Threats Tagged 'mal-2026-13611'

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (6512bd1cea27977e679186d569d524555fdf0ed5ea9e4b965aa640b1ae8326cb) src/index.js opens a persistent WebSocket to a hardcoded default relay at wss://relay.mangomindbd.com and dispatches on message types received from that remote endpoint. On messages of type 'diagnosis' with autoFix set, the handler passes msg.fixCommand — a string chosen by whoever controls the relay — directly to child_process.execSync on the local machine (timeout 120000ms), yielding full-host command execution under the user running the agent. On messages of type 'opencode_request', the handler forwards attacker-chosen HTTP method, path, and body to a locally-spawned opencode AI coding agent bound on 127.0.0.1 and returns its response, giving the same remote party a proxied channel to drive that agent's file and shell tool access against the installer's workspace. The relay hostname mangomindbd.com is also referenced from https://api.mangomindbd.com in the same file, and the module makes cross-platform curl/http.get/os.hostname calls consistent with host-context reporting to the relay. The remote-execution paths are gated only by an initial token handshake with the relay operator, so any party in control of relay.mangomindbd.com holds arbitrary RCE and AI-agent-driven filesystem access on every host running this package.