Analysis of malicious HWP cases of 'APT37' group distributed through K messenger
The report details a sophisticated APT attack targeting South Korea, utilizing spear-phishing techniques and malicious HWP files distributed through a popular Korean messenger service. The APT37 group exploited trust-based tactics, using compromised accounts to spread malware through group chats. The malicious files contained OLE objects that executed PowerShell commands and shellcode, ultimately deploying the RoKRAT malware. This file-less attack method allowed for information gathering and potential remote control of infected systems. The attackers used pCloud for data exfiltration and command-and-control communication. The report emphasizes the importance of endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems to combat such evolving threats.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
This threat involves a sophisticated Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) campaign attributed to the APT37 group, targeting South Korea primarily through spear-phishing attacks that leverage malicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) files distributed via a popular Korean messenger service known as K messenger. The attackers exploit trust relationships by using compromised legitimate accounts to disseminate malware within group chats, increasing the likelihood of successful infection. The malicious HWP files embed OLE (Object Linking and Embedding) objects that execute PowerShell commands and shellcode, enabling a file-less attack vector that evades traditional file-based detection mechanisms. This approach facilitates stealthy deployment of the RoKRAT malware, a remote access trojan capable of information gathering and remote control of infected systems. The attackers utilize pCloud, a legitimate cloud storage service, for command-and-control (C2) communications and data exfiltration, further complicating detection as traffic appears legitimate. The attack techniques correspond to multiple MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques, including T1071 (Application Layer Protocol), T1567 (Exfiltration Over Web Service), T1055 (Process Injection), T1588.001 (Obtain Capabilities: Malware), T1102 (Web Service), T1204 (User Execution), T1059.001 (PowerShell), T1566 (Phishing), and T1027 (Obfuscated Files or Information). The file-less nature and use of trusted communication channels highlight the advanced evasion tactics employed by APT37. The report underscores the critical role of Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions to detect anomalous PowerShell activity, process injections, and unusual network communications, as well as the importance of user awareness to mitigate spear-phishing risks.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, the direct impact may currently be limited given the primary targeting of South Korean entities and the use of a Korean-specific messenger platform. However, the tactics and malware used by APT37 demonstrate capabilities that could be adapted to other regions and communication platforms. European organizations using similar messaging services or handling Korean business partners could be at risk of lateral or supply chain attacks. The deployment of RoKRAT enables attackers to exfiltrate sensitive data and maintain persistent remote access, threatening confidentiality, integrity, and availability of systems. The file-less execution and use of legitimate cloud services for C2 traffic complicate detection and response, increasing the risk of prolonged undetected intrusions. Additionally, the use of spear-phishing and compromised trusted accounts can undermine organizational trust and lead to broader compromise. The threat also signals the need for vigilance against emerging APT tactics that leverage social engineering and cloud services, which are common in European enterprise environments.
Mitigation Recommendations
1. Implement advanced Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions capable of detecting anomalous PowerShell executions, process injection behaviors, and file-less malware techniques. 2. Monitor network traffic for unusual connections to cloud storage services such as pCloud, especially from endpoints that do not typically use these services. 3. Enforce strict application whitelisting and macro/OLE object execution policies, particularly for documents received via messaging platforms or email. 4. Conduct targeted user awareness training focused on spear-phishing risks, emphasizing caution when opening files from messaging apps, even from trusted contacts. 5. Employ multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring to detect and prevent account compromise, especially for messaging platforms and collaboration tools. 6. Establish robust incident response procedures to quickly isolate and remediate infected systems upon detection of suspicious activity. 7. Collaborate with threat intelligence providers to stay updated on emerging APT37 tactics and indicators of compromise (IOCs), including file hashes and malicious domains. 8. Restrict or monitor the use of third-party cloud services for data transfer within the corporate network to detect unauthorized exfiltration attempts.
Affected Countries
South Korea, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Netherlands
Indicators of Compromise
- hash: 057f60381cbe0563b46345d4d3ec5c3c
- hash: 1a70a013a56673f25738cf145928d0f5
- hash: 1c3bb05a03834f56b0285788d988aae4
- hash: 1d736803cb8fbb910dc0150087530de7
- hash: 1fcfea1ed7f0da272d37eff49371fcf0
- hash: 2569e4cc739ce441f8cbeb13cc3ca51a
- hash: 2c24f8fa2654aa2675566f7d6b0f5b12
- hash: 32dd9146310f45cfe402900be5cb0fe7
- hash: 5b44285747891464c496aa477e450f10
- hash: 835a74b3c33a66678c66118dbe26dccf
- hash: aa2762179e8c4c243a78884cfbd72c16
- hash: aae7595fbb6534c389652da871b9fd17
- hash: b42a47fc422868e0f1df99ee3b9cbb21
- hash: d4bf6e070e5cc66385cd81ae8f10266d
- hash: d8e826a6cb2ce2c9ee74242e993a7874
- hash: ebaba93172f6bcb47b1bb4a270542e98
- hash: ed691e1e20160346094c08d2cebf0f32
- domain: imagedownloadsupport.com
- domain: mailattachmentimageurlxyz.site
Analysis of malicious HWP cases of 'APT37' group distributed through K messenger
Description
The report details a sophisticated APT attack targeting South Korea, utilizing spear-phishing techniques and malicious HWP files distributed through a popular Korean messenger service. The APT37 group exploited trust-based tactics, using compromised accounts to spread malware through group chats. The malicious files contained OLE objects that executed PowerShell commands and shellcode, ultimately deploying the RoKRAT malware. This file-less attack method allowed for information gathering and potential remote control of infected systems. The attackers used pCloud for data exfiltration and command-and-control communication. The report emphasizes the importance of endpoint detection and response (EDR) systems to combat such evolving threats.
