Threats Tagged 'mal-2026-5713'

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (7f7b2710441863a429a2a1833e06f54e9afc23c87d1b40d7ee09e1995c6a65c2) On module load, this Vite plugin performs an HTTP GET to https://www.jsonkeeper.com/b/XVHGD (an anonymous, mutable paste host) and passes the response's `data` field to `new Function.constructor("require",...)`, then invokes the resulting function with `require` — granting the remote payload full Node.js capabilities (fs, child_process, network) inside the consumer's Vite build process. dist/index.mjs (lines ~124-128) calls the fetch+eval directly via initPlugin(); dist/index.cjs (lines ~130-141) wraps the same payload in `if (isMainThread) { new Worker(__filename) } else { initPlugin() }`, spawning a worker that re-loads the module with isMainThread=false and executes the network-fetched code in the worker thread to obscure the behavior from naive inspection. The package name and metadata (author 'Vben', debug name 'vite-plugin-compression', plugin name 'vite:compression') clone the well-known vite-plugin-compress / vite-plugin-compression packages, and an otherwise-unused `request` dependency exists solely to perform the C2 fetch. Any developer or build system that imports this package executes whatever JavaScript the operator currently has hosted at the jsonkeeper paste. ## Source: ghsa-malware (7989787bb752866c34bd055adeb5327f5b2f049101dc927be3ba9fa7a20bacc8) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.