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CVE-2025-59693VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2025-59693: n/a

Source CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.8 Critical · fixed in 13.6.12 : patch affected systems as a priority.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 06:26 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.8Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.9% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 59% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 13.6.12
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 2 Dec 2025

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-26.

What to do

AI-suggested

1. Enforce strict physical security measures around Entrust nShield HSM devices, including controlled access to server rooms and hardware, surveillance, and tamper detection monitoring. 2. Regularly inspect HSM devices for signs of tampering or unauthorized access, and maintain detailed logs of physical access events. 3. 4. Implement layered security controls such as network segmentation and strict access controls to limit exposure of HSMs to only essential personnel and systems. 5. Consider deploying additional tamper-evident or tamper-resistant enclosures or alarms to detect chassis openings. 6. Conduct security awareness training for staff on the importance of physical security for cryptographic hardware. 7. Develop incident response plans specifically addressing physical compromise scenarios involving HSMs. 8. Evaluate alternative cryptographic hardware solutions with stronger physical security guarantees if remediation is delayed or infeasible.

Description

The Chassis Management Board in Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11, or 13.7 (patched in 13.6.12 (LTS) and 13.9.0 (STS)), allows a physically proximate attacker to obtain debug access and escalate privileges by bypassing the tamper label and opening the chassis without leaving evidence, and accessing the JTAG connector. This is called F02.

References

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