Threats Tagged 'mal-2026-17177'
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Threats Tagged 'mal-2026-17177'
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--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (f49ee5bcbcb7e8f1028de4021134fdbbc895e737700cf82a834fb26d3b23dd05) postinstall.js fetches an opaque binary from https://mkicom.com/.well-known/pki-validation/ct_dn8, writes it to /tmp/.nc, chmods it 0755, and launches it detached via `spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', 'setsid ' + OUT + '... &'], {detached:true})`. The download URL is disguised under a `.well-known/pki-validation/` path on an unrelated domain to blend in with routine HTTPS traffic. index.js is an empty stub (`module.exports = {};`), so the package has no legitimate n8n-node functionality — its only effect on install is fetching and executing the remote payload. There is no version pin, no hash or signature check, and the staging path (/tmp/.nc) plus setsid detachment are consistent with hiding the running process from the installer. Join the discussion | GCVE Database | 09/25/2026, 02:39:58 UTC Added: 09/25/2026, 04:41:57 UTC |
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