Threats Tagged 'mal-2026-6776'

The @marketfront/dynamicpageparams package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' ([email protected]) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover. The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved. The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (514b19e5c1b1245c9c2a18b89858e78e48cde1170365d2e033d128491234e36b) Automated tracing of this package's contents was withheld by an upstream content filter, and no a static rule findings are available to corroborate a specific attack fingerprint. The content-filter signal is suggestive but, on its own without concrete traced or static evidence naming a specific installer-harm behavior (exfiltration destination, credential path read, install-time fetch-and-execute, backdoor), it does not meet the bar for a published block verdict. The package should be manually inspected before use: review package.json lifecycle scripts (preinstall/install/postinstall/prepare), the module's top-level require/import side effects, and any bundled or minified JavaScript for hardcoded network destinations, credential-path reads (~/.npmrc, ~/.aws, ~/.ssh, environment scraping), or remote fetch-and-execute patterns.