Skip to main content
VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-69158: Unauthenticated full-response SSRF in Atomic-Server /bookmark endpoint

Affects atomic-serverSource GCVE Database

0
Compare
Authoritative record:CVE-2026-69158· High 8.6

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.6 High.

Data as of 18 Nov 2026, 21:34 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
8.6High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (GitHub_M)CVSS 3.18.6
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 17 Nov 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
crates.ioatomic-serverAffected
  • <=0.40.1
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

## Summary Atomic-Server exposes a `GET /bookmark` endpoint that fetches an attacker-supplied URL server-side, parses the response, and reflects the fetched content back to the caller. The endpoint requires no authentication and performs no authorization of its own, and the underlying fetch helper applies no allow-list or private-IP deny-list. An unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the server can force it to issue arbitrary outbound HTTP GET requests to internal-only hosts (loopback services, internal admin panels, link-local cloud-metadata) and read the response body back. This is a full-response SSRF, not a blind one. ## Root cause (source trace) 1. The bookmark endpoint is registered unconditionally for every server: `server/src/appstate.rs:69` (`store.add_endpoint(plugins::bookmark::bookmark_endpoint())`). 2. An unauthenticated caller on the standard GET route becomes `ForAgent::Public`: `server/src/helpers.rs:168-183` (`get_client_agent`). 3. In `get_resource_extended`, when the subject matches an endpoint path the function returns via `call_endpoint` BEFORE the `hierarchy::check_read` authorization call: `lib/src/db.rs:1010-1017` (`if is_endpoint { return self.call_endpoint(...) }`, and `check_read` sits just after at :1017, never reached). 4. `call_endpoint` performs no authorization itself; it only matches the path and invokes the handler: `lib/src/db.rs:662-706`. 5. The bookmark handler discards the caller (`for_agent: _`) and fetches the `url` query parameter directly: `server/src/plugins/bookmark.rs:45-76` (`let content = fetch_data(&path)?;`). 6. `fetch_body` validates only `url.starts_with("http")`: `lib/src/client/helpers.rs:78-91`. A repo-wide grep finds no `is_loopback` / `is_private` / `127.0.0.1` / `169.254` / `localhost` deny-list anywhere in `lib/src` or `server/src`, and no host allow-list. 7. The fetched body is HTML-parsed and written into the resource `name`, `description`, `image` and `preview` (markdown) fields, which are returned to the caller: `server/src/plugins/bookmark.rs:79-110`. This is what makes it a full-response (not blind) SSRF; even plaintext internal responses are wrapped into the preview markdown. ## Proof of concept (unauthenticated) ``` GET /bookmark?url=http://127.0.0.1:<internal-port>/&name=x # internal loopback service GET /bookmark?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/&name=x # IMDSv1 cloud metadata ``` No authentication headers. The returned resource reflects the fetched content in its `name` / `description` / `preview` fields, so the attacker reads the internal target's response body. ## Proof of omission The endpoint-dispatch path returns at `lib/src/db.rs:1011` (`return self.call_endpoint(...)`) before the `check_read` call at `:1017`, and there is no authorization inside `call_endpoint` (`:662-706`). The handler discards the caller (`for_agent: _`, `bookmark.rs:49`), so the endpoint can never enforce per-agent access. `fetch_body` validates only `url.starts_with("http")` (`helpers.rs:83`); no loopback/private/link-local deny-list exists anywhere in the source. No corresponding SSRF/security entry exists in CHANGELOG.md. ## Impact An unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the server can: - read internal-only HTTP services not exposed to the internet (admin panels, dashboards, unauthenticated microservices on loopback or the private network); - read cloud metadata reachable via plain GET (IMDSv1 and similar), enabling potential credential disclosure in affected deployments; - enumerate internal services / ports from the server's vantage point via differing timeout/error behaviour. Because the response body is reflected, this is a high-value full-response SSRF. The only precondition is network reach to the server. Severity: High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N = 8.6. Honest caveats (do not refute the finding): the `ureq` client uses a 2-second timeout, which limits slow targets; AWS IMDSv2 requires a PUT token, so plain GET metadata retrieval may fail there. IMDSv1 and any internal HTTP service or admin panel that answers a plain GET remain fully reachable and reflected. ## Remediation Add a central SSRF guard inside `fetch_body` (`lib/src/client/helpers.rs`): resolve the target host and reject loopback, link-local, RFC1918 private, CGNAT and unique-local ranges, and reject non-http(s) schemes. Re-validate after DNS resolution (to prevent DNS-rebinding) and after each redirect hop. Enforce authorization on endpoint dispatch: run `check_read` (or a per-endpoint policy) for outbound-fetching endpoints instead of short-circuiting before it at `lib/src/db.rs:1010-1012`, and at minimum require an authenticated, authorized agent for `/bookmark`. Optionally add an operator-configurable allow-list of fetchable hosts. ## Dedup - atomicdata-dev/atomic-server GitHub Security Advisories: no published advisories (re-verified 2026-07-03). No CVE/GHSA for atomic-server SSRF / the /bookmark endpoint. - Source re

References

Community reviews

Loading reviews…