CVE-2025-5994: NLnet Labs Unbound · Acceptance of Extraneous Untrusted Data With Trusted Data
Affects NLnet Labs UnboundSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.7 High.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 06:26 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 12% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/R:U/V:CExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 16 Jul 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-26.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| NLnet Labs Unbound | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
European organizations should immediately audit their Unbound deployments to identify if ECS support is enabled and configured to send ECS data upstream. If ECS is not essential, disabling ECS support by recompiling Unbound without the '--enable-subnet' option or disabling ECS forwarding options ('send-client-subnet', 'client-subnet-zone', 'client-subnet-always-forward') can mitigate the risk. For environments requiring ECS, organizations should monitor NLnet Labs advisories for patches addressing this vulnerability and apply updates promptly once available. In the interim, implementing DNSSEC validation can help detect and reject forged DNS responses, reducing the impact of cache poisoning. Network-level protections such as rate limiting DNS responses, deploying DNS over TLS (DoT) or DNS over HTTPS (DoH) to secure DNS traffic, and monitoring DNS query patterns for anomalies can further reduce attack surface. Additionally, segregating ECS queries by subnet more robustly, if configurable, may mitigate the birthday paradox exploitation. Organizations should also consider deploying alternative resolvers with proven mitigations against ECS-related cache poisoning until patches are released.
Description
A multi-vendor cache poisoning vulnerability named 'Rebirthday Attack' has been discovered in caching resolvers that support EDNS Client Subnet (ECS). Unbound is also vulnerable when compiled with ECS support, i.e., '--enable-subnet', AND configured to send ECS information along with queries to upstream name servers, i.e., at least one of the 'send-client-subnet', 'client-subnet-zone' or 'client-subnet-always-forward' options is used. Resolvers supporting ECS need to segregate outgoing queries to accommodate for different outgoing ECS information. This re-opens up resolvers to a birthday paradox attack (Rebirthday Attack) that tries to match the DNS transaction ID in order to cache non-ECS poisonous replies.