CVE-2026-69157: Atomic Server · Unauthenticated `/setup` invite grants write access to the entire Drive
Affects atomic-serverSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.8 Critical.
Data as of 18 Nov 2026, 21:34 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (GitHub_M) | CVSS 3.1 | 9.8 |
|---|
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 17 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| crates.ioatomic-server | Affected
| Fixed in– |
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Description
## Summary atomic-server provisions a well-known invite at `{server}/setup` with `write = true`, `target` = the Drive root, and `usagesLeft = 1`. Invite redemption **ignores the redeemer's identity** (`for_agent: _` in `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:22`), so possession of the URL is the only requirement. An **unauthenticated** attacker who sends `GET /setup?public-key=<attacker_key>` has the server create a new Agent and grant it **write access to the entire Drive**. On a freshly deployed (not-yet-claimed) instance this is a full server takeover with no credentials. ## Severity **Critical — CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.8).** No authentication required; grants attacker-controlled write over all resources in the Drive. ## Affected component - `server/src/appstate.rs` — creates the `/setup` invite targeting the Drive root with `write=true`, `usagesLeft=1`. - `server/src/plugins/invite.rs:14-173` — `construct_invite_redirect` destructures `for_agent: _` (redeemer identity discarded); `?public-key=` → `Agent::new_from_public_key` → `add_rights(agent, target, write=true)`. ## Steps to Reproduce Environment: `joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop` in Docker, `http://localhost:9883`, fresh store. No auth headers are used. 1. Confirm the invite is live — `GET /setup` (Accept: `application/ad+json`) shows `invite/write = true`, `invite/target = http://localhost:9883` (Drive root), `usagesLeft = 1`. 2. Redeem it anonymously with an attacker-generated ed25519 public key: ```http GET /setup?public-key=q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM%3D HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:9883 Accept: application/ad+json ``` Response `200 OK` returns a `Redirect` confirming the new agent: ```json { "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/invite/redirectAgent": "http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=", "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/isA": ["https://atomicdata.dev/classes/Redirect"] } ``` 3. `GET /` shows the attacker is now in the Drive's `write` array: ```json "https://atomicdata.dev/properties/write": [ "http://localhost:9883/agents/+/KwsAmyzc7S/...", // legit root "http://localhost:9883/agents/q2UkizMX0Go4mHwW2BXepqkzpP5FHlagEft8M32t0EM=" // ATTACKER ] ``` 4. The attacker signs a normal Commit (ed25519 over the JCS-canonical commit) and `POST /commit` (200) — the Drive root was successfully edited. Write access proven. **Expected:** `/setup` must require operator authentication / a one-time secret. **Actual:** Any unauthenticated client on the network redeems it and gains Drive-wide write. ## Impact Unauthenticated write to the entire Drive: read/modify/delete any resource, create/alter Agents, reconfigure permissions. This is a complete takeover on a fresh deployment. (It also serves as the entry point of a larger chain: with write access, an attacker can read the server root private key and impersonate root — reported separately.) ## Remediation - Require a one-time secret (printed to stdout at startup) or operator authentication to redeem `/setup`. - Invalidate `/setup` after first use with an **atomic** `usagesLeft` decrement (sled transaction) — the current read-check-decrement is a TOCTOU that allows a single-use invite to be redeemed multiple times concurrently. - Fix the inverted invite-expiry check in `invite.rs` (`if expires > now { reject }` is backwards, so expired invites remain redeemable and valid ones are rejected).
References
- github.com/ontola/atomic-server/security/advisories/GHSA-pfwx-xjp4-qxcj (opens in a new tab)
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69157 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/ontola/atomic-server/commit/98517d8921c78bd9b728a2459378c184ebf8a969 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/ontola/atomic-server (opens in a new tab)