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CVE-2025-53627VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2025-53627: meshtastic firmware · Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input

Affects meshtastic firmwareSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium · fixed in 2.7.15 : update meshtastic firmware when convenient.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 06:26 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.3Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 9% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 2.7.15
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 29 Dec 2025

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-26.

What to do

AI-suggested

The primary mitigation is to upgrade all Meshtastic firmware instances to version 2.7.15 or later, where the vulnerability is fixed. Organizations should audit their device inventories to identify affected versions and enforce firmware updates promptly. Additionally, developers of Meshtastic-based applications should implement explicit indicators to inform users whether a direct message was decrypted using PKI or legacy encryption, enhancing user awareness and trust. Network administrators should restrict access to shared channel keys and monitor for anomalous message injection attempts. Employing network segmentation and access controls can limit the exposure of the shared keys. For deployments where upgrading is temporarily not feasible, organizations should consider disabling legacy encryption fallback if configurable or isolate vulnerable devices from critical networks. Finally, integrating cryptographic validation and message authentication at the application layer can provide an additional security layer against spoofing.

Description

Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. The Meshtastic firmware (starting from version 2.5) introduces asymmetric encryption (PKI) for direct messages, but when the `pki_encrypted` flag is missing, the firmware silently falls back to legacy AES-256-CTR channel encryption. This was an intentional decision to maintain backwards compatibility. However, the end-user applications, like Web app, iOS/Android app, and applications built on top of Meshtastic using the SDK, did not have a way to differentiate between end-to-end encrypted DMs and the legacy DMs. This creates a downgrade attack path where adversaries who know a shared channel key can craft and inject spoofed direct messages that are displayed as if they were PKC encrypted. Users are not given any feedback of whether a direct message was decrypted with PKI or with legacy symmetric encryption, undermining the expected security guarantees of the PKI rollout. Version 2.7.15 fixes this issue.

References

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