Threats Tagged 'mal-2026-10159'
View all threats tagged with 'mal-2026-10159'. Filter and sort to focus on specific types of threats.
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Threats Tagged 'mal-2026-10159'
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--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f9fdedc15d959d978bd3563d29d16c5ab226d3c4fa4ab8b6fecf8bdf130e29ab) On `npm install`, postinstall.js runs `whoami`, reads `os.hostname()`, `process.platform`, and `process.version`, and transmits them via HTTPS GET to a hardcoded remote endpoint at https://testnpm.byte.eyes.sh/npm-proof. This fires automatically as a lifecycle hook with no user consent. The package's declared purpose (`npm script for showing date strings`) and its self-labeling as a 'safe proof' do not match the observed behavior — the code is a functional install-time identity beacon transmitting the installer's username and hostname to an author-controlled destination. Beaconing installer identity to a hardcoded third-party host on install is credential/identity leakage regardless of the 'proof' framing. Join the discussion | GCVE Database | 07/10/2026, 16:34:59 UTC Added: 07/11/2026, 09:37:31 UTC |
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