Certain versions of the MCP TypeScript SDK and related packages do not limit HTTP POST request body size or JSON-RPC batch length. This allows an attacker to send very large requests or long batches, potentially exhausting server memory and causing denial of service. No authentication is required unless implemented outside the SDK. Fixed versions impose limits on request size and batch length.
A vulnerability in the MCP TypeScript SDK and server allows a single HTTP request within the default 4 MiB size limit to exhaust server memory during validation by sending excessive array elements or object keys. This causes the server process to abort with a 'JavaScript heap out of memory' error. No authentication is required unless the server enforces it before the SDK processes requests. The issue affects versions 1.3.0 through 1.31.0 of @modelcontextprotocol/sdk and 2.0.0 through 2.2.0 of @modelcontextprotocol/server. Fixed versions are 1.32.0+ for the SDK and 2.3.0+ for the server, which introduce a new option to limit input elements and recommend lowering request size limits.
The MCP TypeScript SDK versions prior to specified patched releases accept bearer tokens issued for other services due to lack of audience (aud) validation in server-side authentication. This allows tokens valid for one service to be accepted by another MCP server using the SDK, if the authorization server issues tokens for multiple services. The issue affects multiple MCP SDK and server packages in versions before 1.32.0, 2.3.0, 2.0.2, and 2.3.1 respectively. A fix is available that adds an optional expectedResource setting to enforce audience validation, which must be enabled explicitly. Without enabling this setting or applying a custom audience check, the vulnerability remains exploitable.
### Summary
In affected versions, the SDK's OAuth client let the MCP server decide which authorization server received the client's OAuth credentials. Credentials were not tied to the authorization server they belong to.
A malicious or compromised MCP server could name its own authorization server. With no user interaction, the client would send it:
- the `refresh_token` and `client_secret` stored from an earlier sign-in
- the `client_secret` or signed assertion configured on a bundled provider
### Am I affected?
Yes, if both of these hold:
- your application uses the SDK's OAuth client over HTTP, through any of:
- an `authProvider` on a transport
- the `withOAuth()` middleware
- direct calls to `auth()` or `fetchToken()`
- it may connect to an MCP server you do not fully trust while holding credentials for a legitimate authorization server
Affected versions:
- `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.12.0 through 1.30.1
- `@modelcontextprotocol/client` 2.0.0 through 2.1.0, only for:
- bundled providers without `expectedIssuer`
- credentials stored or supplied without `issuer`
- direct calls to `fetchToken()`
- providers that read storage back through `OAuthTokensSchema` or `OAuthClientInformationSchema`
Not affected:
- MCP servers built with the SDK
- stdio clients
### Fix
Upgrade to:
- 1.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/sdk` 1.31.0 or later
- 2.x: `@modelcontextprotocol/client` 2.2.0 or later, and `@modelcontextprotocol/core` 2.2.0 or later if you import it directly
The client now records the authorization server as `issuer` on saved credentials and does not send them to a different one. The user signs in again, or the call throws.
In the following cases, upgrading to the patched version is not enough. You also need to make a change:
- **Bundled providers** (`ClientCredentialsProvider`, `PrivateKeyJwtProvider`, `StaticPrivateKeyJwtProvider`, `CrossAppAccessProvider`): pass `expectedIssuer`, for example `expectedIssuer: 'https://auth.example.com'`. Without it they still use whichever authorization server the MCP server names.
- **Credentials saved without `issuer`:** tokens and client information your `OAuthClientProvider` persisted (file, keychain, database) before upgrading, including everything 1.x saved before 1.31.0. They still go to whichever authorization server is named at first use. Add `issuer` to them, or clear them so users sign in again.
- **Your own `OAuthClientProvider`:** save exactly what `saveTokens()` and `saveClientInformation()` are given, including `issuer`. For pre-registered credentials, include `issuer` in what `clientInformation()` returns.
Not covered by this fix:
- a new interactive sign-in, which still goes to the authorization server the MCP server names. Only complete sign-ins for servers you trust.
- `refreshAuthorization()` and `exchangeAuthorization()` called directly
- 2.x with `skipIssuerMetadataValidation: true`
If an affected client may have connected to an untrusted MCP server, rotate its client secret or signing key and revoke its tokens.
If you cannot upgrade yet, connect OAuth clients only to MCP servers you trust. 2.0.0 and 2.1.0 already accept `expectedIssuer`.