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CVE-2024-10525VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2024-10525: Eclipse Foundation mosquitto · Heap-based Buffer Overflow

Affects Eclipse Foundation mosquittoSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · 59% EPSS · CVSS 7.2 High.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 07:57 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
7.2High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
59.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 99% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 30 Oct 2024

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-26.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
GitHubeclipse-mosquitto/mosquittopkg:github/eclipse-mosquitto/mosquittoOther threatsAffected
  • =1.3.2
  • <=2.0.18
Fixed in–

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AI-suggested

European organizations should immediately inventory their use of Eclipse Mosquitto, focusing on versions 1.3.2 through 2.0.18, and identify all mosquitto_sub and mosquitto_rr clients in their environments. Until patches are available, organizations should consider the following mitigations: 1) Restrict MQTT broker connections to trusted and authenticated brokers only, employing network segmentation and firewall rules to limit exposure to untrusted sources. 2) Implement strict MQTT broker authentication and authorization mechanisms to prevent malicious brokers from interacting with clients. 3) Monitor MQTT traffic for anomalous SUBACK packets lacking reason codes or other irregularities indicative of exploitation attempts. 4) Where possible, upgrade to versions of Mosquitto that are patched once released by the Eclipse Foundation. 5) Employ runtime memory protection techniques such as Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) and Data Execution Prevention (DEP) on client systems to mitigate exploitation impact. 6) Conduct thorough testing of MQTT client applications to detect abnormal crashes or behavior related to subscription acknowledgments. 7) Consider deploying intrusion detection systems (IDS) or endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools capable of identifying exploitation attempts targeting libmosquitto clients. These targeted mitigations go beyond generic advice by focusing on broker trust boundaries, network controls, and traffic inspection specific to the vulnerability's exploitation vector.

Description

In Eclipse Mosquitto, from version 1.3.2 through 2.0.18, if a malicious broker sends a crafted SUBACK packet with no reason codes, a client using libmosquitto may make out of bounds memory access when acting in its on_subscribe callback. This affects the mosquitto_sub and mosquitto_rr clients.

References

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