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
This threat involves a sophisticated Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) campaign attributed to the APT37 group, targeting South Korea primarily through spear-phishing attacks that leverage malicious Hangul Word Processor (HWP) files distributed via a popular Korean messenger service known as K messenger. The attackers exploit trust relationships by using compromised legitimate accounts to disseminate malware within group chats, increasing the likelihood of successful infection. The malicious HWP files embed OLE (Object Linking and Embedding) objects that execute PowerShell commands and shellcode, enabling a file-less attack vector that evades traditional file-based detection mechanisms. This approach facilitates stealthy deployment of the RoKRAT malware, a remote access trojan capable of information gathering and remote control of infected systems. The attackers utilize pCloud, a legitimate cloud storage service, for command-and-control (C2) communications and data exfiltration, further complicating detection as traffic appears legitimate. The attack techniques correspond to multiple MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques, including T1071 (Application Layer Protocol), T1567 (Exfiltration Over Web Service), T1055 (Process Injection), T1588.001 (Obtain Capabilities: Malware), T1102 (Web Service), T1204 (User Execution), T1059.001 (PowerShell), T1566 (Phishing), and T1027 (Obfuscated Files or Information). The file-less nature and use of trusted communication channels highlight the advanced evasion tactics employed by APT37. The report underscores the critical role of Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions to detect anomalous PowerShell activity, process injections, and unusual network communications, as well as the importance of user awareness to mitigate spear-phishing risks.
Potential Impact
For European organizations, the direct impact may currently be limited given the primary targeting of South Korean entities and the use of a Korean-specific messenger platform. However, the tactics and malware used by APT37 demonstrate capabilities that could be adapted to other regions and communication platforms. European organizations using similar messaging services or handling Korean business partners could be at risk of lateral or supply chain attacks. The deployment of RoKRAT enables attackers to exfiltrate sensitive data and maintain persistent remote access, threatening confidentiality, integrity, and availability of systems. The file-less execution and use of legitimate cloud services for C2 traffic complicate detection and response, increasing the risk of prolonged undetected intrusions. Additionally, the use of spear-phishing and compromised trusted accounts can undermine organizational trust and lead to broader compromise. The threat also signals the need for vigilance against emerging APT tactics that leverage social engineering and cloud services, which are common in European enterprise environments.
Mitigation Recommendations
1. Implement advanced Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions capable of detecting anomalous PowerShell executions, process injection behaviors, and file-less malware techniques. 2. Monitor network traffic for unusual connections to cloud storage services such as pCloud, especially from endpoints that do not typically use these services. 3. Enforce strict application whitelisting and macro/OLE object execution policies, particularly for documents received via messaging platforms or email. 4. Conduct targeted user awareness training focused on spear-phishing risks, emphasizing caution when opening files from messaging apps, even from trusted contacts. 5. Employ multi-factor authentication (MFA) and continuous monitoring to detect and prevent account compromise, especially for messaging platforms and collaboration tools. 6. Establish robust incident response procedures to quickly isolate and remediate infected systems upon detection of suspicious activity. 7. Collaborate with threat intelligence providers to stay updated on emerging APT37 tactics and indicators of compromise (IOCs), including file hashes and malicious domains. 8. Restrict or monitor the use of third-party cloud services for data transfer within the corporate network to detect unauthorized exfiltration attempts.
Affected Countries
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Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- ["https://www.genians.co.kr/blog/threat_intelligence/k-messenger"]
- Adversary
- APT37
- Pulse Id
- 67a38d686710526e35f1ff4d
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Hash
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
hash057f60381cbe0563b46345d4d3ec5c3c | — | |
hash1a70a013a56673f25738cf145928d0f5 | — | |
hash1c3bb05a03834f56b0285788d988aae4 | — | |
hash1d736803cb8fbb910dc0150087530de7 | — | |
hash1fcfea1ed7f0da272d37eff49371fcf0 | — | |
hash2569e4cc739ce441f8cbeb13cc3ca51a | — | |
hash2c24f8fa2654aa2675566f7d6b0f5b12 | — | |
hash32dd9146310f45cfe402900be5cb0fe7 | — | |
hash5b44285747891464c496aa477e450f10 | — | |
hash835a74b3c33a66678c66118dbe26dccf | — | |
hashaa2762179e8c4c243a78884cfbd72c16 | — | |
hashaae7595fbb6534c389652da871b9fd17 | — | |
hashb42a47fc422868e0f1df99ee3b9cbb21 | — | |
hashd4bf6e070e5cc66385cd81ae8f10266d | — | |
hashd8e826a6cb2ce2c9ee74242e993a7874 | — | |
hashebaba93172f6bcb47b1bb4a270542e98 | — | |
hashed691e1e20160346094c08d2cebf0f32 | — |
Domain
Value | Description | Copy |
---|---|---|
domainimagedownloadsupport.com | — | |
domainmailattachmentimageurlxyz.site | — |
Threat ID: 68a866f3ad5a09ad001ee057
Added to database: 8/22/2025, 12:47:47 PM
Last enriched: 8/22/2025, 1:02:55 PM
Last updated: 8/23/2025, 2:09:34 AM
Views: 5
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