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CVE-2024-2467VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2024-2467: Timing Side Channel

Source CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.9 Medium.

Data as of 25 Oct 2026, 19:02 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.9Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 43% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 25 Apr 2024

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-25.

What to do

AI-suggested

To mitigate CVE-2024-2467, organizations should: 1) Transition away from the legacy PKCS#1 v1.5 RSA padding mode to more secure alternatives such as RSA-OAEP, which is resistant to Bleichenbacher-style attacks. 2) Update or patch the perl-Crypt-OpenSSL-RSA package to versions that address this timing side-channel vulnerability once available. 3) Implement network-level protections such as rate limiting and anomaly detection to reduce the feasibility of sending large volumes of trial ciphertexts. 4) Employ constant-time cryptographic operations to minimize timing discrepancies observable by attackers. 5) Restrict access to cryptographic decryption services to trusted networks or authenticated users to reduce exposure. 6) Monitor cryptographic service logs for unusual patterns indicative of adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. 7) Educate developers and system administrators about the risks of legacy padding schemes and encourage the adoption of modern cryptographic best practices.

Description

A timing-based side-channel flaw exists in the perl-Crypt-OpenSSL-RSA package, which could be sufficient to recover plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher-style attack. To achieve successful decryption, an attacker would have to be able to send a large number of trial messages. The vulnerability affects the legacy PKCS#1v1.5 RSA encryption padding mode.

References

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