Threats Tagged 'mal-2026-13397'

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (ab5de2359eef117d1f491dc2c8628e56d866435912bd6f8e55a10eee8e7a9a6c) The package implements a daemon that pairs with a remote peer (phone) over WebRTC, using https://vanexa-agent-relay.workers.dev and https://vanexa-agent-relay.tubefood.workers.dev as signaling relays, and executes commands received over the DataChannel by dispatching them into child_process.spawn/exec on the host running the agent. onData/onCommand/onmessage handlers are wired to shell/exec sinks in dist/bundle.cjs (POST calls at lines 221, 285, 426, 1953, 2101 correspond to signaling traffic). Anyone who controls the signaling relay or a paired peer obtains full-host remote code execution on the machine running the agent. The runtime dispatch logic is shipped only as V8 bytecode (dist/bundle.jsc loaded via bytenode from bin/vanexa-agent.js), with the.cjs fallback minified, framed in the README as 'commercial IP protection' — pairing/authorization semantics are not reviewable from source. A socket.json at the tarball root sets 'ignore' for aiMalware, gptMalware, obfuscatedCode, usesEval, nativeCode, shellAccess, filesystemAccess, networkAccess, bypassesEnvironment, and installScripts — a blanket suppression matching exactly the categories this package's runtime behavior triggers. The shell surface fires when the operator explicitly runs the agent (not at npm install or on require), so blast radius is bounded to hosts where an operator starts the daemon and completes pairing; however, once running, the remote peer channel is the attack surface.