishing techniques including app password phishing, OAuth phishing, device code phishing, and malware deployment. UNC6293 and UNC7005 are linked with moderate confidence to ICE RELIC (APT29), while UNC5976 is distinct. Their operations involve social engineering tactics such as fake diplomatic invitations and conference registrations. They abuse legitimate authentication mechanisms like Google OAuth and Microsoft device codes, complicating detection.

MediumCampaignUnited StatesArmeniaFinland+1#russian cyber espionage#oauth phishing#vidar

Recent investigations have uncovered sophisticated phishing campaigns employing multi-stage redirection chains that abuse trusted cloud infrastructure and newly registered domains. One campaign exploits Framer, a no-code web platform, combined with Cloudflare Workers to host deceptive landing pages. These pages utilize HTML redirection smuggling via the Blob API, Web Crypto API for decryption, and anti-debugging techniques to evade detection. Another campaign involves device code phishing targeting OneDrive credentials through three-stage redirections using newly registered domains with randomized alphanumeric strings. Both campaigns employ brand impersonation, custom CAPTCHA challenges, and anti-analysis measures including keyboard shortcut blocking. The threat actors leverage a hybrid infrastructure combining legitimate cloud services with short-lived domains to bypass traditional detection methods.

A sophisticated credential theft campaign manipulates DNS and HTTP traffic on captive portal networks at hotels, conference centers, and hospitality venues to redirect victims to attacker-controlled infrastructure. The operation harvests Microsoft 365 credentials through phishing pages, device code phishing abusing Microsoft Entra ID authentication flow, and malware delivery via ClickFix social engineering techniques. Evidence indicates compromised shared captive portal services rather than individual venue breaches, with affected gateways identified in several U.S. cities, India, and Saudi Arabia. The campaign deploys two primary malware tools: CornFlake, a Go-based RAT providing persistent access and extensive surveillance capabilities, and ChocoShell, an in-memory PowerShell stealer that harvests browser credentials, Microsoft 365 tokens, and Azure AD tokens. The operation targets travelers across multiple sectors and has expanded to include Android devices through malicious APK files.

HighVulnerabilityUnited StatesBritish Indian Ocean TerritoryIndia+1#cve#cve-2026-21509#cwe-807

Helix is a data extortion group conducting multi-target campaigns using vishing, device code phishing, and automated SharePoint data exfiltration. Emerging from the BlackFile and ShinyHunters ecosystem after BlackFile's shutdown in April 2026, Helix uses social engineering to impersonate managers during vishing calls to trigger device code authentication flows. After compromising accounts, the group registers MFA to maintain access, enumerates SharePoint sites with automated tools, and exfiltrates bulk data. Their infrastructure shares hosting with BlackFile and uses geo-matched residential proxies to evade detection. The group varies dwell times to complicate incident response efforts.

Device code phishing exploits the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant, a legitimate authentication feature designed for input-limited devices like smart TVs. Attackers initiate a device-code request with Microsoft, receive a valid code, then trick victims into approving it through social engineering. The victim authenticates on genuine Microsoft pages and completes MFA, but the session tokens are issued to the attacker instead. When targeting the Microsoft Authentication Broker, attackers can register rogue devices and obtain long-lived refresh tokens for persistent access. A recent campaign used sophisticated multi-stage delivery chains involving Google Sites, compromised website redirectors, and fake document-sharing portals. After successful authentication, attackers registered multiple devices, created hidden mailbox rules, and used compromised accounts to send additional phishing emails, all without touching victim endpoints.

A significant expansion of the Kali365 phishing-as-a-service operation has been observed, now targeting multiple platforms beyond Microsoft 365. The operator abuses OAuth 2.0 device authorization flows to bypass MFA and steal authentication tokens. Key discoveries include a live command-and-control panel infrastructure, a phishing campaign impersonating MAX Messenger (Russia's state-backed messaging platform with 110 million users) through fake prize-claim flows, and a cluster of 126 malicious hosts impersonating services including Microsoft Outlook, Okta SSO, Xerox DocuShare, Mail.ru, Yandex Disk, and Odnoklassniki. The operation demonstrates a deliberate focus on Russian consumer platforms alongside Western enterprise targets, utilizing Telegram bots for credential exfiltration and employing a multi-tenant phishing platform distributed through Telegram channels.

Device code phishing attacks have exploded across the threat landscape, with new toolkits emerging weekly. This surge coincides with publicly released criminal toolkits and multiple phishing-as-a-service offerings like EvilTokens and Tycoon. Threat actors abuse the OAuth 2.0 device authorization grant flow to compromise Microsoft 365 and other enterprise accounts by tricking users into authorizing malicious applications. Current implementations use on-demand code generation, addressing the 15-minute expiration limitation of previous techniques. Most activity appears to be generated using AI-based coding techniques. Successful attacks lead to full account takeover, data theft, business email compromise, and potential ransomware deployment. The technique represents the natural evolution of credential phishing as organizations improve their defenses against traditional multifactor authentication bypass methods.

In early April 2026, a large-scale device code phishing campaign targeted organizations across multiple sectors and regions, exploiting OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant. Threat actors leveraged the Kali365 phishing-as-a-service platform, originating primarily from IP address 216.203.20[.]95. The campaign used high-fidelity lures directing victims to Microsoft's legitimate device login flow, where users unknowingly authorized threat actor-controlled sessions. Captured OAuth tokens enabled immediate mailbox access and post-compromise activities. In some cases, attackers established malicious inbox rules to suppress security notifications, extending dwell time. The Kali365 platform operates as a multi-tenant PhaaS ecosystem supporting both device code abuse and adversary-in-the-middle session capture, featuring rapid lure generation across multiple languages and file types, Cloudflare Worker-hosted pages, and token sharing capabilities between affiliates.