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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-104850: modelcontextprotocol typescript-sdk · Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Affects modelcontextprotocol typescript-sdkSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 2.2.0 or 1.31.0 soon.

Data as of 20 Nov 2026, 17:34 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.5High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 21% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 2.2.0, 1.31.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 6 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: evidence found.

    Public exploit code: GitHub proofs of concept

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), GitHub proofs of concept, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 20 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade typescript-sdk to 2.2.0 or 1.31.0; @modelcontextprotocol/client to 2.2.0.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
modelcontextprotocoltypescript-sdkAffected
  • >=2.0.0 <2.2.0
Fixed in
  • 2.2.0
modelcontextprotocoltypescript-sdkAffected
  • >=1.12.0 <1.31.0
Fixed in
  • 1.31.0
npm@modelcontextprotocol/sdkpkg:npm/@modelcontextprotocol/sdkOther threatsAffected
  • =31.0.0
Fixed in–
npm@modelcontextprotocol/clientpkg:npm/@modelcontextprotocol/clientOther threatsAffected
  • >=2.0.0 <2.2.0
Fixed in
  • 2.2.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

A fix is available in @modelcontextprotocol/sdk version 1.31.0 and @modelcontextprotocol/client version 2.2.0. Users should upgrade to these versions to remediate the vulnerability. For those unable to upgrade, versions 2.0.0 and 2.1.0 support an expectedIssuer parameter that can be used as a workaround. For 1.x versions, the only effective mitigation is to connect OAuth-enabled clients only to MCP servers that are fully trusted. No other vendor advisories indicate additional mitigations.

Description

### Summary In affected versions, the SDK's OAuth client let the MCP server decide which authorization server received the client's OAuth credentials. Credentials were not tied to the authorization server they belong to. A malicious or compromised MCP server could name its own authorization server. With no user interaction, the client would send it: - the `refresh_token` and `client_secret` stored from an earlier sign-in - the `client_secret` or signed assertion configured on a bundled provider ### Am I affected? Yes, if both of these hold: - your application uses the SDK's OAuth client over HTTP, through any of: - an `authProvider` on a transport - the `withOAuth()` middleware - direct calls to `auth()` or `fetchToken()` - it may connect to an MCP server you do not fully trust while holding credentials for a legitimate authorization server Affected versions: - `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.12.0 through 1.30.1 - `@modelcontextprotocol/client` 2.0.0 through 2.1.0, only for: - bundled providers without `expectedIssuer` - credentials stored or supplied without `issuer` - direct calls to `fetchToken()` - providers that read storage back through `OAuthTokensSchema` or `OAuthClientInformationSchema` Not affected: - MCP servers built with the SDK - stdio clients ### Fix Upgrade to: - 1.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.31.0 or later - 2.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/client` 2.2.0 or later, and `@modelcontextprotocol/core` 2.2.0 or later if you import it directly The client now records the authorization server as `issuer` on saved credentials and does not send them to a different one. The user signs in again, or the call throws. In the following cases, upgrading to the patched version is not enough. You also need to make a change: - **Bundled providers** (`ClientCredentialsProvider`, `PrivateKeyJwtProvider`, `StaticPrivateKeyJwtProvider`, `CrossAppAccessProvider`): pass `expectedIssuer`, for example `expectedIssuer: 'https://auth.example.com'`. Without it they still use whichever authorization server the MCP server names. - **Credentials saved without `issuer`:** tokens and client information your `OAuthClientProvider` persisted (file, keychain, database) before upgrading, including everything 1.x saved before 1.31.0. They still go to whichever authorization server is named at first use. Add `issuer` to them, or clear them so users sign in again. - **Your own `OAuthClientProvider`:** save exactly what `saveTokens()` and `saveClientInformation()` are given, including `issuer`. For pre-registered credentials, include `issuer` in what `clientInformation()` returns. Not covered by this fix: - a new interactive sign-in, which still goes to the authorization server the MCP server names. Only complete sign-ins for servers you trust. - `refreshAuthorization()` and `exchangeAuthorization()` called directly - 2.x with `skipIssuerMetadataValidation: true` If an affected client may have connected to an untrusted MCP server, rotate its client secret or signing key and revoke its tokens. If you cannot upgrade yet, connect OAuth clients only to MCP servers you trust. 2.0.0 and 2.1.0 already accept `expectedIssuer`.

References

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