The 'Iron Man System' is a commercial Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) operation that provides criminal buyers with a self-hosted phishing kit. It includes over 2,360 phishing templates impersonating trusted entities such as postal services, banks, and government agencies, targeting 130 countries. The system features a bilingual Chinese-English interface, a subscription licensing model tied to vendor-controlled authorization servers, and a build registry with 911 published versions. Resecurity, in collaboration with Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit and industry partners, mapped and disrupted this infrastructure. The kit was used to send approximately 1 billion phishing emails targeting 75,000 organizations, capturing around 17.4GB of telemetry data. Multiple domains associated with the infrastructure have been identified as indicators of compromise.
A sophisticated Phishing-as-a-Service platform called Balonx Sistema, operated from Mexico, targets over 20 financial institutions through tiered subscriptions. The platform employs real-time WebSocket session hijacking to defeat multi-factor authentication, distributing a Spyroid-based Android RAT via fake security alerts. Since October 2025, over 1,100 victims' credentials have been harvested. The operation includes CallFlow, an AI-driven vishing module using GPT-4o-mini, ElevenLabs synthetic voice, and OpenAI Whisper for automated telephone fraud, eliminating human operators. The platform uses continuous domain rotation across 350+ domains since 2019, maintains centralized PostgreSQL infrastructure, and is openly promoted through Facebook groups. The operator, identified as 'balonx', manages a sophisticated criminal enterprise generating approximately $99,000 USD through subscription-based access priced between 3,000-6,000 MXN weekly.
An active SMS phishing campaign targets Serbian road users by impersonating Putevi Srbije, Serbia's state road authority. Victims receive text messages claiming they have unpaid traffic fines with urgent payment demands. The fraudulent links lead to cloned government websites designed to steal payment card details. The infrastructure employs JavaScript-based obfuscation techniques to evade automated security scanners and uses disposable domains with uncommon TLDs. Technical analysis reveals connections to both Darcula and Phoenix Phishing-as-a-Service platforms, indicating fraudsters are combining tools from multiple PhaaS vendors. The operation demonstrates coordinated roles including infrastructure setup, SMS distribution, and data harvesting. Similar campaigns have targeted victims globally across government bodies, postal services, and financial institutions.
FlowerStorm is a widely known Phishing-As-A-Service (PhaaS) attack kit that has been active since at least mid-2024, increasingly in large scale campaigns. FlowerStorm performs targeted, complex collection of a victim’s credentials, including the management of multi-factor authentication (MFA).
Since January 2025, researchers identified over 2,500 phishing domains targeting more than 70 organizations across financial services, telecommunications, and logistics sectors globally. Two dominant smishing campaigns were discovered: Reward Points phishing impersonating banks and telecom providers, and Failed Parcel Delivery phishing mimicking logistics companies. Despite different themes, both campaigns share infrastructure and utilize the Phoenix System administrative panel, a successor to the Mouse System. This Phishing-as-a-Service platform offers real-time victim monitoring, geofencing, IP-based filtering, and live-phishing interventions to bypass multi-factor authentication. The platform is distributed via Telegram channels for approximately $2,000 annually, providing threat actors with pre-built templates, traffic filtering mechanisms, and real-time victim management dashboards. Attackers potentially leverage fake Base Transceiver Stations to bypass carrier-level filtering and deliver messages app...
A large-scale smishing campaign, attributed to the China-based Smishing Triad, is targeting global users with fraudulent SMS messages impersonating toll violations and package delivery issues. The campaign has expanded internationally, targeting critical sectors such as banking, healthcare, and law enforcement by using realistic phishing pages to harvest sensitive data. It operates via a decentralized infrastructure with over 194,000 malicious domains registered since early 2024, primarily through a Hong Kong-based registrar. This phishing-as-a-service operation leverages sophisticated social engineering to maximize victim engagement. The campaign poses a significant threat to individuals and organizations worldwide, including European entities, due to the broad targeting and sector diversity. No known exploits in the wild have been reported, but the scale and complexity indicate a persistent and evolving threat. Defenders should focus on advanced SMS filtering, user awareness, and domain monitoring to mitigate risks. The threat is assessed as medium severity given its impact on confidentiality and ease of exploitation without requiring authentication but does not directly affect system availability.
A new Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) framework dubbed Salty 2FA has been discovered targeting industries in the US and EU. It uses a unique domain pattern combining .com subdomains with .ru domains and employs a multi-stage execution chain to resist detection. The kit can bypass multiple 2FA methods, including push, SMS, and voice. Victims span global industries such as finance, telecom, energy, consulting, logistics, and education. Static IOCs are unreliable for detection; instead, behavioral patterns must be identified. The framework shares traits with Storm-1575 but has distinct characteristics setting it apart from known threats like Tycoon2FA or EvilProxy. It demonstrates sophisticated capabilities in distributing phishing payloads, maintaining dynamic infrastructure, and managing complex communication between phishing pages and C2 servers.