CVE-2025-65564 identifies a denial-of-service vulnerability in the open-source omec-upf component, specifically in the upf-epc-pfcpiface module version 2.1.3-dev. The User Plane Function (UPF) is a critical element in 5G core networks responsible for handling user data traffic. The vulnerability occurs when the UPF receives a PFCP (Packet Forwarding Control Protocol) Association Setup Request message that lacks the mandatory Recovery Time Stamp Information Element (IE). Instead of validating the presence of this IE, the association setup handler attempts to access the RecoveryTimeStamp() method on a nil pointer, causing a runtime panic and crashing the UPF process. This crash results in a denial-of-service condition, disrupting user-plane services and potentially causing outages for subscribers relying on the affected UPF. An attacker with network access to the UPF's N4 interface (PFCP endpoint) can exploit this by sending crafted PFCP messages to repeatedly trigger the crash. The vulnerability does not require authentication beyond network access to the PFCP interface but does require the ability to send PFCP messages, which may be restricted in some deployments. No patches or fixes are currently linked, and no known exploits have been reported in the wild. The lack of input validation for mandatory protocol elements highlights a software robustness issue in the omec-upf implementation. This vulnerability primarily impacts the availability of 5G user-plane services, which are critical for mobile broadband and IoT connectivity. Given the role of UPF in 5G networks, successful exploitation could degrade network performance or cause service interruptions for end users. The vulnerability underscores the importance of rigorous protocol compliance and input validation in telecom network functions.

The primary impact of CVE-2025-65564 is on the availability of 5G user-plane services managed by the affected UPF component. Repeated exploitation can cause persistent crashes of the UPF process, leading to denial-of-service conditions that interrupt data forwarding for mobile subscribers. For European organizations, especially telecom operators and service providers deploying omec-upf in their 5G core networks, this could result in degraded network performance, customer service outages, and potential revenue loss. Disruptions in user-plane traffic can affect critical services relying on 5G connectivity, including emergency communications, industrial IoT, and enterprise applications. Additionally, repeated crashes may increase operational costs due to incident response and recovery efforts. The vulnerability could also undermine trust in open-source 5G components if not addressed promptly. Although exploitation requires access to the PFCP interface, insider threats or compromised network segments could facilitate attacks. The lack of known exploits in the wild suggests limited current risk, but the potential impact on network availability warrants urgent mitigation. European regulators and operators focused on network resilience and service continuity should prioritize addressing this vulnerability to maintain compliance with service-level agreements and regulatory requirements.

To mitigate CVE-2025-65564, European organizations should first verify if their 5G core network deployments use the omec-upf component, specifically version 2.1.3-dev or similar vulnerable releases. Immediate steps include: 1) Implement strict input validation on the PFCP Association Setup Request messages to ensure mandatory Information Elements like the Recovery Time Stamp are present before processing. 2) Apply any available patches or updates from the omec-upf maintainers addressing this vulnerability as soon as they are released. 3) Restrict network access to the UPF's N4/PFCP interface by enforcing network segmentation, firewall rules, and access control lists to limit exposure to trusted management and control entities only. 4) Monitor PFCP traffic for anomalous or malformed messages indicative of exploitation attempts. 5) Employ redundancy and failover mechanisms in UPF deployments to maintain service continuity in case of process crashes. 6) Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing focused on protocol handling robustness in telecom network functions. 7) Collaborate with vendors and open-source communities to track vulnerability disclosures and remediation progress. These targeted measures go beyond generic advice by focusing on protocol-level validation, network access controls specific to PFCP, and operational resilience strategies tailored to telecom infrastructure.