CVE-2025-8406: zenml-io/zenml · Path Traversal
Affects zenml-io/zenmlSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.3 Medium.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 30% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 5 Oct 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| zenml-io zenml-io/zenml | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
To mitigate CVE-2025-8406, European organizations should implement the following specific measures: 1) Restrict access to ZenML environments to trusted users with minimal necessary privileges to reduce the risk of malicious archive uploads or local exploitation. 2) Implement additional validation checks on archive contents beyond is_path_within_directory, including resolving and verifying symbolic and hard links before extraction. 3) Use sandboxed or containerized environments for archive extraction to limit filesystem exposure and prevent writes outside designated directories. 4) Monitor filesystem changes and audit logs for unexpected file modifications, particularly in critical directories. 5) Educate users about the risks of processing untrusted archives and enforce strict controls on data sources. 6) Engage with the ZenML community or vendor for patches or updates addressing this vulnerability and apply them promptly once available. 7) Consider employing application-level whitelisting or integrity verification mechanisms to detect unauthorized file changes. These steps go beyond generic advice by focusing on the specific failure mode of symbolic/hard link handling and the operational context of ZenML deployments.
Description
ZenML version 0.83.1 is affected by a path traversal vulnerability in the `PathMaterializer` class. The `load` function uses `is_path_within_directory` to validate files during `data.tar.gz` extraction, which fails to effectively detect symbolic and hard links. This vulnerability can lead to arbitrary file writes, potentially resulting in arbitrary command execution if critical files are overwritten.