CVE-2025-55081: Eclipse Foundation NetX Duo · Buffer Over-read
Affects Eclipse Foundation NetX DuoSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 08:30 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 30% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 15 Oct 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Eclipse Foundation NetX Duo | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
To mitigate CVE-2025-55081, European organizations should prioritize upgrading all affected NetX Duo instances to version 6.4.4 or later once the patch is released by the Eclipse Foundation. Until patches are available, organizations should implement network-level defenses such as deep packet inspection to detect and block malformed TLS client hello messages with anomalous length fields. Employing strict input validation and anomaly detection on TLS traffic can reduce exposure. For embedded devices where immediate patching is challenging, consider isolating vulnerable devices within segmented network zones with restricted inbound access. Device manufacturers should review and harden TLS handshake processing code to enforce strict length checks and bounds validation. Additionally, organizations should monitor threat intelligence feeds for any emerging exploit attempts targeting this vulnerability. Conducting security assessments and penetration tests focusing on TLS implementations in embedded systems can help identify and remediate potential attack vectors. Finally, maintain an inventory of all devices using NetX Duo to ensure comprehensive coverage during patch deployment.
Description
In Eclipse Foundation NextX Duo before 6.4.4, a module of ThreadX, the _nx_secure_tls_process_clienthello() function was missing length verification of certain SSL/TLS client hello message: the ciphersuite length and compression method length. In case of an attacker-crafted message with values outside of the expected range, it could cause an out-of-bound read.