Threats Tagged 'rat deployment'

Threat actors exploited ChatGPT's Custom GPT feature to impersonate legitimate ChatGPT models, directing victims through sponsored Google ads to malicious Custom GPTs titled 'Plus 5.6'. These instances served fake service availability notices, redirecting users to Google Sites pages hosting ClickFix lures disguised as CloudFlare CAPTCHA checks. Victims were tricked into executing PowerShell commands that downloaded malicious MSI installers. The attack chain employed DLL sideloading through legitimate Canon-signed and later Stardock-signed executables, establishing dual persistence mechanisms via registry Run keys and scheduled tasks. The multi-stage infection involved obfuscated scripts, encrypted payloads hidden in WAV files and NuGet packages, and ultimately deployed a feature-rich remote access trojan with capabilities including remote desktop, browser hijacking, credential theft, and follow-on payload delivery. Huntress investigated approximately 40 incidents linked to this campaign, with confirmed Cus...

An investigation into malware delivery infrastructure reveals an operator using GitHub repositories to stage malicious loaders and RAT payloads. Starting from commit metadata, researchers traced an email address to a compromised machine via stealer log databases. The infected workstation exposed a complete operational pipeline including multiple RAT families (AsyncRAT, DcRat, Remcos, XWorm), phishing templates impersonating Colombian government institutions, bulk email software, and commercial crypter services. The operator maintains delivery infrastructure across GitHub, Bitbucket, AWS S3, and DuckDNS for command-and-control. Phishing campaigns target Colombian organizations using judicial notification and traffic violation lures with password-protected archives. The investigation demonstrates how infrastructure analysis and operational security failures can expose entire malware production workflows beyond individual samples.

MediumMalwareColombia#github loader#asyncrat#stealer log

In July 2026, Microsoft Threat Intelligence uncovered a supply chain attack targeting the official AsyncAPI NPM organization. Attackers published malicious versions of multiple packages under the trusted AsyncAPI namespace, exploiting developer dependencies to distribute malware. The compromised packages deployed a multi-stage Remote Access Trojan through obfuscated lifecycle hooks that executed during routine build workflows. Upon installation, the malware retrieved second-stage payloads from IPFS gateways, established persistence on infected systems, and initiated command-and-control communications with external infrastructure. The attack leveraged trusted build automation and dynamic package retrieval via npx to bypass traditional security controls, affecting developers executing version-pinned tasks in their CI/CD pipelines.

Since late March 2026, a large-scale phishing campaign has been deploying malware including Agent Tesla, Remcos, XWorm, and Best Private LOGGER through fileless techniques and low-detection Lua-based loaders. Attackers impersonate well-known companies using business cooperation lures to distribute malicious archives containing obfuscated JavaScript files. These scripts deploy either AutoIt or LuaJIT interpreters alongside disguised scripts masquerading as TrueType Font (.ttf) files. The Lua loaders employ sophisticated anti-analysis techniques including custom ROT ciphers, decoy memory allocation, and Donut shellcode generation for reflective in-memory payload execution. The campaign evolved from simpler implementations in October 2025 to highly complex versions by June 2026, incorporating API unhooking and advanced debugging countermeasures. Victims are ultimately infected with Remote Access Trojans and infostealers that enable full system control and extensive data exfiltration.

A supply chain attack targeting the Axios npm package has been identified after threat actors compromised the npm account of the company's lead developer. Malicious versions ([email protected] and [email protected]) were published containing a hidden dependency that executed postinstall scripts during npm installation. This automated execution downloaded and deployed a remote access trojan on affected systems without requiring user interaction, making it particularly dangerous for developer environments and CI/CD pipelines. The compromise resulted in full remote access capabilities, potential credential exposure including API keys and SSH keys, and possible insertion of malicious code into software builds. Detection platforms identified suspicious process execution chains involving npm spawning command interpreters and network utilities, followed by outbound connections to attacker-controlled infrastructure.