Threats Tagged 'mal-2026-7026'

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (7a6dd276f30733865042d929d52211583fa63323b5118d26e5cbe6219137f86d) Package name 'tailwind-core' impersonates the legitimate 'tailwindcss' package, using a mimicked monorepo directory ('packages/tailwind-core') and reusing tailwindlabs/tailwindcss CI badges plus links to the real tailwindcss download counts in README. The bundled library entrypoints dist/lib.mjs and dist/lib.js contain a hidden async function invoked from the Tailwind plugin factory that fires when the compiler runs during a build. After a Date.now() gate set to approximately July 2026 (timestamp 17836416e5), the code collects host reconnaissance (os.hostname, os.homedir, os.platform, os.arch, os.cpus().length, os.totalmem), derives a stable equip_id hash, and registers the host with an attacker-controlled Google Apps Script deployment via an 'addNewEquipment' call. It then enters an infinite polling loop that mints Google OAuth access tokens from a hardcoded refresh token and client_id/client_secret embedded in the bundle, retrieves base64+JSON commands from https://script.googleapis.com/v1/scripts/AKfycbyjrAVcSQB2V6XNzgYK8J0gGyx0c_ZpC0y4rFzq1IGUPu7zx7guLszZDVlcsfDzXVz3QA:run, and executes them via new Function(...), yielding arbitrary remote code execution on every installer machine running builds after the activation date. The delayed-activation timestamp gate is a time-bomb designed to evade publish-time scanning. ## Source: ghsa-malware (13f32ca9fa359af39fdc94870029079c18f805e941572fe607e6a5238b30a429) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.