CVE-2025-52586 identifies a vulnerability in the EG4 Electronics EG4 12kPV inverter product line, affecting all versions. The core issue lies in the MOD3 command traffic exchanged between the inverter and its monitoring application, which is transmitted entirely in plaintext without any encryption or obfuscation. This lack of protection exposes critical operational commands and telemetry data to interception and manipulation by an attacker with access to the local network. Specifically, the attacker could intercept sensitive data such as voltage, current, and power configuration parameters, as well as operational status and alarm information. More critically, the attacker could manipulate or forge commands related to read/write operations, system resets, and inverter control functions. Such unauthorized actions could disrupt power generation, cause misconfiguration of inverter settings, or trigger false alarms, potentially leading to operational downtime or damage to connected electrical infrastructure. The vulnerability is classified under CWE-319, which concerns the transmission of sensitive information in plaintext. The CVSS v3.1 base score is 6.9, indicating a medium severity level, with the vector highlighting that exploitation requires local network access (AV:L), high attack complexity (AC:H), no privileges required (PR:N), and no user interaction (UI:N). The impact on confidentiality and integrity is high, while availability impact is low. No known exploits are currently reported in the wild, and no patches have been published yet. The vulnerability is particularly relevant to industrial control systems and critical infrastructure environments where EG4 12kPV inverters are deployed, as attackers could leverage this weakness to interfere with power generation and distribution processes.

For European organizations, especially those involved in renewable energy generation and industrial power management, this vulnerability poses a significant risk. EG4 12kPV inverters are likely used in solar power installations and other distributed energy resources. An attacker exploiting this vulnerability could intercept and manipulate inverter commands, leading to unauthorized changes in power output, potential damage to equipment, or disruption of energy supply. This could affect grid stability, cause financial losses due to downtime or equipment damage, and undermine trust in energy infrastructure security. Confidentiality breaches could expose operational data, which might be leveraged for further attacks or industrial espionage. The integrity compromise could allow attackers to cause unsafe operating conditions or trigger false alarms, complicating incident response. Although availability impact is rated low, the operational disruptions caused by misconfiguration or forced resets could indirectly affect availability of power services. Given the increasing integration of renewable energy sources in Europe’s energy mix and the strategic importance of energy infrastructure, this vulnerability could have cascading effects on critical infrastructure resilience and energy security.

To mitigate this vulnerability, European organizations should implement network segmentation to isolate inverter communication traffic from general IT networks, limiting local network access to trusted personnel and systems only. Deploying strong access controls and monitoring on the local network can help detect unauthorized scanning or command injection attempts. Until a vendor patch or firmware update is available, organizations should consider using VPN tunnels or encrypted communication proxies to encapsulate MOD3 command traffic, thereby adding encryption and integrity protection externally. Regularly auditing inverter configurations and monitoring telemetry for anomalies can help identify potential exploitation attempts. Organizations should engage with EG4 Electronics to obtain firmware updates or security advisories and prioritize patching once available. Additionally, implementing strict physical security controls to prevent unauthorized local network access is critical. Training operational technology (OT) staff on this vulnerability and encouraging prompt incident reporting will enhance detection and response capabilities.