Threats Tagged 'mal-2026-5786'
View all threats tagged with 'mal-2026-5786'. Filter and sort to focus on specific types of threats.
Stop chasing alerts. Route them.
Start free, then upgrade once to turn Radar into an automated delivery engine for your security stack.
Custom feeds / Automations: email, Slack, webhooks, SIEM/MISP / API access (baseline limits)
API access activates after upgrading in Console -> Billing.
Check if your credentials are on the dark web
Instant breach scanning across billions of leaked records. Free tier available.
Filter Threats
Narrow down the results by type, severity, or affected countries
Threats Tagged 'mal-2026-5786'
Click on any threat for detailed analysis and mitigation recommendations
Malicious code in @solana-labs/ancor (npm) 0 --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (3265b293c8d6ebf4e866644687ab8bb9f03345c704acf7c885574886ad396b5b) Package is published as `@solana-labs/ancor` — a name one character off from `anchor`, the well-known Solana smart-contract framework (published as `@coral-xyz/anchor`, formerly `@project-serum/anchor`). The `@solana-labs` scope and the near-miss spelling `ancor` together create high confusion potential for developers searching for the Anchor framework. The shipped bundles `lib/index.cjs.js` and `lib/index.esm.js` are large minified rollups (~11k+ lines) that include `require('child_process')`, `fetch(...)` POST calls, and references to `curl` / `ping`. Pattern matches on keyword co-occurrence in a minified bundle do not by themselves prove malicious intent — Anchor and similar frameworks legitimately bundle child_process and HTTP for build/CLI tooling — but the combination of a typosquat-shaped name, a vendor-impersonating scope, and a large opaque bundle warrants human review before this version is allowed into installer environments. A reviewer should verify scope ownership (is `@solana-labs` actually controlled by Solana Labs, or a squatted scope?), de-minify the flagged regions around lines 5016/5046 and 11336/11441 to confirm whether the POST/fetch destinations and child_process spawns are part of a documented build/CLI flow or an exfiltration path, and compare bundle behavior against legitimate `@coral-xyz/anchor`. Join the discussion | GCVE Database | 06/15/2026, 17:17:17 UTC Added: 09/01/2026, 15:45:31 UTC |
Showing 1 to 1 of 1 result