CVE-2026-0714: Moxa UC-1200A Series · Cleartext Transmission
Affects Moxa UC-1200A SeriesSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.0 High.
Data as of 25 Oct 2026, 19:02 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 3% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 5 Feb 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 2026-10-25.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| MoxaUC-1200A Series | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
European organizations should implement stringent physical security controls around Moxa UC-1200A devices, including tamper-evident seals, locked enclosures, and restricted access to areas housing these devices. Regular physical inspections should be conducted to detect signs of tampering. Network segmentation and monitoring should be employed to detect anomalous device behavior that could indicate compromise. Until a firmware or hardware patch is available, consider deploying additional encryption layers or using devices with TPM modules connected via more secure interfaces that resist physical probing. Where feasible, replace affected devices with models that have improved TPM bus protections or alternative encryption architectures. Educate personnel on the risks of insider threats and enforce strict access control policies. Maintain an inventory of affected devices and track any physical access events. Collaborate with Moxa for updates and apply any future patches promptly. For critical environments, consider hardware security modules (HSMs) or external encryption devices that do not expose sensitive signals on accessible buses.
Description
A physical attack vulnerability exists in certain Moxa industrial computers using TPM-backed LUKS full-disk encryption on Moxa Industrial Linux 3, where the discrete TPM is connected to the CPU via an SPI bus. Exploitation requires invasive physical access, including opening the device and attaching external equipment to the SPI bus to capture TPM communications. If successful, the captured data may allow offline decryption of eMMC contents. This attack cannot be performed through brief or opportunistic physical access and requires extended physical access, possession of the device, appropriate equipment, and sufficient time for signal capture and analysis. Remote exploitation is not possible.