CVE-2025-52586: EG4 12kPV · Cleartext Transmission
Affects EG4 12kPVSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 15:59 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.08% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 0% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:LExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 8 Aug 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| EG4 Electronics EG4 12kPV | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
- Network Segmentation: Isolate inverter communication networks from general IT networks to limit attacker access to the local network where the MOD3 protocol operates.
- Use of VPNs or Encrypted Tunnels: Deploy secure VPNs or encrypted tunnels (e.g., IPsec) for all communications between monitoring applications and inverters to compensate for the lack of native encryption.
- Implement Network Monitoring and Anomaly Detection: Deploy IDS/IPS solutions tailored to detect unusual MOD3 protocol traffic patterns, command anomalies, or replay attacks.
- Restrict Physical and Network Access: Enforce strict access controls to local networks hosting the inverters, including MAC filtering, 802.1X authentication, and physical security measures.
- Vendor Engagement: Engage with EG4 Electronics to request firmware updates or patches that implement encryption and authentication for MOD3 traffic.
- Incident Response Planning: Prepare response plans for potential inverter manipulation incidents, including rapid isolation and recovery procedures.
- Regular Security Audits: Conduct periodic security assessments of inverter communication channels and network configurations to identify and remediate exposure points. These mitigations go beyond generic advice by focusing on compensating controls and operational security measures until a vendor patch is available.
Description
The MOD3 command traffic between the monitoring application and the inverter is transmitted in plaintext without encryption or obfuscation. This vulnerability may allow an attacker with access to a local network to intercept, manipulate, replay, or forge critical data, including read/write operations for voltage, current, and power configuration, operational status, alarms, telemetry, system reset, or inverter control commands, potentially disrupting power generation or reconfiguring inverter settings.