CVE-2025-2843: rhobs observability-operator · Incorrect Privilege Assignment
Affects rhobs observability-operatorSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.8 High : upgrade to 1.3.0 soon.
Data as of 25 Oct 2026, 19:02 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 28% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 1.3.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 12 Nov 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-25.
What to do
Upgrade rhobs observability-operator to 1.3.0.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| rhobsobservability-operator | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Red HatCluster Observability Operator 1.3.1 | Affected– | Fixed in– |
GitHubobservability-operatorpkg:github/observability-operatorOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Currently, no mitigation is available for this vulnerability. If you cannot patch yet, restricting the ability to create MonitorStack resources to trusted users may reduce risk, but no official workaround is provided by the vendor.
Description
A flaw was found in the Observability Operator. The Operator creates a ServiceAccount with *ClusterRole* upon deployment of the *Namespace-Scoped* Custom Resource MonitorStack. This issue allows an adversarial Kubernetes Account with only namespaced-level roles, for example, a tenant controlling a namespace, to create a MonitorStack in the authorized namespace and then elevate permission to the cluster level by impersonating the ServiceAccount created by the Operator, resulting in privilege escalation and other issues.