CVE-2025-52586 identifies a vulnerability in the EG4 Electronics EG4 12kPV inverter product line, affecting all versions. The core issue is that the MOD3 command traffic exchanged between the monitoring application and the inverter is transmitted in plaintext without any encryption or obfuscation. This lack of confidentiality protection allows an attacker with access to the local network to intercept sensitive control and telemetry data. The attacker could perform various malicious actions including eavesdropping on operational data, manipulating or forging commands, replaying legitimate commands to cause unintended behavior, or injecting unauthorized commands. These commands include critical read/write operations for voltage, current, power configuration, operational status, alarms, telemetry, system resets, and inverter control commands. Such unauthorized manipulations could disrupt power generation, cause incorrect inverter configurations, or trigger system resets, potentially leading to partial or complete denial of service or unsafe operating conditions. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-319 (Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information) and has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 6.9 (medium severity), reflecting high impact on confidentiality and integrity but limited availability impact. Exploitation requires local network access and has a high attack complexity, with no privileges or user interaction needed. No patches or mitigations have been published yet, and no known exploits are currently in the wild. This vulnerability highlights a significant security design flaw in the communication protocol of the EG4 12kPV inverters, emphasizing the need for encryption and authentication mechanisms to protect critical industrial control system communications.

For European organizations, particularly those involved in renewable energy generation or industrial automation using EG4 Electronics inverters, this vulnerability poses a substantial risk. Successful exploitation could lead to unauthorized control over inverter settings, resulting in power generation disruptions, equipment damage, or safety hazards. This could affect energy providers, manufacturing facilities, and critical infrastructure operators relying on these inverters. The confidentiality breach could expose operational data, enabling further targeted attacks or industrial espionage. Integrity compromises could lead to manipulated telemetry and control commands, causing operational instability or outages. Although availability impact is rated low, repeated or coordinated attacks could degrade system reliability. Given Europe's strong emphasis on renewable energy integration and smart grid technologies, such vulnerabilities could undermine energy resilience and regulatory compliance. Additionally, the lack of encryption in control communications may violate European data protection and cybersecurity regulations, potentially leading to legal and reputational consequences.

1. Network Segmentation: Isolate inverter communication networks from general IT networks to limit attacker access to the local network where the MOD3 protocol operates. 2. Use of VPNs or Encrypted Tunnels: Deploy secure VPNs or encrypted tunnels (e.g., IPsec) for all communications between monitoring applications and inverters to compensate for the lack of native encryption. 3. Implement Network Monitoring and Anomaly Detection: Deploy IDS/IPS solutions tailored to detect unusual MOD3 protocol traffic patterns, command anomalies, or replay attacks. 4. Restrict Physical and Network Access: Enforce strict access controls to local networks hosting the inverters, including MAC filtering, 802.1X authentication, and physical security measures. 5. Vendor Engagement: Engage with EG4 Electronics to request firmware updates or patches that implement encryption and authentication for MOD3 traffic. 6. Incident Response Planning: Prepare response plans for potential inverter manipulation incidents, including rapid isolation and recovery procedures. 7. Regular Security Audits: Conduct periodic security assessments of inverter communication channels and network configurations to identify and remediate exposure points. These mitigations go beyond generic advice by focusing on compensating controls and operational security measures until a vendor patch is available.