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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2025-52586: EG4 12kPV · Cleartext Transmission

Affects EG4 12kPVSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
6.9Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.08% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 0% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 8 Aug 2025

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
EG4 Electronics EG4 12kPVAffected
  • *
Fixed in–

AI-suggested

  1. Network Segmentation: Isolate inverter communication networks from general IT networks to limit attacker access to the local network where the MOD3 protocol operates.
  2. Use of VPNs or Encrypted Tunnels: Deploy secure VPNs or encrypted tunnels (e.g., IPsec) for all communications between monitoring applications and inverters to compensate for the lack of native encryption.
  3. Implement Network Monitoring and Anomaly Detection: Deploy IDS/IPS solutions tailored to detect unusual MOD3 protocol traffic patterns, command anomalies, or replay attacks.
  4. Restrict Physical and Network Access: Enforce strict access controls to local networks hosting the inverters, including MAC filtering, 802.1X authentication, and physical security measures.
  5. Vendor Engagement: Engage with EG4 Electronics to request firmware updates or patches that implement encryption and authentication for MOD3 traffic.
  6. Incident Response Planning: Prepare response plans for potential inverter manipulation incidents, including rapid isolation and recovery procedures.
  7. Regular Security Audits: Conduct periodic security assessments of inverter communication channels and network configurations to identify and remediate exposure points. These mitigations go beyond generic advice by focusing on compensating controls and operational security measures until a vendor patch is available.

Description

The MOD3 command traffic between the monitoring application and the inverter is transmitted in plaintext without encryption or obfuscation. This vulnerability may allow an attacker with access to a local network to intercept, manipulate, replay, or forge critical data, including read/write operations for voltage, current, and power configuration, operational status, alarms, telemetry, system reset, or inverter control commands, potentially disrupting power generation or reconfiguring inverter settings.

References

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