Threats tagged 'mal-2026-19144'

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (db7da8999828536292e11d09747504d964bf7525862de7d207d03c8809c438a0) The package advertises itself as lightweight string utility helpers (trim/capitalize/truncate), but ships a 17KB Linux ELF.node addon, a 434KB Windows PE.node addon, and a 3.7MB opaque.napi_cache data blob none of which are needed for the stated purpose. index.js unconditionally loads the platform-appropriate native addon on every require() and swallows errors silently before the trivial string helpers are even defined. The native addon references the adjacent.napi_cache blob and contains code paths for file I/O, fork/setsid/execlp on Linux and CreateProcessA with a 'node "%s"' command template on Windows, staging decoded JavaScript at /tmp/.<pid> (format string /tmp/.%u, %s.nc%lu.js) and executing it under node. Before firing, the addon enumerates CI and sandbox indicators (GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITLAB_CI, TRAVIS, CIRCLECI, JENKINS_URL, BUILDKITE, CODEBUILD_BUILD_ID, APPVEYOR, SEMAPHORE, TEAMCITY_VERSION, BITBUCKET_BUILD_NUMBER, NETLIFY, VERCEL, CF_BUILD_ID, SCREWDRIVER, SANDBOX), reads /proc/1/cgroup, /proc/1/cmdline, /proc/self/status (TracerPid) and /proc/self/maps for docker/containerd/kubepod/podman markers, and on Windows checks IsDebuggerPresent, CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent and scans running processes for analysis tools (wireshark, httpdebug, Process32First). The combination of a trivial cover-story API, undeclared native binaries loaded silently on import, an opaque sibling blob decrypted to a hidden /tmp staging path and executed under node, and sandbox/CI/debugger evasion gating is a load-time dropper that runs attacker-controlled code on the installer's host as soon as the package is required.